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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States Gulf Coast is a region with a long-standing history of 
hurricanes. As such, the residents of this region have a wide variety of experiences in 
dealing with the threats and actualities of hurricanes. Although the region has 
experienced numerous storms in its history, this discussion focuses on Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita (2005) and Hurricane Ike (2008).  
Central to this discussion is the idea that safety is a concern important to all 
people involved before a hurricane but that the expressions of this concern can vary both 
on an institutional and individual level. In this way, this thesis looks at preparation both 
from a media perspective (as media presents a construction of preparation based upon 
using official sources) and from the residents’ perspectives. News articles from the New 
Orleans Times-Picayune and the Houston Chronicle are drawn from the days leading up 
to hurricane landfall—the period when preparation messaging is prominent in the media. 
Content analysis of these articles (influenced by Zhang and Fleming 2005 and Choi and 
Lin 2008) develops a sense of the media narrative of preparation. In juxtaposition, this 
thesis also examines residents’ approaches of hurricane preparation through analysis of 
personal experience narratives. Through fieldwork interviews and archival research, this 
thesis analyzes narratives from the Greater New Orleans and Houston areas. The analysis 
of the media narratives and the personal narratives underscore that preparation is a 
complex issue. Using the concepts of master narrative (e.g., Lyotard 1979, Lawless 2001 
and 2003) and narrative entitlement (e.g., Shuman 2005 and 2006), this thesis proposes 
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that there are areas of resistance and cooperation between the two kinds of narratives. 
The media narrative, which is often constructed using the perspectives of “officials” 
(government, meteorologists, etc.), creates an “authoritative” messaging of how residents 
should prepare, but the residents’ themselves, with experiences of their own to draw from 
and their own perspectives on the appropriate responses to storm threats, may respond in 
ways that do not align with the official recommendation. As part of this interplay 
between official and lay narratives, the discussion proposes the idea that the “narrative of 
pre-victimization” may be at play in some official communications. This narrative places 
residents within a narrative space in which they may be doomed to fall prey to a 
hurricane if they do not follow official recommendations. 
This thesis adds to the disaster folklore literature by extending research on 
hurricanes by considering multiple storms in its scope. It contributes to the discussion of 
interactions between media and personal narrative. This discussion also opens up the 
discussion of hurricane stories to include preparation as a useful area of narrative study. 
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Prologue 
 
On September 21, 2005, I found myself preparing to evacuate my apartment in 
Houston, Texas to travel to my parents’ home in a suburb northwest of the city. At that 
time, many Houston residents were leaving the city in the before the predicted landfall of 
Hurricane Rita. I knew that my apartment was near White Oak Bayou, a part of the city 
that was prone to flooding, and I knew from Tropical Storm Allison in 2001 that parts of 
the area surrounding my apartment had flooded badly in the past. I attempted to take as 
much as I could off of the floor in case of flooding, and I brought loose items from my 
porch into my home in case high winds came. I had news on in the background as I went 
about my preparations. Before packing some possessions in my car, including one 
bewildered cat, I took a few pictures around my apartment to document its contents. This 
image was one of them: 
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Figure 1. My apartment before evacuating for Hurricane Rita. 
 
In this picture is captured my actions to prepare for the storm, specifically trying to get 
items off of the floor, alongside information from the news media coming into my home. 
At this time, I could not know for sure whether the actions I was taking would ensure the 
preservation of my property after Rita passed. Simultaneously, having never experienced 
storm destruction myself (even my previous apartment in the area had not been damaged 
by Allison), I had trouble imagining what might happen with Rita. My parents’ home had 
not flooded in hurricanes past, however, so my plan to go there seemed to be my best bet. 
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I packed up and began the traffic-riddled drive to my parents’ home and remained there 
until after Rita passed. 
As a former resident of the Gulf Coast, specifically the Greater Houston area, for 
thirty years, the issue of hurricane preparation is one in which I have had firsthand 
experience. At the same time, I have been fortunate not to have experienced some of the 
aftermath of storms that other residents have. Years later, coming to issues of hurricane 
preparation as a researcher, I inhabit a blended positioning to the subject, having both in-
group and out-group status (Modan and Shuman 2011). That positioning led me to value 
the importance of preparation as both a subject of academic analysis as a folklorist but 
also as a necessary act for residents of my home region. It is from this positioning that I 
come to the discussion that follows in this thesis. 
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Chapter One: 
Theory and Methodology 
 
Defining Disaster 
 
  As anthropologists Susanna M. Hoffman and Anthony Oliver-Smith comment, 
“the anthropological investigation of disaster has evolved to incorporate questions of the 
definition and ownership of disaster, or the ‘framing’ of calamity” (1999, 9). Who has the 
right to claim entitlement to a disaster and how are these rights intensified, nullified, or 
challenged by the claims of others? Whose disaster story has cultural weight, and whose 
does not? Anthropologist Howard Stein further speaks to these issues when he states that 
“certain categories of people are publicly recognized, acknowledged; certain other 
categories of people are publicly unacknowledged, overlooked, ignored…In disasters, 
who gets left out, and what becomes of them?” (2002, 157).  An individual’s disaster 
narrative exists at the intersection of the individual’s construction of experience and the 
cultural expectations and social construction of disaster, and not all of these intersections 
occur in the public view. Combined with the variety of individuals who can qualify as 
disaster victims, such as the four categories proposed by anthropologist Stephen W. 
Dudasik (1980) that include people both at and away from the disaster scene, the 
complexity of these issues of the ownership of experience grows exponentially. This 
broad array of disaster experiences means that individuals can experience disaster 
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without undergoing a publicly seen disaster outcome, and, from a research standpoint, the 
number of people with insights into disaster can be seen as increased, as well. 
 In the social sciences, the interest in disasters is one that originated in the 1920s, 
although as anthropologist Anthony Oliver-Smith notes, there has been “little consensus” 
on how to define disaster throughout the history of the research (1999, 18). In part, this 
lack of consensus stems from the variety and complexity of the events that can fall under 
the umbrella of disaster. As sociologist G. A. Kreps comments, “Disaster is a vague term 
that has defied simple interpretation” (1984, 311). Kreps proposes the following 
definition: 
 
Thus, disasters are: events, observable in time and space, in which societies or 
their larger subunits (e.g. communities, regions) incur physical damages and 
losses and/or disruption of their routine functioning. Both the causes and 
consequences of these events are related to the social structures and processes of 
societies or their subunits. (1984, 312, emphasis in original)  
 
From this definition, we can take away that disasters (1) are bounded in a particular time 
and place, (2) have some form of physical or functional impact on people, and (3) are 
situated within the social structure of people, be it within a large group, such as a nation, 
or a smaller group, such as a family. In this way, disasters are both physical and cultural 
events, yet simply considering these characteristics allows a wide array of events to 
match the definition. Oliver-Smith proposes an anthropological definition that echoes 
many of the dimensions set forth by Kreps: 
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... disasters are best conceptualized in terms of the web of relations that link 
society (the organization and relations among individuals and groups), 
environment (the network of linkages with the physical world in which people 
and groups are both constituted and constituting), and culture (the values, norms, 
beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge that pertain to that organization and those 
relations). (1999, 28) 
 
 
In Oliver-Smith’s definition, we see an interpretation of disasters that includes many of 
the same elements as Kreps’s definition, but the emphasis on the relationships between 
the elements of the definition has shifted from disaster as more of a bounded event 
(Kreps’s first element of “observable in time and space”) to the interplay between the 
players involved (as Oliver-Smith’s definition leaves out time and space altogether). 
Consistent in both of these definitions is the importance of cultural or societal impact and 
response to identifying something as a disaster, whether that disaster is a “natural1” one, a 
technological one, or something that blends the two. Also, if we consider these two 
definitions at once, we can think of disaster as both temporally and physically located and 
as occurring over time.  
 This concept becomes useful as we look at the subject matter of this project, 
hurricanes affecting the Gulf Coast region, because we can look at both the specific 
“event” of an individual hurricane and we can look at the interplay of multiple hurricanes 
over time, the way these bounded events blur over time within the perspectives of 
society, communities, and individuals. Oliver-Smith points toward this blurring when he 
                                                          
1. Oliver-Smith posits that there is no such thing as a natural disaster: “…disasters occur in societies. 
They do not occur in nature… Disasters can result from the interaction of social, material, and natural 
systems, producing a failure of human culture to protect” (1999, 28). 
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notes, “the life-history of a disaster begins prior to the appearance of a specific event-
focused agent” (1999, 30). As I discuss in Chapter Two, an overview of some of the 
hurricanes in the recent past of the Gulf Coast, we can see how these events do not fully 
exist in isolation. Instead, they are frequent enough to remain in the minds of residents 
and impact decisions made beyond the “event” of the storm, creating overlapping 
experiences of hurricane response. 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
 This thesis will follow the following structure in order to discuss issues of 
preparation in relation to hurricanes on the United States Gulf Coast. 
 
Chapter One 
Theory and Methodology 
 Chapter One provides an overview of scholarship in disaster folklore, with a focus 
on work on hurricanes, and in personal experience narrative. By discussing the work in 
both of these areas, I identify gaps in the literature that are addressed by this project, 
including the consideration of multiple storms and the focus on preparation. 
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Chapter Two 
Hurricanes and the Texas-Louisiana Coast 
 Chapter Two provides a description of hurricanes as weather systems, defining 
terminology often used in both weather prediction and communication by officials and in 
the narratives of residents. This chapter also describes the geographic area of the Texas-
Louisiana Gulf Coast with a focus on the greater Houston and New Orleans areas and the 
regions’ histories of hurricanes during the twentieth century. This brief history provides 
support to the claim that hurricanes are a frequent threat to communities in this region in 
the United States. 
 
Chapter Three 
Media Narratives of Preparation 
 Analyzing news stories as a form of narrative, Chapter Three considers a selection 
of articles to examine how they construct concepts of preparation. This chapter includes a 
content and structural analysis of eighty-one articles to reveal patterns in the information 
shared in these texts. The discussion takes patterns uncovered in the analysis to look at 
how newspaper articles disseminate “official” information and recommendations about 
storm preparation—both by utilizing government officials’ and weather experts’ voices 
and by positioning themselves as an official source. Another significant part of this 
discussion is an examination of how these articles characterize residents in the 
preparation process, especially in contrast to official recommendations. 
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Chapter Four 
Lay Discussions of Preparation 
 Chapter Four begins by recognizing preparation stories as a subtype of hurricane 
narrative, which creates space for considering these stories on their own. By examining 
interviews collected during independent fieldwork and archival research, this chapter 
explores ways that residents make preparation decisions from the perspective that the 
narrative of preparation is a subtype of hurricane narrative. Specifically, it describes 
various influences that inform these decisions and the ways that residents prepare 
resources. Concern over the protection of resources and the evaluation of one’s own 
preparation approaches is also addressed. This chapter also discusses the tensions and 
agreements between the official and lay constructions of hurricane preparation using 
concepts of master narrative and entitlement. Using the concept of master narrative, the 
discussion puts forth the concept of the “narrative of pre-victimization” as a possible 
master narrative at play in some hurricane narrative in the media. In this sense, 
“victimization” is the idea of suffering significant damage from a hurricane, and this 
master narrative utilizes the idea that residents may already be doomed by the dangers of 
a hurricane unless they conform to official recommendations. 
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Chapter Five 
Challenges to Public Safety and the Value of Narrative 
 Chapter Five extends the discussion to looking at using narrative as a tool for 
bridging lay and official perspectives of preparation. Also, it summarizes the research 
presented in the thesis as a whole and discusses the implications of the research findings 
on future studies of narrative and disaster preparation. 
 
 
Disaster Folklore 
 
 The links between folklore research and disasters have existed throughout many 
decades in the discipline. The topic of “disaster folklore” is prevalent enough to warrant 
an entry in American Folklore: An Encyclopedia, with the definition “[Disaster lore is 
the] lore created in response to natural or human-made disaster. Events… [that] can 
permanently alter cultural landmarks and the natural landscape, rupturing the common 
body of knowledge crucial for everyday patterns of communication and living” 
(Matthews-DeNatale and DeNatale 1996, 202). This definition echoes the definitions of 
disaster put forth earlier (though it seems to privilege the temporally bounded event over 
the overlapping one), and it places the disciplinary focus on the cultural response to the 
event. In the sense of this definition, the lore is an adaptive response to the disaster. As 
such, the folklore that emerges from human experiences of disaster cuts across both 
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various folklore genres and the many varieties of disaster. What is interesting about Gail 
Matthews-DeNatale and Doug DeNatale’s definition, though, is the key use of the word 
“can” in the discussion: Disaster lore stems from an event that can alter landmarks and 
landscape. The potential is key here, as it opens up the possibility of the creation of 
disaster folklore as a response to an event that threatens—that has the potential to cause 
harm—but does not ultimately alter the environment. In the discussion of hurricanes, this 
small detail has merit, as it allows us to acknowledge that the threat of storms can have 
folkloric weight. 
 Within the discipline, research in the last seventy-five years has examined disaster 
folklore across a variety of genres, including examples from ballads (Hudson 1947), 
folksong (Kononenko 1992), jokes and humor (Doyle 1976, Smyth 1986, Simons 1986, 
Oring 1987, Dundes 1987, Morrow 1987, Failkova 2001, Ellis 2001 and 2002, Kuipers 
2005, Blank 2011), folk belief (Andersen 1974, Doyle 1976, Howell and Lott 1980, 
O’Leary 1997, Goldstein 2009), and material culture (Estes and Shaw 1985, Hagen et al. 
1999, Edwards 2010). Narrative has also been a fruitful genre for disaster folklore 
research (Andersen 1974, Doyle 1976, Bendix 1990, Frank 2003 and 2011, Milspaw 
2007, Sloan 2008, Goldstein 2009). As with much folklore research, however, 
discussions often cross generic lines and illustrate how experiences of disaster occasion 
various forms of expression, such as how Charles Clay Doyle’s piece in Western Folklore 
about the Los Angeles earthquake in 1971 touches upon jokes and belief tales (legend) 
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and Diane Goldstein’s (2009) article about the September 11 attacks in the United States 
discusses issues of belief and narrative.  
 As the above definition of disaster folklore and the previous discussion of 
definitions of disaster would lead us to expect, the types of events that can produce 
disaster folklore also vary widely. On one end of the spectrum, research can range from 
focusing on natural disaster—including earthquakes (Hudson 1947, Andersen 1974, 
Doyle 1976, Howell and Lott 1980, Bendix 1990, Gaudet 1993, O’Leary 1997, Frank 
2003), volcanoes (Estes and Shaw 1985), and hurricanes (Matthews 1993, Frank 2011, 
and the examples in the next section)—to man-made disasters on the other end, with 
notable examples stemming from the Challenger explosion of 1986 (Smyth 1986, Simons 
1986, Oring 1987) and the September 11 attacks (Ellis 2001 and 2002, Goldstein 2009, 
Frank 2011). The concept of a spectrum is important here because the categories of 
“natural” and “man-made” are not absolute, and there can be overlaps within individuals’ 
experiences.  
 
 
Disaster Folklore and Hurricanes 
 
 Most of the folklore-based research on hurricanes has focused on Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005. Granted, this focus on Hurricane Katrina is not just within folklore, but 
within other disciplines, as well. Considering the three hurricanes central to this thesis—
13 
all along the Gulf Coast—Hurricane Katrina is, by far, the most discussed in publications. 
A quick look at the websites Amazon and Google Scholar offer the following results: 
 
Table 1. Number of results from website queries from June 12, 2012 
Hurricane Name Searched Amazon (search limited to 
books) 
Google Scholar 
“Hurricane Katrina” 3133 About 57600 
“Hurricane Rita” 103 About 4550 
“Hurricane Ike” 76 About 2360 
Sources: Searches from Amazon (www.amazon.com) and Google Scholar 
(scholar.google.com) websites. 
 
In noting these results, it is important to remember that these numbers do not represent 
absolute numbers of publications on each storm, but, rather, the number of items 
associated with keywords related to these storms. As such, there may be duplication 
within the results (for example, a book existing in multiple print formats), or items may 
make reference to more than one storm (for example, Hurricane Katrina may be 
discussed in a text on Hurricane Rita). What is very noticeable is the dramatic difference 
between the results from the Hurricane Katrina search and the searches for the other two 
storms. It is difficult to deny that Hurricane Katrina has had an impact in research and 
other publications. 
 Within folkloristics, Katrina has been the focus of several notable publications. 
Before 2005 and before Katrina, published work tended not to focus on hurricanes at all, 
with a few exceptions. For example, Gail Matthews (1993) contributed a chapter to the 
collection Images of the South: Constructing a Regional Culture on Film and Video that 
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describes the Our Stories of the Storm project focused on the effects of Hurricane Hugo 
on South Carolina residents. Generally, though, the bulk of hurricane research in folklore 
and related disciplines stems from Katrina-related topics. Hurricane Katrina garnered a 
great deal of research focus in large part due to the enormity of the storm’s impact on a 
large number of people and the impact that Katrina had on the communities to which 
those people belonged. As thousands of people were evacuated from storm-affected 
regions—many of whom returned months or years later, if at all—their lives were vastly 
and often permanently altered. If we consider disaster folklore as emerging out of a 
disruption of the ways of everyday life, Hurricane Katrina acted as a prime instrument for 
the creation of disaster folklore. 
 This said, work dealing with folklore and popular culture-related material and 
hurricanes cuts across several genres. A large portion of these works focuses on narrative 
research, including personal experience narrative and oral history, legend, and humor. 
However, other scholars have written on topics relating to material culture, custom, and 
identity. Most of these scholars have focused on Katrina specifically, but some have 
addressed other storms as well. This discussion attempts to organize the literature by 
genre, but, as is often the challenge of discussing genre, the lines often blur and some of 
the works in this review could fit into multiple generic categories. 
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Personal Experience Narrative and Oral History 
 Folklorists have been interested in both raw and analyzed narratives of hurricanes. 
In other words, some publishing has focused on narratives standing on their own with 
little academic interpretation, while other literature has sought to use hurricane narratives 
as a basis for analytical discussion. Within the discipline, Carl Lindahl and Pat Jasper 
stand out as two primary figures in publishing about Hurricane Katrina. In the fall of 
2005, Jasper and Lindahl co-founded and -directed Surviving Katrina and Rita in 
Houston (SKRH). Through field schools, hurricane survivors were trained in how to 
document other survivors’ narratives via recorded interviews. This project, the “first 
large-scale project, anywhere, in which the survivors of a major disaster have taken the 
lead in documenting it” (Surviving Katrina and Rita in Houston 2006), has collected 
several hundred interviews since its inception. From this collection of survivor narratives, 
a series of works have been published, both by Lindahl and Jasper and by the 
survivors/fieldworkers themselves writing about their experiences as storm survivors and 
as interviewers for the project.  
 A prominent example of these publications is a series of articles from a 2006 
special issue of the journal Callaloo. In this issue, Lindahl and Jasper contributed 
introductory and background pieces, including discussions of the SKRH project itself and 
its “across her own kitchen table” approach to fieldwork. Lindahl also contributed a book 
notes piece that provides a snapshot of a sample of books published in the ten months 
after Katrina. Also included in this special issue was work from survivors themselves. 
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For example, Nicole Eugene, who evacuated from New Orleans and participated in 
SKRH, writes of her own experiences and contributes an edited transcript of one of her 
fieldwork interviews.  
 In addition to this special issue, the hurricane and fieldwork experiences of Shari 
Smothers, Marie Barney, Glenda Harris, and Linda Jeffers were highlighted as part of a 
piece in Houston History (2010). The SKRH project was also the focus in articles in The 
Dialogue, a bulletin published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
and in The Chronicle of Higher Education (Lindahl and Nash 2008, Howard 2007).  
 The personal experience narrative focus on Hurricane Katrina by folklorists and 
others interested in expressive culture is not limited to work by Lindahl and Jasper and 
other SKRH-related individuals. For instance, in 2006, Health Affairs published a 
collection of narrative commentaries entitled “Witness to Disaster.” This collection 
included short written pieces from medical providers who assisted Katrina and Rita 
survivors in various locations, including Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi. The 
selections were written in response to a call from the journal for medical responder 
stories, with the collection “represent[ing] the most compelling of these writings” 
(Witness to Disaster 2006, 478). Although this collection is not overtly folkloric in nature 
and does not provide an analytical discussion of the narratives presented, it does provide 
an example of interest in hurricane narrative itself.  
 Also, in 2008, several essays in the Louisiana Folklore Miscellany dealt with 
materials at the intersection of personal narrative and Hurricane Katrina. Two presented 
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personal experiences without analysis. In one, Adeem Nachabe, Jessica Cohn-Phillips, 
and Amelia Kish, three students from the Metarie Park County Day School, contributed 
their own narratives to the issue. Each of these narratives is short, about four to seven 
paragraphs long, and the collection is presented without the adornment of an introduction 
or conclusion. In the other, folklorist Chris Goertzen recounts his Katrina experiences, 
using the thread of vehicles used, bought, and sold during the time of Katrina to connect 
the parts of his story. Like the students’ narratives, Goertzen’s is presented on its own. 
These two pieces are interesting points of contrast to the more analytical and interpretive 
articles in the rest of the issue. 
 Also in the same issue, Donna Bonner examines how time is expressed in 
Hurricane Katrina narratives written by her University of New Orleans students. The 
narratives were collected during a class she led in the Fall 2005 semester, the semester 
immediately following Katrina’s destruction. She discusses patterns that look at the 
passage of time in the students’ narratives, and how these ways of considering time play 
into concerns of identity and rebuilding.  
 In another piece from the Louisiana Folklore Miscellany, Alan H. Stein and Gene 
B. Preuss discuss the implications for the collection of oral history in the wake of 
Katrina
2
. They discuss the concern of collection and temporal proximity to the disaster 
and professional distance. They also touch upon issues of funding and dissemination of 
data, highlighting several different collection projects that were working with Katrina 
                                                          
2. This work also appeared in the collection There is no such thing as a natural disaster: Race, class, 
and Hurricane Katrina (2006). 
18 
survivors at the time. Stein and Preuss close with a discussion of “the conflict between 
narrative and oral history” and the uses of oral history material post-Katrina. They 
comment that Katrina’s impact will be long-lasting and widespread, explaining that 
 
How Americans weave this tragedy into their collective memory and the lessons 
we take from the disaster will preoccupy the minds of pundits, historians, and 
both political and community leaders for generations. However, the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina is not limited to Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Gulf Coast. 
“Katrinaland” has become a national and international phenomenon that has 
struck both the nation and the world. (Stein and Preuss 2008, 120) 
 
Stein and Preuss’s piece underscores the great desire to collect stories of the storm and 
the idea that these stories can inform people well beyond those immediately impacted by 
Katrina. 
 Like Stein and Preuss, Stephen Sloan’s “Oral History and Hurricane Katrina: 
Reflections on Shouts and Silences” (2008) discusses issues surrounding the conducting 
of oral history interviews, though his work is specifically within the context of Katrina’s 
aftermath in Mississippi. Sloan writes on issues such as dealing with trauma and the need 
for reflection in disaster work. He also discusses the efforts made by the Center for Oral 
History and Cultural Heritage at the University of Southern Mississippi to collect 
Hurricane Katrina stories in the weeks after the storm, underscoring the need to collect 
these stories soon after the event (as well as later on). One of Sloan’s comments made 
while describing his experiences of interviewing Mississippians is also worth noting: 
 
Whenever I would sit down to interview longtime residents they began telling me 
of their experience with Katrina by relating it to their prior experience of 
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Hurricane Camille.... Hurricane Camille was the benchmark and reference point 
that residents returned to as they began to understand this newer experience. Most 
often, it was how the previous storm, in all its ferocity, did not prepare them for 
Hurricane Katrina. Ironically, however, Hurricane Camille did prepare them in 
the sense that it gave them a familiar point from which to analogize Hurricane 
Katrina quickly and effectively. (Sloan 2008, 179) 
 
 
This referencing of prior storm experiences is part of the aspects of hurricane narrative 
being explored in this thesis, in that how one draws from prior experience (and from 
other narrative sources) can have impact on hurricane preparation and resource 
acquisition. 
 The immediate groundswell of interest in documenting people’s experiences post-
Katrina is the focus of Susan Roach’s (2008) piece, “In the Wake of the Hurricanes 
Research Coalition: A History.” In this article, Roach discusses the efforts made in the 
months after Katrina to organize research and create materials and protocol to facilitate 
projects collecting survivor experiences. Both Lindahl and Jasper’s and Sloan’s projects 
are mentioned, among others, in Roach’s discussion. These projects indicate the 
importance of  Katrina as a cultural event and to the value of hurricane research. 
 
Legend 
 Several scholars have focused on legendary material surfacing in hurricane 
narrative. In “Katrina: The Urban Legends Begin: A Memoir with Commentary,” Frank 
de Caro (2008) blends his own personal narrative with urban legends he heard after 
returning to New Orleans. These included legends such as President George Bush 
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sending Secret Service into the Superdome to execute gang members and a looter 
drowning because he clutched onto a bag of silver and gems he refused to release. De 
Caro discusses why these legends not only address concerns about crime but also 
“emphasize hope and a kind of redemption” (2008, 51).  
 More recently, in 2012, Carl Lindahl’s “Legends of Hurricane Katrina: The Right 
to Be Wrong, Survivor-to-Survivor Storytelling, and Healing” appeared in the Journal of 
American Folklore
3
.  In this article, he discusses “media-borne legends” disseminated 
through news reports and narratives communicated by survivors themselves. Media 
reports, such as the ones of residents shooting at helicopters, positioned New Orleanians 
as dangerous and criminal and created concern about assisting storm victims. In addition, 
narratives of survivors are often cast in doubt in favor of narratives of the media and 
government. In this way, we “dismiss those [narratives] shared by witnesses who were 
present at the site where the legends were born” (140). The discrediting of and suspicion 
cast upon residents disrupted disaster assistance and marred the lives of many survivors, 
in part, by discounting their own lived experiences. As Lindahl comments, 
 
The levee legends [stories that the New Orleans levees were intentionally 
destroyed] accord far more closely with most survivors’ experiences of disaster 
than do the tales that depict storm victims raping and murdering fellow victims or 
shooting at would-be rescuers. Nevertheless, survivors gained nothing but further 
rebuke when they repeated the levee legends to the outside world. (2012, 171) 
 
                                                          
3. This article is an expansion of ideas presented in his essay, “Some Legendary Takes on Hurricane 
Katrina,” published in 2011 in the AFS Review. 
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Lindahl posits that efforts that tap into the survivor community to focus on survivors 
telling their own stories (such as the SKRH project) both help to combat the negative 
media-borne legends and provide an opportunity for survivors to use their voices and to 
heal. Lindahl’s article is significant for several reasons. It underscores the social 
importance of hurricane narrative research. It delineates some of the tensions between 
narratives constructed by the media and government and the experiences of people 
dealing with the storm themselves. Also, it reminds folklorists of the need to think 
critically of our own presumptions when discussing disaster narrative, to be aware of our 
own biases and tendencies when working with narratives from both “official” and 
vernacular sources. 
 Like Lindahl, folklorist Kate Parker (2010) also uses interviews from the 
Surviving Katrina and Rita in Houston project as a basis for discussing how urban 
legends surface in survivor interviews. She posits that survivors use legend to create a 
new sense of home, as people from New Orleans were relocated to the Houston area. As 
she comments, “...put simply, faced with a new home that is strange, perhaps they need to 
make their old home seem stranger” (Parker 2010, para. 3). She provides examples such 
as the mentions of sharks and alligators surfacing in the city and bodies emerging from 
graves and argues that these bizarre images create not only engaging stories but also 
serve to make strange their old, familiar city. The use of legends serves to assist the 
transition to new homes away from New Orleans, to help in coming to terms with a new 
living arrangement even when one longs for the familiarity of their home city. 
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 Legends also surface in relation to Hurricane Ike. My own article, “I (Don’t) Like 
Ike: Post-Hurricane Legends and Anti-Legends in Electronic Discussion” (2011), 
explores different categories of rumor and legend that emerged in response to two 
Hurricane Ike media pieces on the website for the Houston Chronicle, Houston’s 
mainstream newspaper. I discuss how the transmitted rumors and legends addressed 
concerns of community members coming out of a major hurricane and how the online 
comments section of media webpages can become environments for the exchange of 
legendary material.  
 
Material Culture  
 Given the amount of physical destruction that can be wrought by hurricanes, 
especially ones such as Katrina, it is not surprising that scholarship has emerged about 
material culture and hurricanes. Some research bridges material and narrative genres. For 
example, as part of his discussion of disaster humor after Hurricane Katrina, Jason Saul 
(2008) considered graffiti, including the graffiti left on refrigerators pulled out of flooded 
houses, signage, and Mardi Gras floats, as these items became vehicles for expression. 
Saul discusses how these examples of humor are a response to trauma, a sign of resilience 
and the reassertion of community post-disaster. 
 Keagan LeJune’s chapter, “Hurricane Rita and the New Normal: Modified 
Communication and New Traditions in Calcasieu and Cameron Parishes” in Culture after 
the Hurricanes: Rhetoric and Reinvention on the Gulf Coast, also deals with cultural 
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resilience and the use of traditional means of expression to cope with disaster. 
Specifically, he uses folk-created signage and modified holiday decorations displayed 
after Hurricane Rita in these two Louisiana parishes as the basis of discussion. Through 
these expressions of material culture, LeJune discusses how “...visual presentations of 
these modified traditions existed as powerful statements of community spirit aimed at 
both community members and visitors to the area” (2010, 167). These folk acts are part 
of the recovery process but also mark cultural memory. 
 In the same collection, vernacular housing was also linked to post-Katrina 
concerns. Jay D. Edwards’s chapter on the shotgun house, a common housing design in 
New Orleans, explores the history of this design, suggesting that the shotgun house may 
be a folk genre “developed as direct patterns of cultural resistance to political and 
economic hegemonies that African Americans experienced” (2010, 83). However, this 
history of vernacular architectural expression has not received significant attention by 
archival historians and other related researchers, favoring the contributions of other 
groups (such as Anglos and French Creoles), which in turn threatens survival of the 
shotgun house history in the post-Katrina environment. In order to address this, Edwards 
documented 146 “shotgun-like” structures; this revealed “a complex and robust history of 
early shotgun house development” (2010, 61). Editor M.B. Hackler comments, 
“Edwards’s cultural geography of the city’s ubiquitous shotgun houses poses a challenge 
to accepted histories and connects the city with its architectural heritage” (2010, 15).   
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 An interest in more tourist-oriented material culture also surfaces in the literature. 
In “Katrina That Bitch! Hegemonic Representations of Women’s Sexuality on Hurricane 
Katrina Souvenir T-Shirts,” sociologists Kris Macomber, Christine Mallinson, and 
Elizabeth Seale (2011) survey novelty t-shirts from shops in New Orleans after Katrina. 
In doing so, they look at how the shirt slogans construct gender and sexuality and how 
they may play a role in disaster recovery. Although this research delves into popular 
culture creations, by speaking with people along Decatur Street in New Orleans, 
Macomber, Mallinson, and Seale also consider how the expressions on these shirts tap 
into vernacular humor, especially disaster humor. Also, as part of their discussion, they 
acknowledged the possibility of “an important connection between personal experience 
with the hurricane and taking offense to the t-shirts” with people more removed from the 
experience finding them funny or unoffensive (2011, 536). 
 
Custom and Identity 
 In the collection, Culture after the Hurricanes: Rhetoric and Reinvention on the 
Gulf Coast, several essays address custom- and identity-related topics. Two essays by 
Benjamin Morris and Jeffery Schwartz, for instance, deal with foodways issues. Morris 
focuses on the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the culinary culture of New Orleans and 
how restaurants and recipes have been important to post-storm recovery. Schwartz 
focuses on food culture from the angle of neighborhood food markets that cropped up 
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after Katrina to help address the lack of food access. Both address food as a marker of 
cultural identity. 
 Also in Culture after the Hurricanes, W.D. Wilkerson’s chapter on Plaquemines 
Parish examines the interplay between culture and environment. She specifically focuses 
on the effects of land loss from erosion, which is in part caused by hurricanes in the 
region. She discusses how erosion impacts the lives of parish residents: “Without people, 
there can be no culture, and without a healthy landscape, the people of Plaquemines 
cannot survive” (2010, 141). She argues that rebuilding and preservation efforts post-
Katrina must include the cultural and environmental needs of Plaquemines Parish, which 
have been largely ignored by policy makers in the focus on rebuilding New Orleans more 
than surrounding parishes. As she notes, “The environmental restoration of Plaquemines 
Parish is necessary not only to the parish’s way of life and cultural landscape but also 
those of New Orleans” (Wilkerson 2010, 161). 
 Other scholars have also written on custom- and identity-related issues. In “A 
Hurricane Is Nothing...”, Kathleen Carlin uses interview excerpts from the Katrina 
Impacts on Vietnamese Americans Living in New Orleans (KATIVA-NOLA) Project to 
look at how certain cultural traits may lead to resilience after disaster. She discusses how 
stories from past generations of the Vietnamese community dealing with trauma and 
relocation helped to create a point of comparison for Vietnamese-Americans affected by 
Katrina in that crises were not unfamiliar territory. Instead, as Carlin posits, “the crisis 
that Katrina brought on caused these Vietnamese-Americans to reassess their identities, 
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especially in terms of their material life goals and their family relationships. This is in 
line with the principles of respect for family, for the elders, and for their Vietnamese 
heritage...” (2011, 18). In other words, individual and cultural identity can both come into 
play in how individuals relate to and recover from hurricane experiences. 
 Barry Jean Ancelet also examines community identity feeding into hurricane 
response in his essay, “Vernacular Power: The Social and Cultural Implications of 
Katrina and Rita.” Ancelet discusses the differences between the institutional and 
community responses to these storms, and how they differed across these two temporally 
close hurricanes. He connects the community response described in his essay, specifically 
the remarkable efforts of residents assisting and rescuing people with their own boats 
(often in the face of institutional hurdles), to their heritage. As Ancelet comments, “The 
vernacular response managed to do some good despite being frustrated by the breakdown 
in the institutional response. It surged instinctively from the Cajun community for 
reasons that come from deep in our history” (2008, 35). He points to the self-reliance of 
the French settlers who became the Acadians and how their history instilled in the Cajuns 
a strong sense of social cooperation and the ability to get around “the inertia of 
institutions and bureaucracies” (Ancelet 2008, 35). Like Carlin, Ancelet connects 
heritage to how one responds to hurricanes, although they do so through different cultural 
perspectives. 
 Also focusing on community and institutional response, Jocelyn H. Donlon and 
Jon G. Donlon took a different tack in their 2008 article. In “Government Gives Tradition 
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the Go-Ahead: The Atchafalaya Welcome Center’s Role in Hurricane Katrina Recovery,” 
the Donlons “...unabashedly celebrate a local example of cooperation between 
government and citizens which worked not just well, but exceptionally well...” (2008, 
36). Using narratives from the people involved in the response at the welcome center, the 
essay discusses how this “home-grown community effort” grew out of the local 
knowledge of those involved in running it. As in Ancelet’s piece, local culture fed into 
the response, with the Donlons asserting that collective understandings of play and 
foodways helped in its success. 
 Changing focus to Hurricane Rita, Corliss Badeaux, Keagan LeJeune, Stella 
Nesanovich, and Wendy Whelan-Stewart (2008) comment on intersections between 
individual and community identity in their collaborative essay. Each contributor, through 
individually written sections, attempts to “capture the wide-ranging experiences of 
Louisiana residents who faced Hurricane Rita” (Badeaux et al. 2008, 3). The sections 
relate to aspects of the Rita experience, written from a mixture of personal and resident-
based perspectives, including preparation and evacuation, remaining for the storm, 
returning after the storm, and recovery from the storm. Nesanovich, in her discussion of 
her own preparation and evacuation, notes the idea of past storms affecting her response, 
which is a concept picked up in later parts of this thesis. Whelan-Stewart’s and 
Badeaux’s sections address community and individual identities and how they come into 
play in hurricane response and recovery, interweaving their own experiences and choices 
with stories from friends and neighbors. LeJeune’s section, which likely was developed 
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and incorporated into his chapter in Culture after the Hurricanes, moves the essay’s 
focus to the use of handmade signs and public displays created and used in the time 
surrounding Hurricane Rita as a way of communicating community perspectives. 
 More recently, Ancelet, Gaudet, and Lindahl (2013) edited Second Line Rescue: 
Improvised Responses to Katrina and Rita. This collection brings together a wide variety 
of materials, including first person narratives, essays, and field studies to address 
vernacular responses to these two storms. Not solely a personal narrative collection—
though many of the chapters have rooting in personal narrative—this book taps into the 
cultural identity of the region. As Ancelet, Gaudet, and Lindahl note, “The vernacular 
responses and solutions recorded in this book are rooted in south Louisiana’s cultural 
historical background. It is no accident that those who improvise in jazz, blues, second 
lines, Cajun waltzes, and zydeco two-steps also improvise to get people off their roofs” 
(2013, xvi). The collection represents perspectives from both rescuers from outside the 
area who saved people in danger from the storms and displaced storm survivors. It 
includes reprinted and republished pieces (such as the articles from Donlon and Donlon, 
and Eugene referenced in this chapter) as well as interviews and essays new to the 
collection. Although more aimed at the response to hurricanes, the book serves to 
underscore the diversity of experience related to hurricanes, which is important to the 
discussion in this thesis. 
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Gaps in the Literature 
 Taking past literature into consideration, this project adds to the research in 
disaster folklore of hurricanes by looking at narratives of hurricanes in several key ways. 
Unlike most of the research (with some exceptions), this study looks at hurricane 
experiences from several storms instead of honing in on one particular storm. Although 
the impact of a single hurricane can be significant—Hurricane Katrina’s impact on both 
the communities directly affected by the storm and the United States was (and is still) 
undeniable—considering multiple-storm narratives allows us to venture into the realm of 
“hurricane culture,” the ways that people in areas repeatedly affected by hurricanes frame 
their experiences of them.  
 In addition, this project explores the intersections between the personal narratives 
of individual residents and the mainstream narratives promoted by the media and 
governmental entities, narratives that form kinds of master narratives that can be resisted 
or incorporated into stories of personal experience. Elaine Lawless explored similar 
concerns in her discussion of the personal experience narratives of domestic abuse 
(2001), but this project will take this concern and explore it within the context of 
hurricane culture. Examining media itself is not a new approach to take; however, the 
focus on pre-storm media aims to provide a different angle for consideration. This project 
focuses on the issues of preparation and resource acquisition within the hurricane 
experience—in other words, the way in which people prepare for, use, and procure 
resources needed to deal with hurricanes. This focus allows us to tackle a specific aspect 
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of these narratives but also allows us to hone in on a part of the hurricane experience not 
thoroughly represented in the literature of disaster folklore.   
 
 
Personal Experience Narrative Studies 
 
 Before delving into the particular discussion of hurricane narrative in subsequent 
chapters, it helps to contextualize the personal narrative within the larger discipline of 
folklore, and from this contextualization, to touch upon some of the narrative issues that 
will impact this project’s discussion. Within the discipline, the personal experience 
narrative has only been widely recognized as a viable stand-alone genre for the past four 
or five decades, even though its narrative cousins, such as folktale, legend, and myth, 
have enjoyed genre status for much longer. In part, the reticence toward recognizing 
personal experience narrative stemmed from the unique content of the narratives. Each 
narrator’s life is unique, and, by extension, the content of narratives about his/her life 
would also be unique. In this way, personal experience narratives lacked the traditionality 
of content seen in other narrative genres whose stories consisted of content passed down 
through people over time.  
 However, with the work of folklorists, including Sandra K. D. Stahl (sometimes 
also cited as Dolby-Stahl), the discipline’s perspective on the status of personal 
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experience narratives began to shift. In her essay, “The Personal Narrative as Folklore,” 
Stahl examines the notion of tradition in order to justify the genre. She writes, 
 
If, as in the past, tradition were arbitrarily defined as recurrent items of content 
passed on orally from one person to another, then personal narratives along with 
any number of other less content-specific genres could not be considered 
traditional, nor by extension folkloric. However…there is much about any one 
personal narrative that is traditional; there is much more that is traditional than 
innovative. (1977b, 10) 
 
Although the content of the narrative is non-traditional, elements of the personal 
experience narrative that Stahl argues are traditional include “structure, use, attitudes, or 
idioms” (1977b, 14). She also argues that personal experience narratives are “traditional” 
in that they are part of the storytelling tradition and reflect traditional attitudes. She writes 
that “…the personal narrative…is the primary traditional genre for expressing traditional 
attitude just as memorate and legend are the primary genres for expressing supernatural 
beliefs” (1977b, 22). In “The Oral Personal Narrative in Its Generic Context,” Stahl 
further explores personal experience narrative as its own genre. In this essay, Stahl posits 
the following definition of the genre: “The personal narrative is a prose narrative relating 
a personal experience; it is usually told in the first person and its content is 
nontraditional” (1977a, 20)4. Again, there is this sense that the content may be unique to 
the teller (“nontraditional”), but as seen above, these narratives are traditional in other 
                                                          
4. Linda Dégh dissects this definition in her essay, “‘When I Was Six We Moved West…’: The Theory 
of Personal Experience Narrative.” She is most troubled by the use of “nontraditional” in the definition, as 
she argues that “…nontraditional things could not have happened to anyone” (Dégh 1985, 103). She also 
mentions that the “textual, situational, and social context [of personal stories] …cannot” avoid being 
traditional (104). 
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ways. Stahl relates the personal experience narrative genre to other widely recognized 
genres, including the memorate, the legend, the hero tale, the tall tale, the joke, rumor, 
and gossip. In her conclusion, she summarizes several of these relationships: 
 
As we can see, the personal narrative has many close relatives among the genres 
of folklore. Some, like the reminiscence, memorate, and true story are 
distinguishable only through the arbitrary emphasis on certain features—narrative 
form, secular content, the “personal aspect.” Others, like the legend, the anecdote, 
rumor and gossip, have the quality of relatively wide distribution to distinguish 
them from the personal narrative. And yet others, like the tall tale, the joke, or the 
family story, may be distinguishable on paper but may be represented in reality by 
stories that seem to be personal narratives (1977a, 39). 
 
By defining the genre’s relationship to other genres, Stahl seeks to establish a generic 
space for personal experience narrative. In her later 1988 work, “Contributions of 
Personal Narrative Research to North American Folkloristics,” Stahl continues to 
promote the genre by discussing three issues that have been addressed mainly through 
personal experience narrative research: the relationship between narrative and experience, 
the “interplay between tradition and creativity,” and how much narrative reveals about 
the storyteller (390-391). Through her discussion, she illustrates personal experience 
narrative’s contributions to such research areas as structuralism and contextualism, which 
highlights the ways in which this previously unacknowledged genre benefits the 
discipline as a whole. 
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Narrative Analysis 
 Although Stahl is noted as a major force in defining the personal experience 
narrative as a folkloric genre, linguists William Labov and Joshua Waletsky’s work in the 
analysis of structure in personal experience narrative is frequently referenced as a helpful 
tool in analyzing narrative. Labov’s essay, “The Transformation of Experience in 
Narrative Syntax” (which is based on an earlier work by Labov and Waletsky), offers a 
structural approach to the narratives
5
, using narratives about the danger of death as the 
texts for analysis. Labov identifies six major structural elements that may appear in a 
narrative: 
 
 Abstract: summary of the story 
 Orientation: time, place, persons, situation 
 Complicating Action: what happened in the story 
 Evaluation: “indicate the point of the narrative” (366) and include various 
types (external, embedded, evaluative action) 
 Result or Resolution: what finally happened 
 Coda: signal that the narrative has ended 
 
                                                          
5. In this essay, narrative is defined as “…one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a 
verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred” (Labov  1972, 
359-360). He does not specify “personal experience narrative” or “personal narrative” in this definition, 
although the narratives used are personal experiences of the tellers. 
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To Labov (and Waletsky), a complete narrative includes all of these elements, (although 
all elements may not be in all narratives). In addition to presenting the larger structural 
elements of these narratives, Labov also discusses more minute syntactical structures 
within the narrative. Labov’s structure provides us a tool and a vocabulary to use when 
discussing the way a narrative is told. 
 Although Labov’s work is a frequent touchstone for structural analysis, other 
academics prefer a more context-centered approach to analysis of personal experience 
narrative. John A. Robinson, in his essay “Personal Narratives Reconsidered,” uses 
Labov and Waletsky’s work as a jumping off point for his own discussion of personal 
narrative. Specifically, Robinson argues that 
 
(1) personal narratives are not limited to remarkable or unusual experiences; (2) 
the point of a story can be implied or even unknown; and (3) the formal 
organization of personal narrative is jointly determined by norms of 
conversational etiquette, the discourse structures of narrative, and the pragmatic 
functions that prompt narration. (Robinson 1981, 85)  
 
 
Robinson acknowledges the value of the structural approach, but emphasizes that the 
content and meaning can vary from Labov’s notions and the need to consider the situated 
element of personal narratives. Both of these approaches (structural and contextual) tie 
back into Stahl’s discussion of the ways that personal experience narratives are 
traditional. The narratives have structural elements and respond to contextual influences 
that are not unique to the individual teller or his/her storytelling situation. Both structure 
and context will play into the discussion in this thesis. 
35 
Tellability 
 An interesting difference in Labov’s and Robinson’s conceptualizations of 
personal narrative is on the issue of tellability. Tellability refers to the determination as to 
whether a narrative is worth telling. In his classic work, Labov asserts that, to be tellable, 
a story has to be remarkable (reportable) in some way. This is an evaluative aspect of the 
storytelling situation, as the teller must deem the story to be reportable. As Labov 
comments, “Evaluative devices say this to us: this was terrifying, dangerous, weird, wild, 
crazy; or amusing, hilarious, wonderful; more generally, that it was strange, uncommon, 
or unusual—that is, worth reporting. It was not ordinary, plain, humdrum, everyday, or 
run of the mill” (1972, 371). In other words, there has to be something extraordinary 
about the experience to bother talking about it. Discourse scholar Teun A. van Dijk’s 
concept of “remarkableness” is similar to Labov’s reportability. He comments that “a 
remarkable event is an exception to usual states or events” (van Dijk 1975, 287) and is 
more likely to be interesting within the conversational context. 
 The guideline set forth by Labov and van Dijk, however, is not universally 
accepted as the only way to consider tellability. Returning to Robinson, he does not argue 
that Labov’s and van Dijk’s concepts of tellability make for a “good” story; instead, he 
notes that “telling stories about remarkable experiences is one of the ways in which 
people make the unexpected expectable, hence manageable” (1981, 60). (This comment 
echoes the idea, such as that set forth in Regina Bendix’s article about earthquake 
narratives (1990), in which disaster narratives create order out of chaos.) This said, 
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Robinson argues that this idea of limiting the tellable to the remarkable inaccurately 
represents how we tell stories. Turning to stories of “commonplace activities,” Robinson 
notes that the experiences that are unremarkable to the teller may be very interesting to 
the listener, and the story may, in turn, be told. Also, Robinson mentions that seemingly 
mundane narratives (such as recounting one’s day) may be told as “a linguistic resource 
for making life interesting” (1981, 63). Lastly, he comments that stories of victimization 
may be “regarded as secrets rather than stories to tell” (1981, 63) and resist the 
remarkable-commonplace dichotomy. 
 Further, linguist Neal R. Norrick adds to the discussion of tellability by proposing 
a modified perspective. Norrick’s discussion shifts the focus on tellability from content-
centered to contextually influenced. Pulling from linguistic anthropologist Elinor Ochs 
and psychologist Lisa Capps (2001), he notes how tellability is negotiated, determined by 
how the story is relevant to the teller and the audience, giving the listeners an active role 
in the process: “All sorts of participation by listeners can render a familiar story tellable 
in a given context” (Norrick 2005, 326). In this way, Norrick begins to portray tellability 
as a range with the lower end being “sufficient to warrant listener interest” (323) and a 
variety of contextually dependent senses following. However, Norrick proposes an upper 
boundary to tellability, which he terms “the dark side.” This boundary is determined by 
when the narrative becomes untellable in a certain context by becoming too intimate, too 
frightening, or too incoherent. Therefore, the teller must narrate between the two 
boundaries and does so with the following actions. As Norrick writes: 
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 [A] teller decides which personal experiences to relate...; 
 [T]he teller decides how to relate the experience, with regard to key (serious 
vs. humorous), perspective, details etc.; 
 [T]he teller decides whether or not to press on with additional details, with 
related episodes and/or related stories, depending on the reaction of the 
listeners... (2005, 323). 
 
Through these actions, the teller crafts a story that is “in bounds” for the audience at 
hand, contextually interesting enough, but not transgressing audience norms too much. 
To fail to meet the lower boundary or to cross the upper one risks rejection of the story 
and its teller. 
 In this way, tellability encompasses a variety of senses. The concept of tellability 
is relevant to the discussion of hurricane narratives because these narratives span a range 
of experiences. On one hand, some seem obviously tellable in a classic Labovian sense. 
Often, when people think of Hurricane Katrina, they can instantly envision stories of 
rooftop rescues and massive shelters, and Hurricane Rita can conjure up stories of huge 
highway gridlock. However, not all hurricane experiences are so overtly exceptional. In a 
region where hurricane season looms for six months every year, the experience of 
watching hurricanes can seem almost routine. Coupled with this, hurricanes, even large 
ones, can end up leaving a community relatively unscathed, resulting in what seems a 
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“non-event.” Widening the idea of what makes a story tellable, though, opens up the 
ability to put these stories—ones that might fade from attention after the storm passes—
on the table for consideration. The issue of tellability and hurricane narrative resurfaces 
in Chapter Four in looking at different ways we can approach what stories can fall into 
someone’s hurricane narrative repertoire. 
 
Patterns in Narrative 
 Analytical work on personal experience narrative is also often focused on 
discovering patterns within the narratives themselves, focusing on small details within the 
narrative (also called microanalysis). For example, three scholars who have performed 
work in this vein of analysis are Diane Goldstein (2009), Gillian Bennett (1989 and 
1990), and Nessa Wolfson (1978). Goldstein’s work with narrative often focuses on 
patterns within the text, including the uses of metaphor, analogy, modifiers, evidence, 
and silence. Seeking pattern within the texts can provide insight as to how these 
narratives are constructed and how they communicate meaning within their context. Like 
Goldstein, Bennett’s work also seeks pattern within narrative texts. Her work focuses on 
the use of “super-sentences,” extremely long sentences constructed of many clauses; use 
of dialogue; and tense shifts. Bennett argues that these super-sentences are tools used to 
structure and create coherence within a narrative, even though some people misinterpret 
them as poor storytelling or rambling (1990, 214). Taking another approach, Wolfson’s 
piece, “A Feature of Performed Narrative: The Conversational Historical Present,” 
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discusses the use of verb tense in order to shift focus in a narrative, to separate events of a 
story from one another. What is most significant here, however, is that Wolfson does not 
only find meaning in the shift from past tense (“I entered the house.”) to conversational 
historical present (“Then, my mother calls me on the phone.”), but in the switching back 
and forth between the two tenses within a narrative. She describes the switching back and 
forth as having “the effect of a change of lighting or scenery upon a stage” (Wolfson 
1978, 220). Using different approaches, Goldstein, Bennett, and Wolfson provide several 
ways of thinking of pattern within narrative by looking at the small details within them. 
 
Thematic Pattern: Narrative Order in Chaos 
 Theme is another way of considering narrative pattern. One of the themes in 
literature about disaster narratives is the idea that, through disaster narratives, individuals 
make sense of the events that happened to them through the organizing and retelling of 
their experiences. For example, Regina Bendix (1990) points out that narratives 
“illustrate with astounding clarity the interplay between the event, the personal 
experience thereof, and the structuring of this experience in a meaningful fashion” (333). 
Within the narrative, these three elements come together to make meaning. In her 2006 
work on Chernobyl narratives, Ann Enander comments that reflecting upon experience 
“[forms] an important filter between the experiences of an event and anticipations about 
the future… [and can be] interpreted as part of the process of sense-making, which forms 
an important part of recovery from natural disaster” (265). Through narrative, the 
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individual gives structure and sense to experiences that may seem chaotic or traumatic. 
John H. Harvey (1996) further echoes this idea and emphasizes the positive impact that 
narratives of disaster can have. He highlights the “coping value of private reflection and 
confiding and sharing of stories with close others in times of major loss and adversity” 
(162). In these ways, narrative becomes a tool to control one’s experiences by using them 
to make sense of events and to assist in coping. This kind of thematic organizing is not 
universal to all narratives, however. Revisiting the concept of tellability, not all narratives 
create this cohesive representation of experience and some narratives are within contexts 
in which they cannot be expressed. Diane Goldstein and Amy Shuman argue “Stories 
become untellable because the content defies articulation, the rules of appropriateness 
outweigh the import of content, the narrator is constrained by issues of entitlement and 
storytelling rights, or the space the narratives would normally inhabit is understood by the 
narrator to be unsafe” (2012, 120). These untellable narratives can be stigmatized, placed 
in contrast to other narratives that might be deemed more expected or “normal.” 
 
Entitlement 
  Narrative entitlement, mentioned in the prior section, is another concept that 
relevant to the discussion of disaster narrative in this thesis, drawing from work by 
scholars such as Shuman. Her use of the term entitlement follows the work of Courtney 
Cazden and Dell Hymes on storytelling rights (1978) and the work of William Labov on 
tellability (1972). Narrative entitlement concerns who gets to say what, to whom, in 
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which contexts, and, perhaps most importantly, who does not. Amy Shuman and Carol 
Bohmer’s (2004) work on narrative claims in the context of refugee asylum appeals 
illustrates that these concerns are particularly significant in high-stake social situations. 
Their work has shown that personal narrative has become increasingly important in legal 
and governmental settings, having implications for crucial legal decision-making. 
Entitlement—the right to one’s story—becomes important as one seeks authority as an 
informed voice of experience, especially in light of potentially contradictory narratives 
from the media and governmental sources (seemingly “official” stories). In this way, 
entitlement will play into the discussion of lay and official narratives later in this thesis. 
 
Master Narrative 
  Personal narratives exist in a world also populated with master narratives often 
espoused in the official stories mentioned above. The concept of master narrative has its 
roots in the work of Francois Lyotard and refers to narratives created and propagated by 
collectives (such as “the people” and “the state”) that carry cultural weight within society, 
such as the “narrative of progress” that seems to drive decisions made within western 
societies by making these decisions seem legitimate. These are narratives that “give 
coherence and meaning to smaller or ‘local’ stories and practices” (Seidman 1998, 226). 
In other words, the “big” story may shape/control/change the “small” story. Master 
narratives can become a kind of defining and legitimizing force as they affect how 
situations are perceived and can become schemata that map expectations of how life is 
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lived, or should be lived. In this way, they can have a kind of hegemonic power in which 
the “authority” in play holds cultural sway over other individuals and groups, and, in 
doing so, further legitimizes its own power. However, this power is not stable, and master 
narratives can be contested by more localized narratives, which may contradict all or part 
of the master narrative. These competing narratives can lead to a variety of outcomes, 
including, on one end of the spectrum, the master narrative losing its power, and, on the 
other, the localized narrative being dismissed or not believed. 
  Elaine Lawless’s work on the cycle of violence stands as an example of master 
narrative research in folklore. In Women Escaping Violence, Lawless discusses the theory 
of the cycle of violence (also termed the cycle of abuse), which is a concept used by 
social workers, academics, and abuse victims. The concept serves as a type of master 
narrative: “suggesting a narrative that everyone has come to know well and one that is 
referenced perhaps too freely as the ‘typical’ narrative for domestic violence” (2001, 12). 
By doing so, the master narrative may serve to drive our expectations of abuse 
experiences and may not match the actual lived experience. Those experiences that differ 
may be narratively altered to meet the master narrative or may be silenced or ignored as 
they do not meet the expectations set forth by the master narrative. Shuman and Bohmer 
also encountered this dynamic in their work with asylum-seeking refugees, mentioned 
earlier. Refugee narratives that do not meet the expectations of the institution may have 
difficulty gaining the teller political asylum. In this way, refugees may be compelled to 
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change their story and/or how they present it for the purposes of securing governmental 
assistance. 
  In “Ethnography as Narrative,” anthropologist Edward Bruner comments that, 
“Narrative structures organize and give meaning to experience, but there are always 
feelings and lived experiences not fully encompassed by the dominant story” (1997, 268). 
The act of telling experience stories creates narratives that may or may not conform to 
mainstream ones, creating alternative interpretations of the “reality” of a situation. This 
process illustrates the dynamic ways that individuals co-construct the meaning(s) of the 
past, present, and future. Anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly, occupational therapist Mary 
Lawlor, and anthropologist Lanita Jacobs-Huey echo this concept when they explain that 
“stories are highly agentive speech acts that occur in specific contexts and are co-
constructed by speakers and their audiences…stories may seem to be ‘about’ the past, but 
they have implications for how one should act on or interpret immediate and future 
events” (2002, 745). Narratives, then, are valuable in how they embody a plurality of 
realities, shaped by the culture in which they are told: “…they come in certain, culturally 
available types, genres that provide a repertoire of possible, tellable tales” (Mattingly, 
Lutkehaus, and Throop 2008, 15).  Further, anthropologist Bradd Shore comments that, 
in Bruner’s vision, storytelling is “the very workshop of meaning making” (2008, 98). In 
disaster, this sense-making aspect of narrative is crucial: “While disaster ultimately 
implies death of at least a few…those who remain thrust themselves into vigorous 
affirmation of life, and words strung together, eventually finding narrative cohesion, are 
44 
the first symbolic evidence of our escape from death” (Bendix 1990, 336). In this way, 
examining personal narratives and how they influence and are influenced by more 
“dominant” narratives is important in exploring issues of narrative entitlement.  
  The concept of master narrative can also come into play when considering 
hurricane narratives. In a media-saturated environment that reports on hurricanes through 
meteorological information, storm coverage, and news stories of response and recovery, 
the messages conveyed through “official” channels can become their own kind of master 
narrative as well, creating expectations about matters such as proper preparation and 
response to storm threats.   
  By using the concepts of master narrative and narrative entitlement, this thesis 
explores the interactions between media and residential perspectives of preparation. For 
the purposes of this discussion, narratives of those who hold positions of authority as 
“official” narratives (which would include individuals such as governmental officials and 
meteorologists), in contrast to the lay narratives from “ordinary” people6. Patterns of 
narratives, both in media narratives and residential narratives are highlighted to discuss 
how each perspective constructs concepts of “appropriate” preparation and authority. 
From this, I discuss how these narrative interactions can bridge lay and official 
perspectives and how this understanding can have implications for future hurricane 
preparation communication. 
 
                                                          
6. More discussion of official and lay definitions is in Chapter Three. 
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Considering Preparation 
 
  Preparation, in a simple sense, is often construed as being merely action taken in 
response to information. In other words, threat and preparation information is transmitted 
by agencies and other entities “in the know,” and individuals are meant to receive the 
information and act accordingly. This concept could be visualized as: 
 
I ===> A 
(where I is information and A is action by recipients) 
 
Douglas Paton and David Johnston comment, however, that “...care must be taken with 
regard to assuming that the provision of information on hazards or risk will facilitate the 
adoption of preventative measures. The information-action link assumes that recipients 
automatically assimilate, comprehend and utilise information in forming and following 
action plans. This assumption is often unjustified” (2001, 270). The link, therefore, does 
not always play out in reality. Both sides of this link are more complex than they may 
seem on the surface.  
  Michael D. Barnes, Carl L. Hanson, Len M.B. Novilla, Aaron T. Meacham, 
Emily McIntyre, and Brittany C. Erickson point to two issues that complicate the matter 
from the information side of the process. In their discussion of media and Hurricane 
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Katrina, they note that “the media engenders public awareness and concern on the basis 
of assumptions that (1) the press and the media do not reflect reality but, rather, filter and 
shape it, and (2) media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the public to 
perceive those issues and subjects as more important than others” (Barnes et al. 2008, 
605). In this way, the information communicated to audiences cannot be conceived 
simply as factual information. Instead, it reflects a constructed view of that information. 
  In addition, the action aspect of this process is not straightforward. Gerry Larsson 
and Ann Enander point out several issues that are cited as reasons individuals do not 
participate in disaster preparation and express a lack of willingness or interest to act. 
These reasons include belief that one is less vulnerable than others, an uncertainty about 
that to do, and belief that action is useless if the disaster does not occur (Larsson and 
Enander 1997, 11). Out of these reasons, Larsson and Enander found uncertainty to be 
the strongest justification for not preparing. Paton and Johnston also note that individuals 
can assume that the officials providing information are responsible for preparation 
actions. Moreover, individuals often overestimate their own knowledge (2001, 271). 
Richard Zoraster adds other possible variables that can influence “understanding and 
believing” public warnings, such as socioeconomic level, literacy, and lack of trust in 
authority (2010, 75). Many of the variables mentioned here focus on the thinking and 
characteristics of the individuals receiving preparation messages.  
  However, other variables point towards interactions between individuals and 
official messages. Kathleen Tierney, Christine Bevc, and Erica Kuligowski mention that 
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individuals can interpret disaster messages in unintended ways. To illustrate, they use a 
Red Cross campaign with the theme “I can’t stop a [tornado, flood, fire, hurricane, 
terrorist attack, etc.] but I can stop panic.” They note that this messaging did not work as 
intended because it actually sent the message that individuals were powerless in the face 
of disaster and that panic was inevitable (Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006, 60). The 
preparation information attempting to be communicated can instead demotivate those it is 
supposed to move to action. Further complicating matters, the individuals receiving 
disaster information may disregard it by deeming it common knowledge. As part of her 
work on media and Hurricane Georges in Puerto Rico, Maria Perez-Lugo looked at the 
media-audience relationship during different phases of the storm (preparedness, impact, 
recovery). One of the issues she noted was that media safety recommendations often fell 
into what her interviewees considered “common sense knowledge, based on previous 
personal and collective experiences with hurricanes” (Perez-Lugo 2004, 218). Due to it 
being deemed common knowledge, many individuals disregarded the information.  
  What is interesting in looking at many of these complicating reasons are how 
social they are—they often involve interactions among the individuals, those around 
them, and their environment.  Preparation, then, becomes an emergent act
7
, coming out of 
the interactions of a variety of factors, not simply the cause and effect relationship 
                                                          
7. This idea of preparation as emergent is influenced by Richard Bauman’s discussion of emergence 
and performance: “The emergent quality of performance resides in the interplay between communicative 
resources, individual competence, and the goals of the participants, within the context of particular 
situations” (1977, 38). Although the factors may be a bit different in this discussion, the idea of interplay is 
still relevant. 
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implied by the information-action link. If we think about preparation as emergent action, 
it becomes a much more complex process instead of a linear one. As such, preparation 
messaging produced by official outlets is received in varying ways by diverse audiences 
of residents. Those residents take that discussion and weigh it among other considerations 
relevant to their experiences, beliefs, and interests. The ways that residents prepare (or do 
not prepare) then emerges from these variables.  
  Also relevant to this discussion is the concept of risk perception, which has come 
into play within folklore studies in the context of health and belief. In Once upon a Virus, 
Diane Goldstein notes that many expert models of risk-related health behaviours tend to 
assume “that knowledge of risk factors will relate directly to the informed estimation of 
one’s own risk” but that these approaches are not successful due to “their lack of 
allowance for the cultural associations and meaning that feed individuals’ abilities to 
internalize and apply notions of risk to themselves” (2004, 163). A similar concept is at 
play with preparation in that the information-action link here is also not as 
straightforward and that preparation activities can also be rooted in the cultural contexts 
in which individuals live. 
  Though not often the explicit focus in disaster folklore research, the above 
discussion illustrates how the issue of preparation has a place in other fields, such as 
public health and psychology. Bringing folklore into the conversation helps to broaden 
the interdisciplinary perspectives on this topic. With interests in narrative—the 
construction of preparation by both the media and by residents—and emergence—how 
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actions emerge out of considerations of those taking action—a folkloristic approach can 
add to the discussion of this recurring public safety concern. 
  From a folklorist's perspective, preparation is interesting both because preparation 
itself and preparation narrative can be considered traditional. Preparation choices can be 
steeped in familial and community experience. For example, Stacy C. commented on her 
experiences from Metairie, Louisiana: “Usually everybody gets together so just in case 
somebody has a generator...They call them hurricane parties, so I mean typically 
everybody got together, whoever had the biggest house, we all got together and we hung 
out and made the best of it...get together, listen to the radio, have our candles and our 
batteries and all the flashlights and just...played games and did the best we could...” 
Preparation narratives, in turn, can also be passed among people. From my own 
experiences, stories about the days before storms have been shared among my own 
family members. The story of the days leading up to Hurricane Alicia in 1983, which is 
shared in Chapter Four by my mother, is a familiar one in my own family. The ways that 
preparation in action and in narrative can be transmitted and shared over time make it a 
topic that folklorists can and should consider. Also, ultimately, these traditional 
experiences have importance and value. As Diane Goldstein notes, “The power of the 
personal and the power of the local make them valuable tools for our cultural institutions” 
(2015, 137). Not only does looking at preparation as traditional resonate with the 
folklorist within our discipline, but it also has merit in its potential to inform and shift the 
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status quo by recognizing different ways of understanding and doing in the context of 
recurring environmental threat. 
 
Methodology 
 
This project employed a number of methods to explore how concerns surrounding 
hurricane preparation are discussed within the affected Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast 
community: 
 
1. Independent fieldwork: Using the snowball technique, I conducted interviews 
with twenty-two informants focusing on the experiences of residents affected by 
the three hurricanes central to this study. The snowball technique involves finding 
eligible participants and, through the recommendation of those individuals, 
locating more participants (Morgan 2008, 816).  
 
In my fieldwork, my informants ranged from being personally close to me, such 
as my parents, to being individuals whom I had never met.  About two-thirds of 
my informants were female, one-third male. Most of my informants resided in in 
urban or suburban areas. They tended to be Caucasian and generally came from 
middle-class backgrounds. There were, however, exceptions to these descriptions, 
but it is necessary to point out that the stories of my informants do not include 
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representative samples from all demographic groups in the region. A wider 
sample of socioeconomic and racial backgrounds, however, was represented in 
the materials collected by the archives and used to augment my own interviews. 
 
This distinction is important because race and socioeconomic status have 
historically had impact on preparation in the Gulf coast region. For example, 
Susan L. Cutter and Mark M. Smith point out ways in which race had played into 
preparedness for Hurricane Camille in Mississippi, noting how segregation played 
into who was placed on particular evacuation buses and to which shelters they 
were taken. They write, “...the very process of evacuation functioned as a 
microcosm of the long battle between white segregationists and African 
Americans who pressed hard to enforce their civil rights” (Cutter and Smith 2009, 
para. 11). Issues of race continue to play a role in the region. Jeffrey A. Groen and 
Anne E. Polivka note that “Although the demographic composition of evacuees 
reflects the composition of prestorm residents of the Katina affected region, the 
probability of returning varies considerably by demographic group” (2008, 41). 
Drawing from the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey from October 
2005 to October 2006, they noted that black residents were comparatively less 
likely to return than their white counterparts (54 percent and 82 percent 
respectively) (41). This is worth noting, in part, due to that returning or not 
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returning can shift the make up of communities in a region, and can impact 
certain racial or ethnic groups disproportionately. 
 
Socioeconomic class can also be a factor that affects how preparation is enacted 
by residents. For instance, taking into account that, according to Cutter and Smith 
(2009), 27 percent of New Orleans Parish was below the poverty line and 21.8 
percent of households were without a car, the decisions made by some residents 
can be impacted by access to finances and mobility. Further, as Elizabeth Fussell 
comments, “Low-income residents had fewer choices with respect to how to 
prepare for the imminent arrival of Katrina. Since the storm was at the end of the 
month and many low-income residents of New Orleans live from paycheck to 
paycheck, economic resources for evacuating were particularly scarce” (2006, 
para. 4). In this way, we can expect that preparation decisions can vary widely 
across segments of the population in these regions, given historical issues of race 
and class. The informants who participated in my research represent their 
experiences of preparation, but they do not necessarily represent all possible 
experiences. 
 
2. Archival collection: I accessed several archival collections to locate a variety of 
interviews with residents. Three collections were used: the “Writing Katrina” 
Collection at the Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans; the Surviving 
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Katrina and Rita in Houston (SKRH) Collection; and the Through Hell and High 
Water: Katrina’s First Responders Oral History Project at the Williams Research 
Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection. Including archived interviews 
allowed me to broaden my collection of narratives with people outside of my own 
fieldwork. 
 
3. Narrative analysis: Interviews provided the basis for examination of patterns of 
both overt methods of preparation, including information gathering, decision-
making (to evacuate or not), and resource acquisition as well as underlying 
concerns about these activities. This work follows the textual and discourse 
analysis strategies of other narrative scholars, including Bennett (1989 and 1990), 
Goldstein (2009), Labov (1972), Wolfson (1978), and Shuman (2005 and 2006). 
 
4. Newspaper analysis: Using a blend of content and structural analysis approaches, 
influenced by Ernest Zhang and Kenneth Fleming (2005) and Yoonhyeung Choi 
and Ying-Hsuan Lin (2008), I analyzed eighty-one newspaper articles from the 
Times-Picayune and the Houston Chronicle published in the days before 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Ike. From this analysis, I looked at how 
newspapers, which both assert an official stance and present official information 
from members of the government and meteorologists, construct not only a sense 
of what preparation is, but also a portrayal of residents in the preparation process. 
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These two newspapers were selected because they represent the largest 
mainstream papers for these cities. Although readership numbers do not guarantee 
exact numbers of individuals reading complete editions of newspapers, they do 
represent large potential audiences for these articles, both in physical newsprint 
and online. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 At its core, this project explores how individual narratives of hurricane experience 
challenge, incorporate, and/or ignore more mainstream master narratives constructed by 
official sources. In order to hone the discussion, the area of focus within this thesis is the 
way in which issues of resource acquisition and preparation are constructed in these 
narratives. To do so, the discussion must consider how individuals, the media, and 
governmental entities address these issues. Also of interest to this thesis is how the 
history of storms and repeated threat of hurricanes molds both individual and institutional 
narrative. Third, this project considers how institutional narratives leverage personal 
narratives in their own construction, which may serve to use personal authority to bolster 
institutional authority or to undercut individual experience. 
 As seen in this section, natural disasters are not unfamiliar territory to scholars. 
While scholars have recognized the significance of narrative, and while numerous 
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researchers have written about natural disasters, few have looked at the intersection 
between preparation and resource acquisition and narrative entitlement, especially in an 
environment of competing and repeated environmental disaster. Often past research has 
focused on individual disasters, but, in doing so, the effects of long-term and repeated 
exposure to disaster situations have not been fully explored. In Everything in Its Path, 
Kai Erikson argues that we must “note that we are edging toward the notion that chronic 
conditions as well as acute events can induce trauma, and this, too, belongs in our 
calculations” (1976, 255). The Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast is a region that exists in both 
these situations, and exploring the intersection of narrative entitlement and resource 
accessibility here will broaden scholarly understandings of disaster behavior and 
response.  
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Chapter Two: 
Hurricanes and the Texas-Louisiana Coast 
 
The Gulf Coast of the United States is no stranger to hurricanes. As Barry D. 
Keim and Robert A. Muller point out in their climatological history, Hurricanes of the 
Gulf of Mexico, “Of the 63 major hurricane strikes around the shores of the Gulf from 
1851 to 2007, 36—more than half of all the strikes—have assaulted the coastline from 
East Texas to the Florida Panhandle,” with the most frequent strikes from Morgan City, 
Louisiana to Gulfport, Mississippi (2009, 75). Also, the Gulf Coast region has 
experienced significant population growth in recent history. From 1960 to 2008, coastline 
counties bordering the Gulf of Mexico have grown in population by 8.4 million people 
(Wilson and Fischetti 2010, 4). Couple the frequency of hurricanes on the Gulf Coast 
with the population growth in this region of the United States, and the number of Gulf 
Coast residents with hurricane stories to tell is considerable. 
Houston, Texas and New Orleans, Louisiana represent two of the largest 
population areas in the region. The Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (The Greater Houston Area) is defined by the United States Census 
Bureau as including ten counties encompassing and surrounding the City of Houston 
(Austin, Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty, Montgomery, San 
Jacinto, and Waller Counties).  
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Figure 2. Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown Metropolitan Statistical Area. Map created using 
the United States Census Bureau TIGERweb Application 
(http://tigerweb.geo.census.gov/tigerwebmain/TIGERweb_main.html)  
 
The Greater Houston Area is home to approximately 5,946,800 residents (Greater 
Houston Partnership 2009). This number takes into account Galveston, Texas, a barrier 
island roughly 35 miles (56.3 kilometers) away from Houston. The New Orleans-
Metairie-Kenner Metropolitan Statistical area, which includes seven parishes (Jefferson, 
Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, and St. Tammany 
Parishes), has approximately 1,165,440 residents, based upon 2008 data from the Greater 
New Orleans website (Greater New Orleans, Inc. 2011).  
 
58 
Figure 3. New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner Metropolitan Statistical Area. Map created using 
the United States Census Bureau TIGERweb Application 
(http://tigerweb.geo.census.gov/tigerwebmain/TIGERweb_main.html)  
 
 
As these cities are only about 350 miles (563 kilometers) apart, they share a history of 
hurricane and tropical storm vulnerability. Between the years 1960 and 2010, these 
neighboring metropolitan areas have each experienced threats from eighteen storms 
(tropical storms and hurricanes combined)
8
. New Orleans is particularly vulnerable, as 
Keim and Muller comment that the city’s geographical placement makes it “...more storm 
                                                          
8. These numbers were calculated using the Historical Hurricane Tracks tool on the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (http://csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/). It reflects storm tracks that 
crossed over an area encompassing a 65-nautical mile radius from each city. As such, it does not reflect 
storms outside of this area, such as storms that may have approached the region but changed course before 
crossing into the 65-nautical mile boundary. 
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prone for hurricane disasters than any other major American city” (2009, 131). These 
cities are connected by Interstate 10 (I-10), a major thoroughfare used in both regular 
commerce as well as travel and evacuation. Both cities are also connected to several other 
major roadways, including Interstate 45, U.S. Highway 59, and U.S. Highway 290 for 
Houston and Interstates 55 and 59 for New Orleans. The maps below illustrate the 
placement of highways in these regions, as well as the location of some of the 
communities included in the greater city areas. 
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Figure 4. Map showing the roadways in the Houston area. Map data ©2013 Google.  
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Figure 5. Map showing the roadways in the New Orleans area. Map data ©2013 Google.  
 
In order to frame the discussion of hurricane experiences in the following 
chapters, this chapter defines tropical storms and hurricanes and provides a brief history 
of notable storms in these two areas. Even though the focus of most of the narratives in 
this thesis is on experiences of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Ike, the contextualization of 
these storms within the larger scope of storms in the eastern Texas/western Louisiana 
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coast offers a picture of how these specific events can feed into the broader cultural 
experiences of residents of the greater Houston and New Orleans areas. While this 
chapter does not address every storm in this region, it highlights many of the historically 
“major” storms that affected the region. This distinction is important because, for the 
individual resident, a storm not deemed major from a historical perspective may still be 
personally significant in its effect(s) on an individual and his/her family and friends. 
 
 
Defining Storms 
 
Tropical storms and hurricanes are both physical and social events. The storm is 
both a meteorological entity and an event that becomes woven into the experiences of 
individuals and communities (in both a small and large sense of community). 
Tropical storms and hurricanes that come into the Gulf of Mexico are related 
events that fall under the overall category of tropical cyclones, which are storm systems 
(often just referred to as storms) that consist of an organized system of thunderstorms that 
form over the warm ocean water of the Atlantic Ocean. More technically speaking, the 
National Weather Service National Hurricane Center defines a tropical cyclone as  
 
A warm-core non-frontal synoptic-scale cyclone, originating over tropical or 
subtropical waters, with organized deep convection and a closed surface wind 
circulation about a well-defined center. Once formed, a tropical cyclone is 
maintained by the extraction of heat energy from the ocean at high temperature 
63 
and heat export at the low temperatures of the upper troposphere. (National 
Hurricane Center 2011a) 
 
 
The term tropical cyclone describes a spectrum of systems ranging from tropical 
depressions to tropical storms to hurricanes. These systems are generally differentiated by 
wind speed, thunderstorm intensity, and the level of organization in the storm circulation. 
Tropical depressions are the weakest of the three systems, having the least defined 
circulation and wind speeds of 38 miles per hour (62 kilometers per hour) or less. 
Tropical storms have more definition and maximum sustained wind speeds between 39 
miles per hour (63 kilometers per hour) and 73 miles per hour (118 kilometers per hour). 
Hurricanes are the strongest of the three systems, with the most well defined circulations 
and sustained wind speeds of 74 miles per hour (119 kilometers per hour) or greater. As 
tropical cyclones become more organized and stronger, the center of the system will form 
the distinctive eye often pictured in hurricane images. The eye, though an area of 
relatively calm light winds at the axis of rotation for the cyclone, is surrounded by the 
eyewall that can have some of the highest winds of the system (Landsea 2011). 
 As tropical cyclones represent a spectrum of systems, storms that begin as tropical 
depressions may develop into tropical storms and, later, hurricanes if the ocean 
environment in which they develop is conducive to gaining strength and organization. 
Stronger systems also degrade, and hurricanes weaken to tropical storms and depressions 
and eventually lose their status as organized systems altogether. Storms tend to degrade 
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quickly after making landfall and moving over land
9
. Tropical cyclones are most likely to 
threaten the Gulf of Mexico during the Atlantic “hurricane season,” a period that runs 
from June 1 to November 30 (other regions of the world have differing “seasons” for 
tropical cyclones and related weather events). Although tropical storms and hurricanes 
can threaten southeast Texas and southwest Louisiana throughout hurricane season, the 
peak threat to the Texas coast is from August to September and the Louisiana coast from 
August to mid-October (National Weather Service, Southern Region Headquarters 2010 
and 2010-2011; Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 22). Many of the memorable storms 
in this region occur during these periods. Hurricane season is common knowledge to area 
residents. As K.C. G. told me, “Every hurricane season, I think, everyone in Houston 
goes, ‘OK, it’s June 1st, it’s time to start thinking about this.’ And every season I go, 
‘What am I going to do if a hurricane comes?’” In this way, the potential threat of 
hurricanes plays an annual role in residents’ lives, even as there is a chance that no major 
storm will threaten their area. Granted, not everyone shares the same seriousness to 
hurricane season. As New Orelans resident Ali J. noted in discussing why she never 
evacuated before Katrina, 
 
I never do because it’s—the people—it’s funny. They all know that I say this 
about them. As you’ve been through hurricane season, people just “Oh, it’s 
horrible!” I mean, there can be, like, a storm off the coast of Africa and people 
here are buying water, Sterno, they’re freaking out, making hotel reservations, and 
                                                          
9. A hurricane or tropical storm officially makes landfall when the center of the system intersects with 
land  (National Hurricane Center 2011a). 
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then they sit in traffic for a million hours to get to Baton Rouge. I’m like, no. It’s 
always just this total bullshit thing
10
. 
 
 
Even though residents take varying levels of response to hurricane season period, the 
time frame is one marked in residents’ minds. 
 Once a storm system becomes categorized as a tropical storm in the Atlantic 
Ocean, it is provided a name by the National Hurricane Center from a list of names 
maintained by the World Meteorological Organization, which maintains lists of storm 
names for a six-year cycle (National Hurricane Center 2011b). The official naming of 
Atlantic storms started in 1953. Before that, storms were identified by the phonetic 
alphabet (from 1950-52) or not officially named at all (Landsea 2010). If a tropical storm 
progresses to hurricane status, the name given to that system remains the same.  
 After running out of phonetic alphabet names, the National Weather Bureau 
transitioned to using women’s names. The names for hurricanes from 1954 until 1978 
were solely female names. Liz Skilton
11
 (2011) notes that the reason for using women’s 
names is unclear, though it quickly caught on in the media as a way to talk about 
hurricanes. Skilton mentions one legend about the origin of the gender choice: “The most 
popular version [of this story] is that of a Key West weatherman named ‘McAlphin’ who 
                                                          
10. “Through Hell and High Water: Katrina’s First Responders Oral History Project” Collection, 
Williams Research Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection. 
11. Liz Skilton's presentation, “Talking about The Tempest: Constructing a Gendered Hurricane,” 
provides  an informative overview of ways people have described hurricanes historically, focusing largely 
on the naming conventions in the last one hundred years and the gendered-related issues associated with 
these conventions.  
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described a particular hurricane headed towards Florida as looking ‘just like my wife 
Gretchen.’ The joke about a terrorizing ‘Gretchen’ was quickly passed on and eventually 
inspired the female-only naming system” (Skilton 2011, 10). The use of women female-
only names changed in 1978 for storms off the Pacific Coast, with worldwide transition 
occurring a year later (Skilton 2011, 14). After this, storm name lists have included both 
masculine and feminine names, though gender issues still surface in some descriptions of 
hurricanes. This tension is discussed in Macomber, Mallinson, and Seale’s (2011) work 
about sexuality and Hurricane Katrina novelty t-shirts, mentioned in the previous chapter.  
 The naming of these storms is interesting because, as Skilton comments, “Nothing 
about a cyclonic natural force is physically gendered or contains a specific sex” (2011, l, 
emphasis in original). However, these storms are given names that both identify them and 
gender them. Anthropomorphizing these systems by using human names gives further 
dimension to them as being significant. Skilton notes that, well before the naming 
conventions of the 1950s, hurricanes were attributed with human qualities, that 
“...humanistic descriptions of hurricanes increased as direct impact of hurricanes on 
humans was noted” (2011, 7). Considering the increased impact on people as population 
size in hurricane-prone areas grew and exposure to media increased, the use of human 
names to label and discuss these storms grew in popularity appears quite sensible. A 
hurricane is not simply a weather system, it is an entity that can enter a life and alter it 
immensely. Calling it by a human name seems to recognize its identity, making it a 
character in a person’s life story. It is worth noting that names of particularly damaging 
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storms are retired by the World Meteorological Organization and never used again, so as 
to respect the damage, both in life and property, wrought by a storm. 
 The issue of potential gender bias and hurricane naming was the subject of a 
recent study by Kiju Jung, Sharon Shavitt, Madhu Viswanathan, and Joseph M. Hilbe. 
The authors posit that male-named hurricanes are considered riskier than female-named 
hurricanes due to ingrained cultural sexism, resulting in less preparation for “female” 
hurricanes. As they comment,  
 
Feminine-named hurricanes (vs. masculine-named hurricanes) cause significantly 
more deaths, apparently because they lead to lower perceived risk and 
consequently less preparedness. Using names such as Eloise or Charlie for 
referencing hurricanes has been thought by meteorologists to enhance the clarity 
and recall of storm information. We show that this practice also taps into well-
developed and widely held gender stereotypes, with potentially deadly 
consequences. (Jung et. al 2014, 8782)  
 
 
To this thinking, people tend to downplay the danger of female-named hurricanes, which 
can result in those storms causing more damage and death. This research was picked up 
by media outlets, such as the Washington Post via a blog post on June 2, 2014. The post 
discussed the research findings and the reaction of several weather experts, who, though 
interested in having the findings explored further, felt that the effects of the name alone 
needed more support before being considered a significant factor. The reader comments 
to this article were more strongly sceptical, with comments ranging from criticisms of 
statistics and methodology to general lampooning about either the article (such as “I can’t 
believe I wasted my time reading this...so I’ll waste a little more by commenting. Like 
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someone commented, let’s name them all with male names from now on, but then we 
would need to call them “himmacanes”!”) or gender issues in general (such as “The real 
problem here is the female-named storms are only paid 77 cents on the dollar compared 
to male-named storms. Just kidding.”). In this way, although the statistical analyses in the 
article may point towards the potential dangers from the gendered naming of hurricanes, 
the findings may not resonate with the audience whom the research is ultimately aiming 
to protect. 
 In the context of the research for this thesis, the issue of the implications of male- 
versus female-named hurricanes did not come up frequently. Most of the time, the 
referencing of gender came up in media coverage of storms, such as when a Houston 
public official noted “I don’t think history will remember Rita as a lady” (Cappiello et al. 
2005, para. 30). In the fieldwork interviews conducted for this thesis, the gendering of 
storms (beyond simply using the storm’s name) did not surface much at all. One example 
was when Stacy C. described her refusal to evacuate for Hurricane Rita after her 
experiences with Hurricane Katrina
12
: “Over my dead body. I will not get in that car 
again... If Rita wants to take me, she can take me. I’m done. I am done” (emphasis mine). 
Here, the hurricane is a “she,” but her femininity is not what influenced the response, her 
past experiences were
13
. 
                                                          
12. Stacy C.’s experiences are discussed more in Chapter Four. 
13. This is not to say that naming conventions cannot influence decisions in hurricane preparation. 
Instead, I am pointing out that this did not seem to overtly surface much in my own fieldwork. 
69 
 When a tropical cyclone reaches hurricane status, one of the most common 
descriptors of the system’s intensity is its wind speed, as indicated as its scale number on 
the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale
14
. The wind speed measurement considered for 
the scale is the maximum 1-minute surface wind speed (Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 
2011, 3). With that in mind, the Saffir-Simpson scale includes five categories of 
hurricane intensity: 
 
 Category 1: 74-95 miles per hour (119-153 kilometers per hour) 
 Category 2: 96-110 miles per hour (154-177 kilometers per hour) 
 Category 3: 111-130 miles per hour (178-209 kilometers per hour) 
 Category 4: 131-155 miles per hour (210-249 kilometers per hour) 
 Category 5: Greater than 155 miles per hour (Greater than 249 kilometers 
per hour) 
 
It is worth noting, though, that the Saffir-Simpson scale does not take heavy rainfall into 
account in its categories of intensity (Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 3). In this way, 
although a Category 3 hurricane and above is considered “major” by the National 
Hurricane Center (National Hurricane Center 2011a), a “weaker” hurricane (and even a 
tropical storm) can produce heavy and destructive rainfalls. In other words, a hurricane’s 
                                                          
14. Blake, Landsea, and Gibney (2011) note that the original Saffir-Simpson scale was based on wind, 
central pressure, and storm surge values and that it has only been since 1990 that the scale has come to 
categorize them only by maximum 1-minute sustained wind speed. 
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intensity on the Saffir-Simpson scale does not necessarily serve as a complete indicator 
of the threat a storm can pose to residents in its path. However, residents may play down 
the threat posed by a tropical cyclone at tropical storm or Category 1 level. Tropical 
Storm Allison, discussed later, serves as an excellent example of how a weaker system 
can still have significant impacts on people and communities. This sometimes also 
surfaces in offhand comments by residents. Vicki B. noted regarding early information 
about Hurricane Ike that, “As Ike was coming in as a Cat 1, Cat 2 hurricane, it was like, 
‘Pfffbbbt [a derisive sound]!’” Even though lower category storms can cause serious 
damage, their category label can reduce residents’ concern. 
 With this in mind, the task of describing storms as “major” or “memorable” 
becomes more than a simple task of knowing a storm’s category on the Saffir-Simpson 
scale. Keim and Muller point this out succinctly:  
 
Potential factors [for choosing memorable Gulf Coast hurricanes to discuss in 
their book] include storm intensities in terms of the Saffir-Simpson scale…; 
maximum heights of storm surges; loss of life; monetary estimates of property, 
business, and infrastructure losses; the collective impacts on the socioeconomic 
functions of communities and cities; and, of course, the personal narratives of the 
survivors. (2009, 68)
15
 
 
 
In their 2011 National Hurricane Center report, “The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most 
Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2010 (and Other Frequently 
Requested Hurricane Facts),” Eric S. Blake, Christopher W. Landsea, and Ethan S. 
                                                          
15. The National Hurricane Center (2011a) defines a storm surge as an “An abnormal rise in sea level 
accompanying a hurricane or other intense storm, and whose height is the difference between the observed 
level of the sea surface and the level that would have occurred in the absence of the cyclone.” 
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Gibney present rankings of storm systems based on these factors of impact. Table 2 
synthesizes the top ten storm systems in each category. Of these storms, ones that 
threatened the Greater Houston and Greater New Orleans areas are highlighted.  
 
Table 2. Summary of top-ten hurricanes across several variables 
Deadliest Storms Costliest Storms 
(values not adjusted 
for inflation) 
Costliest Storms 
(values adjusted to 
2010 U.S. dollars) 
Most Intense Storms 
(defined as central 
pressure at landfall) 
 
1. TX (1900) 1. Katrina (2005) 1. Katrina (2005) 1. FL (1935) 
2. FL (1928) 2. Ike (2008) 2. Andrew (1992) 2. Camille (1969) 
3. Katrina (2005) 3. Andrew (1992) 3. Ike (2008) 3. Katrina (2005) 
4. LA (1893) 4. Wilma (2005) 4. Wilma (2005) 4. Andrew (1992) 
5. SC/GA (1893) 5. Ivan (2004) 5. Ivan (2004) 5. TX (1886) 
6. GA/SC (1881) 6. Charley (2004) 6. Charley (2004) 6. FL/TX (1919) 
7. Audrey (1957) 7. Rita (2005) 7. Hugo(1989) 7. FL (1928) 
8. FL (1935) 8. Frances (2004) 8. Rita (2005) 8. Donna (1960) 
9. LA (1856) 9. Allison (2001, 
tropical storm) 
9. Agnes (1972) 8. FL/MS/AL (1926) 
[tie] 
10. FL/MS/AL 
(1926) 
10. Jeanne (2004) 10. Betsy (1965) 10. Carla (1961) 
Source: Data adapted from Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 7-13. 
This table illustrates two points. One, these two cities have a history of being threatened 
by significant storms as defined in a variety of ways. Two, storms that can be defined as 
significant by one measurement may not be considered as significant by another 
measurement. Granted, in the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, a storm can have 
significance across multiple measurements. However, the perspective taken when looking 
at tropical storms and hurricanes does contribute to how we conceptualize the magnitude 
of the storm. This process of conceptualization comes into play in the discussion here 
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because both lay and official sources often refer to storms in the past when discussing 
storms in the present. By doing so, they can evoke different images of danger, from death 
to destruction. References of past storms, therefore, are part of the discussion of media 
narrative (Chapter Three) and lay narrative (Chapter Four). 
 
 
A Selection of Past Storms 
 
 For the purposes of framing the research in the coming chapters, the next section 
of this chapter highlights some of the notable storms over the last fifty years (with an 
exception being made for the 1900 Galveston Hurricane). As has been discussed 
previously, the labeling of a storm as major or important is a relative process, and this 
section only seeks to provide thumbnail sketches of some of the storms in the region. For 
the most part, these sketches report the basic physical elements of the storm, such as 
intensity and costliness. As most of the storms here occurred within the last fifty years, 
they are weather events that can still live on in the recent memory of area residents within 
the last few generations—and, indeed, mentions of some of these storms did surface in 
the interviews collected in the course of this research process—and they form some of the 
basis of hurricane culture in the region. The storms are addressed in chronological order. 
For the sake of covering basic details of storms across several decades, each storm is 
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touched upon briefly. Later chapters will delve more deeply into three specific storms, 
weaving in details that go beyond basic physical dimensions. 
 
The 1900 Galveston Hurricane 
 On September 8, 1900, Galveston Island was struck by a hurricane that would 
become colloquially known as “The Great Storm.” At the turn of the twentieth century, 
Galveston was a prominent city, described as the “third richest city in the United States in 
proportion to population” (Scharnweher, ed. quoted in Greene and Kelly 2000, 3). As 
David G. McComb writes of Galveston at the end of the nineteenth century: “Galveston 
still was the most important port [of Texas], it was the first to have telephones and 
electricity, it had the best newspapers and theater, it had the greatest variety of sports, it 
had the most individual wealth and the most advanced architecture, and it was a place of 
unique, sensual beauty which every visitor could feel” (1986, 118). However, as the city 
stood directly on the Gulf Coast and only at a maximum elevation of 8.7 feet (2.65 
meters) above sea level (Greene and Kelly 2000, 5), the city was extremely vulnerable to 
hurricane threats. The city’s status of prominence, therefore, took a significant hit when 
the storm ravaged the city, and the hurricane became the deadliest storm to strike the 
mainland United States to date. Current reports place the deaths caused by the 1900 storm 
to be approximately 8,000, with the possibility of being up to 12,000 (Blake, Landsea, 
and Gibney 2011, 7). The cost of life from this storm is significant, and the hurricane is a 
notable part of Galveston history. 
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Figure 6. The 1900 Storm Memorial by David W. Moore, located on the Galveston 
Seawall. 
 
 
 Unfortunately, the residents of Galveston were provided little warning of the 
storm threat posed by the hurricane. No hurricane warning was ever issued by the 
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Weather Bureau in Washington, and Isaac Cline, chief of the Galveston Weather Bureau 
office, only issued a storm warning. As Keim and Muller note, “...most city officials and 
the public, including Cline and the other Weather Bureau personnel, anticipated a day of 
stormy weather but nothing that had not been experienced before” (2009, 7). Hence, little 
preparation or evacuation occurred, and residents went about their business, some even 
taking time to enjoy the pleasant weather that preceded the landing of the hurricane. 
 The Category 4 hurricane devastated the city. Hundreds of acres of shoreline were 
cleared by the storm, and “[thousands] of houses, the wharves, railroad bridges, and 
telegraph connections to the outside world were lost” (Greene and Kelly 2009, 4). The 
city faced huge struggles to recover, which included the challenges of disposing of large 
numbers of dead bodies, a task that was first attempted by burial at sea. When that failed, 
disposal was accomplished through the use of funeral pyres. Despite the setbacks and 
tragedies experienced by Galveston and its residents in the 1900 Hurricane, the city was 
rebuilt. Part of the rebuilding of the city included the creation of a seawall and the raising 
and grading of the entire city. The seawall, initially completed in 1904, initially stood 17 
feet high and stretched for 3.3 miles (Galveston and Texas History Center, Rosenberg 
Library 2004). Over the following decades, the seawall has been developed and extended 
to protect a larger portion of the island. However, although the city was revived, 
Galveston never regained its prominence as a major city in Texas, and Houston became 
the major port city of the area with the opening of its Ship Channel in 1914. The 1900 
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Galveston Hurricane stands out as a significant storm not only due to its large death toll 
but also its impact in the historical development of cities in the region. 
 
Hurricane Carla 
 Hurricane Carla struck the Texas Gulf Coast on September 11, 1961. Although it 
struck as an intense Category 4 storm near Port O’Connor (well over 100 miles [160 
kilometers] southwest of Galveston), it still struck Galveston with tropical storm-force 
winds (Keim and Muller 2009, 147). Carla created a maximum storm surge of 22 feet, 
with flooding at some parts of the Texas coast that went ten miles inland, and a nine foot 
tide at Galveston (McComb 1986, 26; Keim and Muller 2009, 151). In addition, Carla 
spawned 26 tornadoes during its strike on Texas. One tornado, out of the four that hit the 
area, caused notable damage in Galveston. Tornado activity in Galveston cost the city 
120 buildings and the lives of six people (McComb 1986, 149). 
 What is particularly important to note, though, is the damage avoided with 
Hurricane Carla. Due to early warnings, there was an evacuation of about a quarter of a 
million people from Galveston and the surrounding areas (Larson 1999, 272). In addition, 
the Galveston seawall held up to Carla’s force, which is why most of the damage wrought 
by the storm resulted from the tornadoes that the hurricane caused, not the storm surge 
and flooding. In addition, the news coverage surrounding Carla marked the beginning of 
the national career of long-time news anchor Dan Rather and the first time that televised 
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news showed a live radar image of a hurricane on air (Keim and Muller 2009, 147; 
Holguin 2009). 
 
Hurricane Betsy 
 Hurricane Betsy threatened the Gulf Coast in September 1965. After initially 
making landfall near the southern tip of Florida as a Category 3 storm, Betsy moved into 
the Gulf of Mexico and ballooned into a Category 5 hurricane. The hurricane landed 
again on September 10 as a Category 3 storm at Grand Isle, Louisiana, just 50 miles (80.5 
kilometers) south of New Orleans. The winds at New Orleans were significantly weaker, 
measured at speeds near Category 1 strength (Keim and Muller 2009, 84). 
 Although the winds from Betsy seem less significant in relative terms, the ten-
foot storm surge breached the levees protecting New Orleans, causing “massive breaks” 
in the levee system (Keim and Muller 2009, 86; Lewis 2003, 82). About 250,000 people 
evacuated the area, and about 150,000 homes were flooded (Keim and Muller 2009, 85). 
The aftermath from Betsy marked the first time in the United States that a hurricane 
exceeded $1 billion in damages, earning the nickname “Billion Dollar Betsy” (Keim and 
Muller 2009, 84). Needless to say, Betsy was nowhere near the last hurricane to cause 
this amount of damage or more. By the time that Blake, Landsea, and Gibney compiled 
their list of the top 30 costliest mainland United States tropical cyclones from 1900-2010, 
Betsy only ranked 25
th
 place.  
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Hurricane Camille 
 Hurricane Camille made landfall on August 17, 1969 at Venice, Louisiana, 
southeast of New Orleans. The center of the storm missed New Orleans by only about 50 
miles (80.5 kilometers). As a Category 5 storm, Camille had maximum sustained winds 
between 190 and 205 miles per hour (305 to 330 kilometers per hour), making it the 
strongest landfall in United States history (Keim and Muller 2009, 87). As metropolitan 
New Orleans was on the weaker side of the storm circulation (colloquially called the 
“clean” side of the storm16), it did not sustain as much damage as might be expected 
given the strength of the storm. Also, advance warnings and the implementation of 
mandatory evacuation minimized the loss of life. On the eastern side of the landfall, 
however, residents were faced with more destruction. As Keim and Muller write: “Along 
the Mississippi Coast, almost all buildings from the Louisiana border to Biloxi and up to 
three miles inland were destroyed, much of it by the high-record storm surge of 22.6 feet 
at Bay St. Louis” (2009, 87-88). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also noted “less 
reliable [high-water] marks” at Pass Christian of 24.2 and 24.6 feet (qtd. in Lewis 2003, 
82). 
 Approximately 140 people drowned due to Hurricane Camille, most in 
Mississippi. In addition, the storm was so strong that more deaths occurred in West 
                                                          
16. Storms in the northern hemisphere rotate counter-clockwise, which means that the easterly side of 
the storm is “the most powerful part…with the strongest winds, heaviest rains and most energy that can 
lead to a high storm surge” (Myrie 2011). This side is often referred to as the “dirty” side of the storm. The 
westerly, “clean” side of the storm, in contrast, has less energy and moisture. 
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Virginia and Virginia due to people being taken off-guard by floods and mudflows 
caused by Camille’s inland rains (Keim and Muller 2009, 88). Camille caused $1.42 
billion in damages (in 1969 currency, $9.282 billion by 2010 standards) (Blake, Landsea, 
and Gibney 2011, 9-11). 
 Both Camille and Betsy caused strong impressions on residents who experienced 
them and who have heard stories about them. While talking about the time period before 
Hurricane Katrina, Ali J. noted the moment she decided to evacuate: 
 
I went and helped her [a friend] pack up animals at her animal shelter, and then, 
you know, was still, like, just totally undecided [about evacuating]. Then the 
weather lady came on. The point of my story is the weather lady came on TV that 
night and said, “If you stay, you need to get an ax and have it in your attic,” 
because during Hurricane Betsy that’s where so many people drowned and died, 
in their attics. When I heard that, I said, I probably should leave town, so we did 
the next day
17
. 
 
 
The memory of death by waiting out flood waters in an attic resonated enough with Ali J. 
to push her into evacuating for the first time. Area resident Glen K. had first-hand 
memories of staying in his attic during these storms. He noted, 
 
I remember being in our attic on Magazine Street as the water was coming up. It 
didn’t get really high there. My dad was in the National Guard and they actually 
had to go to Chalmette [Louisiana] to go…And they had to leave us during the 
storm, and told us to get in our attic. Because they were hearing all they water 
levels down in St. Bernard and all and they were getting scared because the water 
was coming up in New Orleans, but it never did get really bad. But I remember 
my dad and the news reports. Same thing with them getting people off of the 
                                                          
17. “Through Hell and High Water: Katrina’s First Responders Oral History Project” Collection, 
Williams Research Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection. 
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rooftops. People having to bust holes through their attics to get out and get on the 
roof
18
. 
 
 
Even though Glen K.’s experience is not of direct experience with storm waters, his 
memories from his father’s experience have remained strong to him. Also worth noting 
here is the parallel made in the last two sentences between memories of these older 
storms and the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina, decades later. These connections 
with previous storm experiences are discussed further in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
Hurricane Alicia 
 Unlike the other storms mentioned thus far, Hurricane Alicia was not identified as 
a tropical storm until it was close to shore, on August 15, 1983, when it was only 300 
miles (483 kilometers) southeast of Galveston. By the time it landed on August 18, Alicia 
was a Category 3 storm (Keim and Muller 2009, 147). As the eye passed over the far 
west end of Galveston Island (McComb 1986, 26), Galveston found itself on the dirty 
side of the storm, which placed the city in a vulnerable position. Minimal evacuations 
occurred before the storm. Keim and Muller note that only ten percent of Galveston area 
residents evacuated, and due to the suddenness of the storm, by the time the storm had 
become a major concern, evacuation off the island was impossible (2009, 147). Alicia 
had the potential to be extremely dangerous for the area. 
                                                          
18. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
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 The Galveston seawall again held up under the threat of the hurricane, and the 
city behind the seawall had minimal damage, most of which was due to winds. The area 
not protected by seawall, however, did not fare as well. Alicia washed away between 50 
to 200 feet of beach (McComb 1986, 149). The erosion caused some private property to 
end up on public land, which, due to the Texas Open Beaches Act, caused legal issues as 
to whether property owners could rebuild on their land or repair their buildings (National 
Weather Service, Houston/Galveston 2010). Total damages caused by Alicia are 
estimated at around $4.6 billion (2010 values) (Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 11). 
Alicia also claimed 21 lives, although no deaths were on Galveston Island (Keim and 
Muller 2009, 147; McComb 1986, 149). Some damage was noted in Houston, as well, 
when winds blew gravel off of downtown skyscrapers, which broke windows on several 
buildings and led to changes in building codes (Keim and Muller 2009, 147-148). 
 
Tropical Storm Allison 
 Tropical Storm Allison is the only tropical storm addressed in this section, but it 
stands out due to the impact it had on the Greater Houston area. Interestingly, there were 
two Tropical Storm Allisons of note, one in 1989 and the other in 2001, the latter being 
more the focus of this discussion. Both storms landed near Freeport, Texas, south of 
Houston, and both storms looped around southeast Texas. The 2001 storm, however, has 
the distinction of being the only tropical storm-level cyclone deemed destructive enough 
to have its name retired. 
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 On June 5, 2001, Tropical Storm Allison made landfall around Freeport with 
sustained winds around 50 miles per hour (80.5 kilometers per hour). The storm moved 
slowly across eastern Texas as a tropical depression, as far north as around Lufkin, before 
turning and drifting back to the Gulf of Mexico, where Allison regained strength. Later, 
Allison landed again near Morgan City, Louisiana and moved across the southeast United 
States as a depression, before becoming a tropical storm again over Atlantic waters near 
Atlantic City, New Jersey (Keim and Muller 2009, 96). In total, Allison caused 41 deaths 
(23 in Texas) and almost $11 billion (2010 values) in damages (Stewart 2002; Blake, 
Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 11). 
 Allison is most noted for the damages it brought upon Houston during three 
rounds of extremely heavy rain. The multiple rainfalls occurred due to the slow 
movement of the system and the looping path it took across southeast Texas. According 
to Keim and Muller these three rainfall periods drenched the area (2009, 96): 
 
1. June 5, 2001: up to 8-12 inches (203-305 mm) of rain in Houston and 
parts of Harris County 
2. June 7, 2001: 5-12 inches (127-305 mm) in the area 
3. June 8-9, 2001: 4 inches (102 mm) of rain an hour (26 inches [660 
mm] measured by one particular gauge) 
 
83 
The heavy rain caused a standstill in the Houston area, with considerable flooding that 
made many major roadways impassible. Thousands of homes and vehicles were flooded. 
Also, among the flooding losses was approximately $2 billion (2007 values) of damage to 
the Texas Medical Center in Houston, the largest medical center in the world (Keim and 
Muller 2009, 97). Damages were incurred as bottom levels of hospitals and other medical 
facilities were flooded and thousands of patients had to be moved to other locations. 
Overall, Allison is notable because of the surprising amount of impact it had for its 
seemingly weak intensity. As Keim and Muller note, “These [the amount of Allison’s 
damage] are amazing losses for such a weak tropical meteorological system—hardly 
identifiable on the daily weather maps for North America” (2009, 97). 
 
Hurricane Gustav 
 Hurricane Gustav entered the Gulf of Mexico at the end of August 2008. While in 
the Gulf, the storm grew in size, though wind shear and dry air seem to have presented 
the storm from significantly strengthening (Beven II and Kimberlain 2009, 2). On 
September 1, 2008, the storm made landfall near Cocodrie, Louisiana, approximately 60 
miles (96.6 kilometers) southeast of New Orleans as a Category 2 storm (Keim and 
Muller 2009, 190). 
 Two days before Gustav’s landfall, Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, called for 
an evacuation of the city. Due to Nagin’s comments about Gustav being “the mother of 
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all storms
19” and the “storm of the century” (Nossiter and Dewan 2008) and that Gustav 
was the first hurricane to seriously threaten New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
(see next section), large numbers of New Orleans residents left the area. Approximately 
1.9 million people were evacuated, making the evacuation for Gustav the “largest and 
most orderly evacuation in Louisiana history” (Keim and Muller 2009, 190).  
 Due to Gustav having weakened to tropical storm strength by the time it was over 
New Orleans, damages to the city were less than expected, and storm waters did not 
breach the levees. Damages to other parishes around New Orleans, however, were 
greater. Louisiana cities, such as Houma and Baton Rouge, were much more affected. For 
example, Baton Rouge sustained more property loss from Gustav than from Hurricane 
Betsy in 1965 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992, two significantly destructive storms to that 
area (Keim and Muller 2009, 192). Overall, even though Gustav did not do much damage 
to New Orleans, it took 43 lives in the United States and cost between $4.8 and $8.3 
billion in damages (Keim and Muller 2009, 192; Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 11). 
 
 
                                                          
19. Given that the storm had a masculine name, it is interesting to see Mayor Nagin call it a “mother.” 
Granted, it could be argued that the essence of the use of “mother” in this manner could also be invoking 
the idea of “mother***er,” a term that would not be appropriate for a public official to exclaim. 
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Three Particular Storms 
 
 This section provides basic information about the three particular hurricanes 
discussed throughout the rest of this project: Hurricane Katrina (2005), Hurricane Rita 
(2005), and Hurricane Ike (2008). Each of these hurricanes has had notable effects on the 
recent history of the Greater Houston area and Greater New Orleans area, and they were 
the primary foci of the interviews conducted in the research process. As media, 
government, and personal narratives about these storms will be the subjects of deeper 
discussion in the following chapters, the descriptions in this section serve to provide 
preliminary information to place these particular storms alongside the other systems 
previously discussed. 
 
Hurricane Katrina 
 According to the information presented in Table 2, Hurricane Katrina is the only 
storm to be in the top 10 for each of the dimensions addressed by Blake, Landsea, and 
Gibney’s report. The myriad of impacts that Katrina had on the country, especially in 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, combined to make Katrina one of the most 
devastating natural disasters in United States history. 
 Hurricane Katrina occurred during the record-making 2005 hurricane season, 
during which 27 named storms were identified
20
, including several threats specifically to 
                                                          
20. After the list of official hurricane names is exhausted, the National Hurricane Center names 
hurricanes after letters in the Greek alphabet (Alpha, Beta, and so on). 
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the Gulf Coast region. Hurricane Cindy, although at the time at tropical storm strength, 
had already visited the New Orleans area, only causing minimal damage (Keim and 
Muller 2009, 19). When Hurricane Katrina entered into the Gulf around August 26 (three 
days before making landfall near New Orleans), the storm was a minimal Category 1. 
Predictive models initially had the risk of a landfall near New Orleans as very low (Keim 
and Muller 2009, 25). However, the storm quickly intensified, and the predictive models 
changed tracks for the storm. By the end of August 26, the winds were up to 105 miles 
per hour (169 kilometers per hour), and “the official consensus prediction [of weather 
models was that the threat was focused on]…Plaquemines Parish and New Orleans” 
(Keim and Muller 2009, 26), marking a dramatic change in strength and threat to the 
New Orleans area. Over the course of the next day, the predicted landfall of the storm 
jogged a bit to the east, to southeast Louisiana/south Mississippi, and Katrina continued 
to grow from a Category 3 to a Category 4 storm. By nine o’clock in the morning on 
August 27, two Louisiana parishes called for mandatory evacuations because of the 
storm, and at five o’clock that evening, New Orleans mayor, Ray Nagin, declared a state 
of emergency for the city and called for a voluntary evacuation (although many residents 
chose not to heed the voluntary evacuation order).  
On August 28, the day before landfall, Katrina grew to a Category 5 storm over 
Gulf waters, and the threat for landfall had refocused again near New Orleans. That 
morning, at 9:30, Mayor Nagin issued a mandatory evacuation (less than 24 hours before 
landfall) and designated the Superdome, the major sports arena, as a shelter of last resort. 
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It is estimated that 100,000 people remained in the New Orleans area even after the 
mandatory evacuation order (Keim and Muller 2009, 29). 
Katrina ended up taking a path similar to that of Hurricane Camille, about 36 
years earlier. The storm made landfall as a Category 3 storm at Plaquemines Parish in the 
early morning of August 29. The storm brought with it a strong storm surge, flooding 
waters, strong winds, and tornadoes that wreaked havoc in the area. (In total, Katrina 
caused 43 tornadoes, though most of them touched down in Georgia, Alabama, and 
Missisissippi and none were reported in Louisiana [Knabb, Rhome, and Brown 2011, 
10].) The New Orleans levees crumbled, causing widespread flooding to the area
21
. The 
flooding was worsened by the levees on the Lake Pontchartrain side of the city being 
breached by the storm surge of lake waters caused by shifting winds as the hurricane 
moved inland. There was extensive damage to roadways and buildings in the Greater 
New Orleans area, and to many areas on the Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama. As Keim and Muller note: “The three nineteenth-century beach towns just east 
of New Orleans—Waveland, Bay St. Louis, and Pass Christian—all heavily damaged by 
Hurricane Camille in 1969—were virtually swept off the map by the storm surge” (2009, 
31-32). 
 
 
                                                          
21. There is also the belief that the levees were intentionally blown up. 
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Figure 7. Map showing the track of Hurricane Katrina. Map created using the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Historical Hurricane Tracks database 
(http://csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/)  
 
After the storm, thousands were rescued from New Orleans in large-scale rescue 
attempts, although, during the days of evacuations huge numbers of people were stranded 
on tops of buildings and on roadways. Other areas were served by rescue attempts, 
although many of these were delayed due to lack of resources or accessibility to the area. 
For example, federal disaster responders did not reach Bay St. Louis until more than three 
days after Katrina made landfall (Keim and Muller 2009, 35). Large numbers of Katrina-
affected people were displaced, with nearly a quarter of a million people in “officially 
designated shelters and hotels in Texas” (Keim and Muller 2009, 39). According to the 
Houston Chronicle, about 150,000 of those individuals came to Houston itself (2006, 
para. 1). From the tri-state area of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, more than 1.7 
million people were displaced and ended up in almost all of the 50 states (Keim and 
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Muller 2009, 39). The death toll from Hurricane Katrina varies from about 1,200 (Blake, 
Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 7) to 1,350 (Keim and Muller 2009, 43). The mass movement 
of people and widespread damage made accurate death toll counts difficult. 
 In New Orleans, the levee breaches were not closed off until September 5, 2005, 
and, by that time, eighty percent of the city was flooded (Keim and Muller 2009, 39). The 
Army Corps of Engineers did not deem the city dry until October 11. The damages from 
Katrina made it the costliest storm in United States history with $106 billion in damages 
(2010 values) (Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 11). The hurricane caused population 
loss as well, with the U.S. Census estimating that coastline counties affected by 
Hurricane Katrina had an overall two percent decrease in population
22
 (Wilson and 
Fischetti 2010, 20). 
 
Hurricane Rita 
 Less than a month after Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita threatened the Texas-
Louisiana coast. After entering the Gulf on September 20, Rita grew to a Category 5 
storm. While in the Gulf, the landfall projections targeted New Orleans, still reeling from 
Katrina, and later Houston and Galveston, where thousands of Katrina survivors were 
trying to recover (Keim and Muller 2009, 104). Fortunately for both cities, Rita 
weakened while still over the Gulf. Hurricane Rita finally made landfall on September 24 
as a Category 3 storm near the Texas-Louisiana border. 
                                                          
22. Wilson and Fischetti’s report does not specify the types of decrease included in this figure 
(relocation, death, etc.). 
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Figure 8. Map showing the track of Hurricane Rita. Map created using the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Historical Hurricane Tracks database 
(http://csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/) 
 
 In the days leading up to landfall, when both New Orleans and Houston-
Galveston were in the direct projected path of the storm—and memories of Katrina were 
still fresh in the memories of residents—mass evacuations were ordered in several 
locations on the Gulf Coast. The evacuations for Rita were the largest in United States 
history at that time, with an estimated three million people evacuating across all the states 
threatened by Rita (Keim and Muller 2009, 104). In Texas alone, the evacuation may 
have been larger than two million people (Knabb, Brown, and Rhome 2011, 8). The 
evacuation of Houston-Galveston received a great deal of media attention, due to the 
extensive gridlock on the highways leaving the region to the north and the west. 
Residents from the area who evacuated often found themselves on the highways between 
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twelve to thirty-six hours, depending upon their planned destination (frequently Austin or 
Dallas, cities usually three to five hours away from the area). 
 The direct death toll of Rita was low in large-scale terms, with only seven deaths 
resulting from the storm itself (Knabb, Brown, and Rhome 2011, 8). Most of Rita’s toll 
on life was from the mass evacuations in Texas. This toll is reported as including at least 
55 lives. Twenty-four of these deaths were from a bus accident on the way to Dallas, a 
majority of passengers being elderly nursing home residents from Bellaire, a 
neighborhood within the Houston area (Belli and Falkenberg 2005). Other deaths 
occurred due to carbon monoxide poisoning and heat exhaustion during the evacuation 
effort. 
 Hurricane Rita caused damages estimated at between $11.8 billion (2010 values) 
and $12.037 billion (Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 11; Knabb, Brown, and Rhome 
2011, 8). Even though New Orleans missed much direct damage from Rita, the storm still 
caused some levee breaching and flooding, causing setbacks to the Katrina repairs (Keim 
and Muller 2009, 142). Considerable damage occurred in the area near the Texas-
Louisiana border. As Knabb, Brown, and Rhome note, “The storm surge of Rita 
devastated entire communities in coastal areas of southwestern Louisiana... Almost every 
structure in these areas was destroyed, and some were completely swept away” (2011, 8). 
However, media attention tended to focus on the evacuation problems surrounding Rita, 
rather than on the damages done to these smaller towns near the border. 
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Hurricane Ike 
 Less than three years after Hurricane Rita, and less than two weeks after 
Hurricane Gustav, Hurricane Ike threatened the Houston-Galveston area. While in the 
Gulf of Mexico in mid-September 2008, Ike became a Category 3 storm, though it 
initially had the potential to grow to Category 4 intensity (Keim and Muller 2009, 194). 
However, the storm still was predicted to create large storm surges to Galveston Island 
and the nearby Bolivar Peninsula, to the east of the island. On September 13, Ike landed 
on Galveston Island as a Category 2 storm. Keim and Muller point out that the storm 
track ended up crossing on the eastern side of the island, which helped to protect the west 
end of the island (where the seawall does not extend) and the petrochemical companies 
farther west on the coast. They continue to note, though, that “the jog [in storm track] 
intensified the potential for disaster along the Houston Ship Channel, the greatest 
concentration of petrochemical complexes along the Gulf Coast” (Keim and Muller 2009, 
194). 
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Figure 9. Map showing the track of Hurricane Ike. Map created using the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Historical Hurricane Tracks database 
(http://csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/) 
 
 Before the storm made landfall, a large number of residents evacuated the 
threatened areas. Another large-scale evacuation included about 2.2 million people from 
Texas, with about 130,000 evacuating in Louisiana (Keim and Muller 2009, 194). 
Compared to the evacuation for Hurricane Rita, however, this evacuation included 
noticeably fewer residents. Indeed, many residents chose to remain in areas under 
mandatory evacuation order, a number estimated at about 140,000 people (Keim and 
Muller 2009, 194). In this way, although many residents chose to leave, a considerable 
amount of people remained in threatened areas. 
 The storm surge on Bolivar Peninsula was between 15 and 20 feet (approximately 
4.5 to 6.1 meters), with an average of 4 feet (1.2 meters) of water covering the peninsula 
(Berg 2010, 6). The storm surge on Galveston Island was less strong, but still between 10 
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to 15 feet (approximately 3 to 4.5 meters). Ike is credited as creating the largest storm 
surge since Hurricane Carla (National Weather Service, Southern Region Headquarters. 
2010-2011). The rainfall from Ike reached a maximum measurement of 18.90 inches (480 
millimeters) just north of Houston (Berg 2010, 7).   
 The effects of Ike were felt over a large area. In Texas and Louisiana, about 2.6 
million people were without power (Keim and Muller 2009, 195), and many people were 
without power for weeks after the storm. According to Berg (2010), there were 20 direct 
deaths in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, with 12 from Galveston and the surrounding 
areas. In addition, there were 64 indirect deaths in Texas because of Ike (Berg 2010, 9). 
The damages incurred by Ike are estimated to be about $27.8 billion (2010 values) 
(Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011, 11). In Houston, many downtown buildings were 
damaged, including skyscrapers and Reliant Stadium. More striking, though, was the 
extensive damage to Galveston and the Bolivar Peninsula. Many buildings in downtown 
Galveston were flooded with about 6 feet (1.83 meters) of water, which coated the inside 
of buildings with debris, and seven buildings near the seawall were destroyed (Keim and 
Muller 2009, 195). Figure 10 illustrates the damage that occurred in informant Sharan 
Z.’s bookstore in Galveston.  
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Figure 10. Sign in Sharan Z’s bookstore in Galveston. The sign notes both the depth of 
the floodwaters in her store and the damage caused by the flooding. 
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In contrast to the buildings flooded but still standing in Galveston, many buildings on the 
Bolivar Peninsula were washed away by Ike, “...much like the Mississippi Gulf Coast 
during Katrina in 2005” (Keim and Muller 2009, 195).  Residents were not allowed back 
into the Galveston/Bolivar area until September 24, and it took even longer than that to 
restore basic services to the area. 
 These storms and others help to illustrate the long history of hurricanes that 
residents have experienced in this part of the Gulf Coast. This history provides the 
context to discuss narratives that have emerged from the three storms described in this 
final section. Chapters Three and Four will explore narratives from the official 
perspective through newspaper media and lay narratives from area residents. Behind the 
narratives from both perspectives, though, there is the constant backdrop of regional 
hurricane history.  
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Chapter Three: 
Media Narratives of Preparation 
 
“And perhaps most importantly, we know that few people in the modern world 
live in a vacuum of ignorance when it comes to hurricanes. The clarion warnings 
from hurricane forecasters have blared from television, the radio, the Internet and, 
yes, newspapers.” 
—Eric Berger, “The Sciguy” from the Houston Chronicle (2008, para. 10) 
 
  
In order to see the ways in which official and lay narratives interact regarding 
issues of hurricane preparation, we need to describe patterns within those narratives. For 
this discussion, the news media is being used as the voice of the “official” narrative. This 
choice reflects the tendencies of the news media to reach widely and to incorporate 
messages from other sources that may be thought of as official, such as government 
figures and “expert” groups (e.g., meteorologists).  These concepts of official and lay in 
the following chapters parallel the concepts of expert and lay in other folklore research, 
particularly that dealing with health and belief. In his article, “Folklore Studies Applied 
to Health,” David Hufford makes this delineation between the two: 
 
It is no accident, of course, that medical and scholarly views converge in a 
tendency to dismiss the knowledge claims of ordinary people. Both professional 
communities are faced with similar situations: each makes a claim to expert 
knowledge about the world, and alternative claims from non-experts—whether 
informants or patients—are a potential threat to professional authority. However, 
this is not only a problem in studying the relationships of doctors and patients, it 
is also a highly suggestive and fruitful place to begin to understand the interaction 
of official and folk traditions. We have here a process of intense social 
negotiation among competing constructions of reality, official realities versus the 
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realities of ordinary people—the starting point of folklore research, both 
historically and conceptually (DeVinne 1991 [citation in original]). It is in this 
competition that I locate my working definition of folklore—unofficial culture 
contrasted to official narrowly defined: “1. Of or pertaining to an office or post of 
authority” (DeVinne 1991 [citation in original]). (Hufford 1998, 301) 
 
In this sense, the “official” stance I explore in this discussion relates to the narratives 
espoused by those who hold “an office or post of authority” in contrast to the “lay” stance 
that relates to the narratives shared by “ordinary” people. I chose to use “official” instead 
of “expert” in this project because the authority of the narrative does not seem to come 
explicitly from professional credentials (such as the medical and advanced degrees that a 
doctor or a scholar would hold, to use the two categories of experts noted in Hufford’s 
quote), but from their position in relation to the lay person, either in the sense of being an 
elected official (such as a mayor or governor) or in the sense of communicative power 
(being a writer for the most widely circulated newspaper in a city). This is not to say that 
all people that fall into the category of official here would not also have “expert” 
credentials, as meteorologists, for example, have backgrounds that would make them 
expert in this sense. For that reason, the constructed narratives in newspapers can be 
thought of as having multiple claims to being representative of the official reality—
through their communicative power and through their representation of other kinds of 
officials. In this chapter, therefore, the focus will be on examining how official media 
expresses concepts of preparation. What do people need to do or need to have to be 
officially prepared? When should people stay and when should people go? What does a 
prepared person look like?  
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To explore these questions, this chapter will analyze newspaper articles to look 
for trends within their stories, focusing on newspaper stories in the days leading up to 
each storm. A three-to-four-day window leading up to each storm was chosen because 
official sources (emergency management, meteorologists, governmental officials) will 
usually begin to make concrete recommendations to residents within the 72 hours before 
a storm makes landfall. Due to hurricanes’ ability to shift course at periods of time 
beyond three days out, the storm track is often too uncertain for recommendations to start 
before this period. Also, the three-to-four-day window reflects that landfall can take place 
any time during a day and is not based on publication schedules. 
 The newspapers chosen for analysis are the largest newspapers in each affected 
area. Therefore, articles from the Times-Picayune (weekday circulation: 252,799) were 
examined for Hurricane Katrina and articles from the Houston Chronicle (weekday 
circulation: 554,783) were chosen for Hurricanes Rita and Ike (circulation numbers from 
Choi and Lin 2008, 295). These newspapers represent the widest circulations for their 
respective areas. Newspaper articles were chosen as the media of choice as they are 
widely accessible when published (being both a print medium and an Internet medium in 
the current age) and in archival form. Honing the scope to this time frame and these 
papers allowed for an examination of pre-storm messages communicated specifically to 
these areas through the newspaper outlets with the greatest exposure to the local public. 
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Newspaper Analysis 
 
 Newspapers serve as a window to the official stance on hurricane preparation and 
how it is presented to the general public. By creating narratives, news media tell the 
audience what the people “in charge” are thinking and what audience members should be 
doing. Building upon the introduction of lay verses official, crafting these narratives is a 
powerful thing in that it allows news media to portray officials and their instructions 
through the media’s own lens. These messages are then spread widely across the 
readership (in the case of newspapers). In this way, not only does the newspaper outlet 
communicate “official” messages, they wield an official power of their own in their 
relationship to the public at large. In other words, residents might not hear what was said 
through a press conference, but they might read or hear about it later on through the 
news.  
 My analysis blends both a content (what was discussed in the article) and 
structural (how the article was put together as a unit and as part of a larger newspaper) 
approach to looking at these texts, influenced by Ernest Zhang and Kenneth Fleming’s 
analysis of SARS coverage in Chinese newspapers and Yoonhyeung Choi and Ying-
Hsuan Lin’s analysis of newspaper coverage of three 2005 hurricanes. Each of these 
articles analyzed coverage from different points of emphasis. Zhang and Fleming focused 
on front-page news coverage of a major newspaper (and all pages of a weekly 
newspaper) to identify categories of information, placing any given story into one 
category. Choi and Lin focused on news stories relating to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 
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Wilma printed one week before the storms’ “occurrences” (not defined in the text). Their 
analysis included two newspapers each in Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. They coded 
content based on categories (e.g., outcomes of damages, severity of the hurricanes) and 
emotional versus logical framing patterns. These frames were “defined based on 
dimensions such as image evoking (vs. non-image evoking) and specific (vs. general, 
e.g., data, statistics)” (Choi and Lin 2008, 295).  
 In the present analysis, for content, I focused on pre-storm and preparation 
messages put forth to the readers: what kinds of actions should they take, what supplies 
are needed, etc. Also, I considered the sources referenced for this information, how 
different “voices” are used to convey information about what to do (or what is not being 
done). From a more structural perspective, I considered where within the paper as a 
whole articles were published, when available, as the front page and, by extension, the 
front section tend to cover the “most important news and breaking news” (Zhang and 
Fleming 2005, 326). This would be in comparison to pieces in other sections, such as the 
Entertainment section of the newspaper that is embedded further into the newspaper (in 
the Houston Chronicle, this section is the “Star” section). 
 Also, I looked at how each article sets the stage for what it presented (in other 
words, how the article frames the information). Framing information helps to influence 
how the information is interpreted. As Goffman notes, “the type of framework we 
employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied” (1974, 24). 
Newspaper texts are constructed in ways to affect the interpretation and understanding of 
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events and information. Choi and Lin used the emotional versus logical framing in their 
analysis. In my own, however, I considered what I term “official” versus “lay” framing. 
In this frame, I looked at whether the article itself opens from a lay perspective (a 
resident, a business owner, a general image of everyday life) or an official perspective 
(government official, the National Weather Service, etc.). The idea behind this framing 
approach is to see how the article is grounded—which kind of perspective it invokes from 
the beginning. When looking at official versus lay framing, I looked at the voices and 
images invoked in the first three or so sentences in each article. Most of the time, the 
official/lay stance was clear. When the stance was unclear, either due to both being 
represented in close proximity or the stance seeming neutral, this was noted (as blended 
or neutral, respectively). This approach to framing is influenced by the concept of the 
formulaic frame in folktales, in which the opening of the narrative shapes the audience 
expectations of what is to follow. In this sense, a media narrative opening with a public 
official discussing information about a storm cues a different expectation than one 
opening with a young woman planning for her wedding. 
 An important distinction to make between my analysis and both Zhang and 
Fleming’s and Choi and Lin’s is that my own analysis is not statistical in nature. Instead 
of looking for statistical relationships amongst the articles, I looked at how breaking 
down these articles helps to uncover patterns in the narratives they tell. As Elliott Oring 
notes in “Legend, Truth, and News,” although the press may try to present themselves as 
factual and objective, these concepts are actually illusory as the press controls the 
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selection and organization of its stories (1996, 329). In this way, the consideration of 
news stories is not too far afield from considering personal experience narratives, and, as 
I will later look at how residents construct preparedness from their perspective, an 
analysis of newspaper articles sheds light on how the press constructs preparedness from 
their perspective, which then allows for consideration of how these narratives can overlap 
and disagree.  
  
The Article Collection and Method 
 To locate newspaper articles for each storm, I performed archival searches via 
library databases. Searches were limited to the days leading up to the hurricane and by 
mentioning the name of the hurricane anywhere in the title or text of the article. Further, 
only articles before the hurricane in question were used; ones focusing on hurricane 
aftermath were not included because the focus of this analysis is on pre-storm preparation 
information and recommendations. 
 The total number of newspaper articles I examined was eighty-one. Eleven were 
pre-Katrina, forty-eight pre-Rita, and twenty-two pre-Ike. Table 3 below illustrates the 
spread of the articles analyzed by date.  
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Table 3. Articles analyzed by date 
Hurricane Katrina (Landfall: August 29, 2005) 
Total Articles Examined: 11 
 August 27 
2 
August 28 
5 
August 29 
4 
Hurricane Rita (Landfall: September 24, 2005) 
Total Articles Examined: 48 
September 20 
6 
September 21 
18 
September 22 
14 
September 23 
10 
Hurricane Ike (Landfall: September 13, 2008) 
Total Articles Examined: 22 
September 10 
1 
September 11 
4 
September 12 
11 
September 13 
6 
 
It is worth noting that Hurricane Rita—the hurricane often considered a “non-event” by 
Houston residents (though it did cause significant damage in East Texas)—garnered the 
most articles published that surfaced in my archive searches. This number likely indicates 
a spike in interest due to its closeness to Hurricane Katrina. The drop in number of 
articles for Hurricane Ike may also indicate a reduction in concern given the three years 
after Rita.  
 After determining the article collection, I created a chart to analyze the articles 
based on several dimensions: location in newspaper, opening frame used, preparation 
instructions provided, and whether lay voice was used (with examples when used). This 
approach was taken so that I could more clearly see patterns across articles that might 
provide insights into the narratives constructed. 
 When looking at the lay versus official framing, and how official and lay voices 
are used within the article, issues of authority come into play. The press itself holds a 
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certain authority. As Sue Robinson writes, “Journalists perform as storytellers and 
watchdogs, guidance counselors and history writers from within the established 
American institution of the press” (2009, 796), even though this position is not 
monolithic, given the rise of other forms of information dissemination (such as online). 
The voices within news stories, official and lay, “tend to be symbols of the institutional 
power elite...or archetypal characters who relay social ideologies and values” (Robinson 
2009, 797), with citizens generally portrayed as “passive, disengaged and two-
dimensional, with little agency or even a desire for agency” (Robinson 2009, 797). 
However, Robinson notes that these roles are shifting as more participation outside 
mainstream journalism occurs. In her analysis of mainstream and citizen-based 
journalism post-Katrina, Robinson notes how mainstream media portrayed citizens as 
larger symbols of morality than as regular people, a narrative device to construct the 
moral of the journalist’s narrative. As she states, “it is not so much citizens who show up 
in this narrative [of rebuilding] as the concept of citizenship” (Robinson 2009, 805).  
 My analysis here differs from Robinson’s in that I look at the narratives before the 
storms, articles dealing not with rebuilding but with preparation. In this sense, my 
analysis seeks to test this idea of lay person as symbol—are residents used as larger 
archetypal characters and, if so, what kinds? In addition, by considering official framing, 
I look at how newspaper media bolsters its authority through the use of official voices to 
open its narratives. 
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 For the purposes of this discussion, I begin by looking at some of the trends I 
noticed in the analysis. Since media narrative does not necessarily contain some of the 
vernacular patterns we might expect in a personal narrative discussed in Chapter One, 
such as false starts or shifts in verb tense which would be revised away though the editing 
process, I looked for other patterns that might hint at meaning. Then I discuss how some 
of these trends feed into the construction of the official narrative that seems to be created 
through these articles. Specifically, I want to consider messages communicated about 
preparation, how residents are portrayed by officials and how officials are portrayed by 
residents, and how preparedness themes seem to emerge through these messages.  
 
 
Some Trends from the Article Analysis 
 
Article Positioning in the Newspapers 
 First, I looked at where articles were located within the newspaper as a whole. 
Pre-Katrina articles were excluded from this part of the analysis because they all were in 
the National Section or were archived from the Web Edition (nine articles, one and two 
articles, respectively). Due to the small number of Hurricane Katrina articles, I opted to 
focus on the Houston Chronicle articles. The Houston Chronicle is divided into several 
main sections: 
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1. A-Front Page 
2. B-City and State 
3. C-Sports 
4. D-Business 
5. Star/E-Lifestyle and Entertainment 
 
A difference did emerge between the placement of coverage between Rita articles and Ike 
articles. Twenty-six (54%) of the Rita articles were Front Page material, compared with 
seven (32%) of Ike articles. Conversely, thirteen (27%) of Rita articles were in the City 
and State section compared with fourteen (64%) of the Ike articles. It is also interesting to 
note that nine (19%) of Rita articles surfaced in other sections of the newspaper, namely 
the Business and Star sections, whereas only one (5%) of the Ike articles showed up 
outside of the two front sections of the paper. These differences in placement may hint at 
different perspectives taken in relation to these storms, with Rita coverage being more “in 
the reader’s face” and spread across the paper as a whole and Ike coverage more locally 
focused. This more local focus also may make sense in light of the financial market 
failures around mid-September 2008, which competed for news story space with Ike’s 
approach. 
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Storms Referenced in Articles 
 While reading through the articles, I also noted the past hurricanes and tropical 
storms referenced in each article. I defined reference as a mention of the storm in the title 
or text of an article, as the mention of an event invokes memories or images of that event 
as a whole. Table 4 below shows the top storms by number of articles mentioning them: 
 
Table 4. Top storms referenced by articles
23
 
Top Storms Referenced in Articles 
(By number of articles in which the storm is mentioned) 
First Set: 
Pre-Katrina 
(11 articles) 
Second Set: 
Pre-Rita 
(48 articles) 
Third Set: 
Pre-Ike 
(22 articles) 
Ivan (2004): 3 (27%) 
Betsy (1965): 3 (27%) 
Dennis (2005): 2 (18%) 
Camille (1969): 2 (18%) 
Katrina (2005): 28 (58%) 
Allison (2001): 9 (19%) 
Alicia (1983): 7 (15%) 
Rita (2005): 14 (64%) 
Katrina (2005): 6 (27%) 
Gustav (2008): 5 (23%) 
 
 
 
Other storms were mentioned in the collected articles, but I focused on the ones garnering 
the bulk of references. Looking at the top storms mentioned across articles, the storms 
that are mentioned most seem to be either (1) close in proximity (space or time) or (2) the 
storms having the most “impact.” Looking at the Katrina set, Ivan was a recent storm to 
have landed near Louisiana and Texas, and Dennis was a 2005 season storm that landed 
on the Gulf Coast near Florida. The storms between Dennis and Katrina did not threaten 
the United States. Betsy and Camille, as noted in Chapter Two, were both major storms 
                                                          
23. The percentages are not intended to add up to 100%. Multiple storms may be referenced in a single 
article. Also, not all articles reference past storms. 
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affecting the greater New Orleans area, even though they were decades earlier than 
Katrina. 
 In terms of Rita, Katrina had just occurred the month before, and brought with it 
historic damage and population movement. Allison and Alicia, on the other hand, were 
the last two major storms to damage the greater Houston area, with Alicia being the last 
notably destructive hurricane to visit the city (as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Allison was a tropical storm). Finally, for Ike, the memories of Katrina and Rita were still 
fairly vivid in media (and cultural) memory, while Gustav was the most recent storm to 
threaten the Gulf Coast in the 2008 season before Ike, and caused a massive evacuation in 
Louisiana. In comparison to the Rita articles, Alicia and Allison are still mentioned, but 
their prominence relative to other storms slipped down a few places. These patterns seem 
to indicate two different kinds of storm memory are at play in the media narrative. One 
points toward more of a short-term memory of what hurricane events are most recent in 
both media and readership memory. The other pulls from a longer-term, more image-
based memory of impactful storms in area history. Invoking the memory of storms such 
as Betsy, Carla, Alicia, and Allison acts as a shorthand to the destruction those storms 
wrought, often through media outlets as well as first hand (or passed down through 
family and friends) experience. Katrina and Rita, in the case of Ike, seem to play a similar 
role, even though the time lapse between these storms and Ike is relatively short. These 
storms take the place of Allison and Alicia in this case, seeming to indicate a possible 
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lessening of those storms’ visceral effectiveness, at least from the angle of the news 
narrative. 
 
Official versus Lay Frame 
 Looking at each set of articles, the opening frame of articles tended to lean 
towards the official. The breakdown was as follows: 
 
 Katrina set: 6 official, 3 lay (66.7%, 33.3%) 
 Rita set: 22 official, 17 lay (56.4%, 43.6%) 
 Ike set: 10 official, 8 lay (55.6%, 44.4%) 
 
The numbers did not add up to the total of each set due to some articles having a more 
neutral or blended opening frame. 
 Whereas a newspaper acts as an official source in an attempt to communicate 
what people “ought” to know or do, the slight lean towards the official frame makes 
sense. That said, what is interesting is how closely split the articles tended to be overall. 
This trend points toward different narrative hooks being used across the collection. An 
official frame included mayors making statements, press conferences, or meteorologists 
positing forecasts about the storm. A lay frame opens the news narrative in the life of 
“ordinary people” doing things, either in preparation or otherwise. Official frames set the 
stage for actions, information, and authority, whereas lay frames set the stage for lives 
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disrupted or under stress. Examples of this lay frame included looks into the lives of a 
variety of residents. The residents depicted in these openings included: 
 
 A bride in New Orleans going forward with her wedding before Katrina. She 
refused to let the storm stop her wedding. (“It was enough to make any bride 
break down in tears. But first, Katrina Christoval had to laugh. She and the 
hurricane that kept more than half her guests from attending her nuptials 
Saturday have the same name” [Thevenot 2005, para. 1].) 
 People at the Superdome “without enough money or luck to leave town...” 
(For example: “A 2-year-old girl, clutching a bottle and ignoring her knock-
off Barbie doll, running in circles around her mother. Homeless men trying to 
doze on the sidewalk, using backpacks as pillows. People without cars. People 
with cars but nowhere to go” [Filosa 2005, para. 1].) 
 Residents praying and preparing for the storm coming. 
 Shoppers scrambling for supplies at stores.  
 Evacuees from Katrina having to evacuate again for Rita. (“This was not the 
move that LeEsther Scott wanted. Scott, 37, waited outside Reliant Arena 
about 5 p.m. Tuesday for a bus to take her and 12 family members to Fort 
Chaffee, Ark. But what she really wanted was to go home” [Bowman 2005, 
paras. 1-2].) 
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 A mother preparing for a hurricane after having to cancel a child’s birthday 
party. 
 Members of a retirement community who did not evacuate Galveston even in 
light of warnings. (“At a retirement community in the 2800 block of 61st 
Street, 66-year-old Ed Raymond patrolled the courtyards on a red motorized 
scooter Friday morning. He carried a handwritten list of his neighbors who 
hadn’t yet evacuated. An American flag fluttered on the back of the scooter as 
he maneuvered the cracked sidewalks to check on them, one by one” [Wise 
2008, para. 1].) 
 
These images of ordinary people’s lives, in contrast to the more official frames of 
weather information and official action, will contribute to the construction of “residents” 
discussion later in this chapter. 
 
Lay Voice in Articles 
 Along with considering the opening frame of the articles, I also looked at how the 
voice of residents (lay speech) was used in newspaper narratives. In the use of lay speech, 
quotes from residents are woven into the media narrative. Examples of lay speech are 
when Katrina Christoval is quoted in the article about her wedding or when quotes from 
residents interviewed at the Superdome are worked into the article on stranded residents, 
to use two articles cited above. Lay speech was used in many articles in this collection: 
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 Katrina set: 8 (73%) 
 Rita set: 17 (35%) 
 Ike set: 8 (41%) 
 
Some of the differences in lay speech used across sets could result from differences in 
writing style and newspaper preference, but what is worth noting is that a sizable number 
of articles incorporate the speech of lay people along with other information. Borrowing 
from Nessa Wolfson’s idea that incorporating reported speech in personal narrative 
makes it “seem more authentic by invoking the words of others” (1978, 220), it is not 
much of a leap to see the lay voice in the news narratives as grounding them in the 
experience of “real” people. For instance, in the Filosa Superdome article, we are given a 
glimpse into the experience of an unnamed woman: 
 
No funds, a 41-year-old woman surrounded by four children, ages 2 to 14, said 
when asked what brought her to the shelter...“I can’t have them in all this water,” 
the mother said of her children, explaining why she didn’t choose to evacuate 
from the coming hurricane. If only things were different, she said, she would 
have reserved seats on a Trailways bus or perhaps bought plane tickets. But she 
wasn’t placing her children in a car for hours on end, she said. (Filosa 2005, 
paras. 7 and 9) 
 
 
Alternating between the mother’s own words and Filosa’s paraphrase attempts to give life 
and authenticity to the article’s depiction of the situation. This practice is not uncommon 
in news media. 
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 However, thinking of these news stories as constructed narratives, it is worth 
exploring how these bits of reported speech are selected and presented in the articles. 
What do these printed “sound bites” say about residents? Relatedly, when official voices 
are quoted talking about residents, what is being said there? These concepts also feed into 
the construction of official and lay in these narratives discussed later. 
 
 
What Do Newspaper Articles Say about Preparation? 
 
 In Choi and Lin’s work on risk-related messages in newspapers, they mention that 
“actions to take to prevent the risk,” which included evacuation and preparation, was the 
most frequent type of message. This echoed a similar finding in research for a thesis by 
Laura B. Cowan. In her analysis of thirteen newspapers dealing with Category 3 storms 
or higher, she noted, “Preparation content is by far the most common hurricane content” 
(2006, 41). She found that 36.5% of the articles she examined dealt with preparation and 
15% dealt with evacuation, the most emphasized content areas in her study (Cowan 2006, 
22). In the articles I analyzed, a wide variety of preparation advice was given to readers, 
ranging from specific orders from officials to checklists of items to gather. When I 
considered preparation advice, I included both explicit recommendations, such as the 
aforementioned direct orders and checklists, to more implicit recommendations, such as 
descriptions of people buying food, water, and batteries at a store, as images such as these 
115 
serve as potential models of what people preparing for a hurricane might look like. 
Examples of these implicit recommendations include descriptions such as “Batteries, 
bottled water, canned food—shoppers wanted it all on Tuesday” (Garza et al. 2005, para. 
1) and “Across the Houston region, residents busied themselves Thursday morning 
preparing for Ike’s onslaught. Some bought plywood and duct tape; others ice and 
generators” (Casimir et al. 2008, para. 1). Casting this wide net for preparation 
information, I found that a majority conveyed clearly identifiable explicit or implicit 
preparation information. Examples of other types of articles included ones focused on 
storm information only, on hospital preparation, and the like. This said, the kinds of 
preparation information conveyed varied widely. 
 General preparation warnings were common. These included officials using the 
term “preparation” without specificity. For instance, in the days before Katrina, Mayor 
Ray Nagin was quoted as saying “This storm really scares me... That’s why I am trying to 
stress to everyone now to get prepared” (Schleifstein 2005, para. 22). Similarly, The St. 
Tammany Parish President stated, “I urge citizens to make storm preparations today” 
(Breaking News Weblog Day 1 2005, para. 17), and the Jefferson Parish Emergency 
Management Director warned, “Everybody needs to get their plan and be prepared” 
(Schleifstein 2005, para. 26). This vague order to prepare was also seen in the general 
order to use “common sense.” Both Houston Mayor Bill White and Harris County Judge 
Robert Eckels were cited using this advice before Rita, with White and Harris County 
Judge Ed Emmett invoking similar advice before Ike. 
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 Residents were also told to follow official instructions—or to face the 
consequences of not doing so—and to stay up-to-date about official storm information. 
Before Rita, the Galveston City Manager warned that people should heed evacuation 
recommendations, although official entities would not compel them with force: “If there 
are people who are unwilling to leave, we’re not going to pry them out of their 
households” (Moran et al. 2005, para. 20). While this comment allows for choice 
regarding evacuation, not surprisingly, it does not cast non-compliance in a positive light. 
Other “officials” remarked that by ignoring evacuation orders, residents should not 
expect emergency services.  
 Before Ike, the Brazoria County Assistant Emergency Management Coordinator 
was reported as saying that no one would be fined or arrested if they did not leave (which 
was ordered), but “they will be on their own” (Stewart 2008, para. 21). Residents were 
advised to follow the lead of local officials or face the consequences of going their own 
way. Coupled with this was the general advice to follow official information regarding 
storms, to “stay alert” (Schleifstein 2005, para. 27), and, as senior federal officials were 
reported as advising before Ike, “to listen to what their local officials tell them to do. And 
if they are told to evacuate, evacuate” (“Hurricane Watch; Ike in Brief” 2008, para. 11). 
Overall, the official message underscores that residents should be strongly guided by 
official recommendations and information. At the same time, officials recommended 
uniting as a community. For instance, before Katrina, the St. Tammany Parish President 
advised, “I also ask that you check with your neighbors... This is a time to pull together 
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as a community (Breaking News Weblog Day 1 2005, para. 17). Similarly, Mayor Nagin 
urged, “This [Katrina] is an opportunity for us to come together in a way that we’ve 
never done before” (Breaking News Weblog Day 2 2005, para. 137). Coming together as 
a community was also advised by Houston’s Mayor White before Rita, as he stressed the 
need for “‘neighbors helping neighbors,’ noting that the government will not have 
sufficient vehicles to carry out all needed evacuations” (Markley et al. 2005, para. 8). In 
this way, a clear stance that residents must follow what they are told by officials, yet must 
also fend for themselves (either by not following orders or because the officials actually 
do not have the resources to help you) seems to emerge; this stance also seems echoed in 
the advice to follow local officials’ lead, yet to use common sense (which lies within the 
residents themselves).  
 
More Specific Recommendations  
 Amidst the vague instructions presented in these articles were also more concrete 
pieces of advice about residential storm preparation. Several articles presented various 
lists of actions to take or supplies to gather. Out of the three storm article collections, the 
Katrina articles had the least information of this kind, while the Rita articles had the 
most. Some of these lists were fairly short, comprised of only three to five actions or 
items. One example is when the St. Tammany Parish President advised that “Residents 
should refrain from putting out garbage for pick up during the storm. Lids from garbage 
cans can quickly clog storm-water drains. I am also asking residents fuel cars and to help 
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neighbors who may be unable to secure items in their yards” (Breaking News weblog 
Day 1 2005, para. 35). Another example is a list from a pre-Ike article that outlines five 
pre-storm tips regarding insurance information (Patel 2008).  
 However, most lists were more complex. These lists included one article that 
outlined several actions to take to protect personal data and documents along with a 25-
item list of documents and information that should be protected (Patel 2005). Another 
included a lengthy set of actions followed by a 31-item checklist of things to gather, 
divided into “Tools and Supplies,” “For Sanitation, Safety,” and “Documents” (“Food for 
thought; Stock up for the Storm; Check This List for The Essentials” 2005). This same 
section of the Houston Chronicle also presented an article on the “‘do’s and dont’s’ of 
emergency eating” (Vuong 2005). These lists seem to offer residents more actionable 
guidance than the more vague instructions already discussed.  
 From the sense of narrative, though, it is worth noting another way that these 
articles discuss preparation, which is through the description of residents preparing. In 
these descriptions, readers “see” preparation and what people are gathering (or should be 
gathering) before storms hit. A few articles describe residents boarding up windows with 
plywood, advice echoed in several articles’ lists. By far, though, the most common 
preparation image invoked in these articles is the image of people buying supplies at 
stores. Several examples of these descriptions include:  
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 “All day Saturday people pumped gas into their cars, scooped up last minute 
supplies from groceries and visited ATMs” (Nolan 2005, para. 24)  
 “Customer after customer walked through the store with carts filled with 
bottled water and canned goods, scanning shelves for items that may be 
useful, such as can openers” (Bowman, Stiles, and Garza 2005, para. 5). 
 “Batteries, bottled water, canned food—shoppers wanted it all on Tuesday... 
Mark Anton hit the grocery store to stock up on water Tuesday afternoon, 
while his wife foraged for baby food. ‘Everybody is kind of freaking out a 
little bit,’ he said, turning onto the aisle of a southeast Houston H-E-B 
[grocery store] where rows of water bottles normally sit in stock. It was 
empty. Outside, lines of cars snaked across the parking lot as people waited to 
top off their gas tanks.” (Garza et al. 2005, paras. 5-8). 
 “So people lined up for plywood and water, canned tuna and duct tape, 
preparing to safeguard their homes and stock up on the essentials” (Garza et 
al. 2005, para. 11). 
 “As authorities prepared themselves for the second major hurricane to strike 
the Gulf Coast in less than a month, Houston-area residents stripped stores of 
food, bottled water, batteries, toilet paper and other necessities. The cheapest 
grade of gasoline was in high demand” (Markley et al 2005, para. 18). 
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 “A rush on hurricane supplies was reported at several coastal-area stores, as 
shoppers stocked up on batteries, bottled water and plywood to cover 
windows” (Rice et al. 2008, para. 32). 
 “Residents across the Houston region scurried and scrounged Thursday 
stocking up on essentials from gasoline and batteries to water and peanut 
butter, everything needed to endure Hurricane Ike’s arrival—or flee its path. 
Streets throughout town were unusually busy. People emerged from home 
improvement and grocery stores laden with supplies. Gas lines snaked around 
the pumps and spilled into the streets. Some stations ran out of fuel” (Khanna 
et al. 2008, para. l-2). 
 “Across the Houston region, residents busied themselves Thursday preparing 
for Ike’s onslaught. Some bought plywood and duct tape; others bought ice 
and generators. Some packed their belongings to flee; others secured supplies 
to fortify” (Casimir et. al 2008, para. 1). 
 
Several items seem to be commonly noted in preparation advice. Certain of these items 
tend to emerge as basic essentials: canned food, bottled water, gasoline, and plywood. 
Other items—such as, in the examples above, can openers, toilet paper, ice, and 
generators—can get added in, but the core items seem fairly consistent. The images of 
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shoppers exemplify a narrow type of preparation through a commonplace description, in 
contrast to some of the lengthier checklists. 
 Also notable are the many images that highlight scarcity and the inability to get 
supplies. Looking at the aforementioned examples, shoppers “scan” the shelves, “forage” 
for baby food, “stripped” stores of supplies, and “scurried and scrounged” around their 
areas. Store shelves are emptied, and lines of cars snaked around gasoline pumps. 
Residents preparing, as they are told to do, are portrayed amid scenes with few or any 
resources available. These scenes are occurring at the same time as officials are telling 
residents to gather the things they need to prepare, and lengthy checklists of supplies for 
emergency kits are being disseminated by the media. For illustration, the 31-item list 
mentioned earlier was published on September 22, 2005, about two days before Rita’s 
landfall. In this way, issues of time and preparation emerge. If residents are trying to 
follow official calls for preparation, these calls may be counteracted by occurring at a 
time when acting upon them is extremely difficult. 
 
 
Construction of the “Resident” 
 
 Also worth considering, along with the concept of what constitutes preparation, is 
how residents are portrayed in this time period. The descriptions discussed in the last 
section already point to a sense of how residents seem to be rushing out last-minute to get 
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their storm supplies. With this, looking at how official voices (governmental officials, 
etc.) and lay voices (residents) are used to create this portrayal points toward how these 
articles construct an understanding of what residents do and do not do to prepare for 
hurricanes. 
  
Official Voices about Residents 
 Amidst communicating about the need to prepare ahead of storms, officials also 
make comments that, when presented via news media, create a sense of how to perceive 
residents and their preparedness. These constructions are often juxtaposed with officials’ 
statements about their own plans and preparation activities.  
 While analyzing the articles in this collection, one thread that emerged was that of 
officials casting residents in a negative light, as not listening to advice or as stubbornly 
taking other courses of action. In the days before Katrina, Mayor Nagin commented, “We 
want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving—right now, as a matter of 
fact” (Breaking News Weblog Day 1 2005, para. 41). A day later, Louisiana Governor 
Kathleen Blanco and a state police spokesperson also commented about residents. Blanco 
noted that “It appears that no one has heard the message to evacuate,” while the 
spokesperson commented that “Part of the problem of people evacuating (is that) there’s 
a large amount of people that won’t do any pre-planning” (Moller 2005, paras. 8 and 13). 
Official perception of residents was additionally illustrated in the same article by 
presenting reports given to Blanco about residents not heeding warnings. The example 
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provided was from a Representative telling her that “at 7 p.m. he saw about 700 people 
attending a Little League baseball game—and that few people in attendance appeared to 
know or care that a storm was approaching” (para. 26). Taken together, these comments 
form an image of a passive, heedless populace, contrasted to officials urging action and 
vigilance. They seem much like what Robinson described as “passive, disengaged, and 
two-dimensional” (2008, 797), noted previously, in that they simply do not seem to be 
paying attention. 
 The articles from days before Katrina were not the only ones with these types of 
comments. Before Rita, Texas Governor Rick Perry was reported as saying that Texans 
had “adopted ‘a somewhat blasé altitude’” because of the length of time that had passed 
since Texas had a major hurricane, though he also noted “I think Katrina got everybody’s 
attention... It’s no longer the boy calling wolf” (Hughes et al. 2005, paras. 14 and 15). 
Two days later, Perry commented on the evacuation: “If you’re in the storm’s path, you 
need to git [sic] gone. You need to be on the road, moving out of the storm’s path. There 
are a few hardheaded ones out there who are going to ride this thing out, don’t expect 
there to be a lot of support in those areas” (Stiles and Ratcliffe 2005, para. 6). While both 
of these comments paint a less than supportive image of residents, the second one seems 
particularly worth noting. Invoking the very informal “git gone” advice to residents, 
Perry almost seems to be shooing people away as one might a stray dog on the front 
lawn. Also, people who do not evacuate are “hardheaded,” taking away any other 
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explanation for ignoring orders. Lastly, his comment echoes the “or else” advice 
discussed earlier. 
 Articles before Ike were not without a similar kind of characterization of 
residents. In contrast to the other two storms, though, the comments about residents seem 
a little less harsh. United States Senator John Cornyn commented that he was concerned 
that “...because Ray Nagin said that Hurricane Gustav was the ‘storm of the century’ and 
then it sort of petered out, that people may sort of get the sense that... maybe we don’t 
need to leave this time” (Rice et al. 2008, para. 12). In a similar vein, Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff was reported to warn residents “... not to take Ike lightly. He 
said Ike is not a storm to gamble on” (“Hurricane Brief; Ike in Brief” 2005, para. 11). 
Both of these comments hinge upon an assumption that residents will likely default to 
thinking that the storm is not a threat and will take more of a passive role. Stubbornness 
is also addressed in comments such as the one from the Harris County Office of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management regarding evacuation routes. While 
describing the improvements that had been made in evacuation routes since Rita, the 
spokesperson also commented, “People don’t like to be told what the best route for them 
is” (Christian 2008, para. 9). Admittedly, this comment is much kinder than calling some 
residents “hardheaded,” but it still speaks to an assumed stubbornness on the part of the 
population, especially coming after a description of all the accommodating improvements 
that had been made to the roadways. 
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 This said, not all descriptions of residents by officials were critically tinged. 
School officials noted how local parents had been calling in the days before Rita for an 
early decision regarding school closures (Radcliffe et al. 2005, para. 21). Also prior to 
Rita, the Chief of Police in the small city of Palacios noted that “Most [people] are well 
aware of this storm and are not going to take any chances...People know what type of 
damage this type of storm can do, because they’ve rebuilt (after other storms), and 
they’re just going to get out with their family to be safe” (Hughes, Gonzalez, and 
Pinkerton 2005, para. 26). These comments show a more active and prepared residential 
response; however, examples along these lines are more infrequent than the passively 
oriented ones. 
 
Lay Voices about Residents 
 Although officials are often reported commenting on residential response and 
preparation, residents themselves (the lay voice) are also included to construct the media 
portrayal of residents. Like official voices, residents are often reported discussing 
reduced concern or not following the orders of authority. In the Katrina articles, for 
example, one resident was “headed unconcerned to a funeral Saturday morning,” not 
aware of the threat of the storm. In this resident’s case, though, his wife called him on the 
cell phone and updated him, changing his course of action, even though bringing his 92-
year-old mother was going to complicate evacuation plans (Nolan 2005, paras. 29-31). 
As noted above, another Katrina article related the story of a bride, also named Katrina, 
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who went ahead with her wedding in the face of the hurricane threat. Before Rita, a shop 
owner described his storm plan: “I’m going to roll the dice and say I’ll survive if it hits...” 
(Lezon 2005, para. 5). Another resident, pre-Rita, commented that “If I lose [my home], 
I’ve lost everything I’ve got. I may as well go with it” (Markley et al. 2005, para. 44). 
Before Ike, comments included a resident explaining his rationale for feeling no 
sympathy for residents refusing to evacuate: “If people don’t have an eye on the weather, 
they have no business on this Island [Galveston]” (Rice et al. 2008, para. 19). Two 
paragraphs later in the same article, however, a ship owner in Surfside Beach, just west of 
Galveston Island, describes staying put, explaining “I’m going to go upstairs above my 
shop with my two guns and protect my property... Besides, the storm isn’t coming here... 
I went out on the jetty last night and prayed that it would just turn around” (Rice et al. 
2008, paras. 22-23).  
 On one hand, these uses of residential voice point towards a disjunction between 
residential action and official advice. However, they also present a more complex image 
of the resident. Some residents are portrayed as weighing the responsibilities of everyday 
life over storm information, such as the resident attending a funeral (although he was 
ultimately convinced to change his mind) and the determined bride. This sense comes 
through in the two other residents’ descriptions of staying on their own property. The 
Surfside Beach shop owner’s comment also hints toward a competing source of storm 
information on which to base his decision-making: his own experience and prayer on the 
jetty. These comments describe situations that may not be as simple as staying or going, 
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and even when they communicate the choice to stay against orders, they do not seem 
necessarily “hardheaded.”  
 The complexity of residential perspectives also surfaces in the varying ways 
residents discuss how prior storm experience informs their actions. These experiences 
sometimes influenced residents to follow official advice while others led them to diverge. 
Several residents commented on how Rita preparation was influenced by Katrina. One 
noted that “People understand it now, and I think that they are going to prepare fully” 
(Bowman, Stiles, and Garza 2005, para. 6). Another stated “I think it’s just increased 
awareness of the power of the storms, the realization that earlier preparation is necessary” 
(Garza et al. 2005, para. 21).  Contrasting with these ideas of preparation are residents 
commenting on the panicky way others seemed to prepare. The same resident remarking 
on residents preparing fully also described the scene at the store as, “It seems a lot of 
people have pressed the panic button” (para. 4). Another resident shopping before Rita 
noted, “Everybody is kind of freaking out a little bit” (Garza et al. 2005, para. 6). Later, 
before Ike, residents still commented on a sense of preparation panic at home 
improvement stores. For example, one said, “I don’t dare to go to Lowe’s or the Home 
Depot... It’s got to be a madhouse” (Khanna eta. 2008, para. 18). This resident instead got 
supplies at a dollar store, tailoring supply gathering to perceived chaos. In this way, there 
is a fine line between being motivated to prepare (advised action) and being panicky (not 
advised). Other storms could also motivate residents to prepare as advised. Before Ike, a 
resident identified experiences from Tropical Storm Allison as motivation to prepare and 
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evacuate: “This home flooded during Allison... This one next door is still vacant. We are 
just not going to chance it” (Khanna et al. 2008, para. 10). Past experience, in these 
examples, motivates residents to behave in ways aligned with official orders. In these 
cases, the use of the residential voice serves to emphasize the official recommendations. 
 In other instances, past experience does not work in this way. Most notably, 
experiences trying to evacuate before Rita informed subsequent choices not to leave. One 
resident in a neighborhood near a Houston bayou known for flooding commented that “I 
evacuated three years ago, and I will never do that again” (Khanna et al. 2008, para. 13). 
A resident of the city of Webster, about midway between downtown Houston and 
Galveston, explained her rationale for staying by stating “Because we did leave for Rita, 
and I wasn’t going to sit in some 20 hours of traffic again,” even though the area was 
under evacuation orders (Casimir et al. 2008, para. 15). In cases such as these, residents 
may hear the official orders, but they are more strongly informed by their past 
experience. And this kind of counter-informing was not limited to Rita. One resident 
explicitly noted other storms as his reason for not fearing Ike: “I’m not afraid. We had 
Carla, we had Alicia, and we had Katrina...We survived those” (Carroll et al. 2008, para. 
30). This resident uses this experience to resist his son’s urging to evacuate from his 
home, as it is next to a bayou in a flood-prone area. Also, quite evocatively, a different 
article quoted an elderly man in a Galveston retirement home who had chosen to stay for 
Ike. He explained to the reporter:  
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“I’m a stubborn old man... I’ve lived here [in Galveston] 22 years and never left, 
so I feel safer here than in my tin-can car on I-45... So I have gone through this 
many a time. I ain’t going to evacuate again for anybody... J C. [Jesus Christ], I’ll 
listen to him. If he tells me to go, I’ll go. But if my numbers [sic] up and J. C. 
calls me, he’s gonna call me in my own bed, not some strange place.” (Wise 
2008, paras. 30-32)  
 
 
His explanation for staying comes amidst other residents discussing staying for Ike, many 
of whom had attempted and endured lengthy Rita evacuations. His comments point 
towards both a choice based upon past experience and a differing sense of official 
authority, as Jesus is the only “official” who could change his mind. 
 In the midst of residents being cited as following or resisting official advice 
because of their experiences, another segment of quoted residents are shown to be 
undecided, even in the few days leading up to storm landfall. Instead of knowing whether 
to stay or go, these residents are still portrayed in a wait-and-see mode or as awaiting 
more guidance. For example, prior to Rita, another elderly Galveston man commented on 
his preparations: “I was going to try to make some kind of arrangements to get out [of 
Galveston], but nobody’s said I needed to get out yet” (Moran et al. 2005, para. 34). In 
another pre-Rita article, a woman asked an elderly resident about her plans. In response, 
the resident “laughed and said, ‘I don’t know.’ But she said she wouldn’t leave without 
her new scooter” (Garza 2005, para. 12). This undecided response did not get presented 
as often as the other two stances, but it did crop up occasionally.  
 All three of these stances serve to create a complex portrayal of the general public 
in relation to their preparation. Some prepare, sometimes to the point of panic; others 
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ignore orders due to past experience even in the face of identifiable danger; and yet 
others delay decisions in the dwindling time before the storm. What seems absent or 
downplayed amidst this construction of the residential population is the idea of residents 
as being calm and rational decision-makers. When shown to be preparing or evacuating, 
these actions often take place in chaotic stores or in massive gridlock (with other people 
doing the same thing). When going against official advice, they are often individuals 
living in notably vulnerable areas, as this detail is added in the article by naming 
neighborhoods or locations that would be familiar to the readership. Also, by showcasing 
particularly vulnerable resident examples, such as the elderly or infirm, a heightened 
sense of the need for residents to be protected and told what to do emerges. In this way, 
by infusing the articles with these particular characterizations of residents, the media 
narrative seems to set up a sense that the “better” decision-makers tend to be official 
sources or people who align with those sources. 
 
Uncertainty Pre-Landfall 
 Further, these scenes take place in front of a backdrop of information uncertainty. 
Even as officials instruct residents as to what to do, the days before a hurricane are also 
laced with a sense of uncertainty about the storm in these articles. Before Katrina, the St. 
Tammany Parish President stated, “Because the path of Hurricane Katrina is unclear, we 
are making storm preparations” (Breaking News Weblog Day 1 2005, para. 34). The 
models of hurricanes that provide predicted paths for the storms were frequently cited as 
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uncertain. One staff writer for an article published before Rita commented that “Five day 
forecasts for hurricanes are unreliable,” later adding the words from the Houston-
Galveston National Weather Service Office: “The models have been a bit squirrelly” 
(Berger 2005, paras. 5 and 9). Even closer to landfall, Rita’s track was shrouded in 
uncertainty. The day before landfall, the Harris County Office of Emergency 
Management Administrative Coordinator noted that “This storm [Rita] is being a little 
unpredictable” before adding “I don’t think history will remember Rita as a lady” 
(Cappiello et al. 2005, para. 30). This comment is particularly interesting due to its focus 
on uncertainty but also its gender commentary in Rita not being ladylike. For storms, 
then, to be ladylike is to be either predictable (as it is placed in the comment) or weak (as 
it seems more likely to mean in contrast to causing damage). In either case, the 
implications for feminine portrayal are worth considering, though they lie outside of the 
scope of the current discussion.  
 Ike, as well, was not without uncertainty. A few days before landfall, one article  
described Ike’s path as “tricky” and later noted that “Despite being in a region already 
fatigued by the number of storm alerts and near misses, Ike’s uncertainty is grabbing 
people’s attention” (Rice et al 2008, paras. 1 and 7)24. In this way, the official 
information that residents are advised to rely on is always shifting, changing the danger 
of the storm’s landfall and damage potential with each shift. 
                                                          
24. This idea of storm fatigue cropped up in many articles either directly, such as in the words of Mayor 
White, or through the comments of people residents tired of evacuating or of hearing about storms and their 
threats. 
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 The uncertainty also spilled over into the preparation discussion. A day or two 
before Ike, Mayor White and Harris County Judge Emmett urged residents to follow 
directions from local officials, with White adding “Nature doesn’t always comply with 
the best laid plans” (Tolson et al. 2008, para. 41). Whether intentional or not, resident 
plans seem portrayed as more fallible, in contrast to that the “local officials are prepared 
to deal with the storm and the aftermath” (Tolson et al. 2008, para 40). Again, official 
preparation seems more solid, less vulnerable, than residential preparation. However, 
uncertainty about the storms did not only plague residents. In another article, National 
Hurricane Center Director Bill Read—who the writer noted does not advise local officials 
on evacuation—commented on the issue of uncertainty and planning: “Every storm is 
different... My take is that 72 hours in advance is too far out to have enough certainty to 
a) always make the right decision and b) convince people they need to go” (Falkenberg 
2008, para. 16). Director Read’s comment points toward a further layer of complexity. 
Not only is hurricane behavior difficult to predict, leaving residential plans at the mercy 
of the forces of nature, but, in a short window before a storm makes landfall, officials 
may lack the certainty to construct a solid, actionable plan, especially one to evacuate.  
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Conclusion: Complex Construction of Preparation 
 
 All of these factors, taken together, create a complex narrative of preparation 
shared through these articles. Returning to the work of Choi and Lin, my analysis also 
found that print and online journalism does communicate risk information to the public, 
often through what they term “actions to take to prevent the risk” (2008, 295). In both 
vague and specific ways, these articles disseminate recommended actions to residents. 
Choi and Lin argue that media also need to mention the expected outcomes in order to 
“...reduce uncertainty among the general public in the event of a natural disaster” (2008, 
296). Although this is potentially true, my analysis points to other aspects of newspaper 
narrative that contribute to uncertainty, including the range of potential actions residents 
can/should take and the limits of certainty in the forecasting technology that reduce the 
ability of officials to make suggestions and of residents to decide what to do. 
 The larger narrative that seems to emerge about hurricane preparation in these 
articles is that the official side of the equation—though culpable when major errors occur 
(or seem to occur), such as Nagin’s misjudgment of Gustav’s risk in 2008—is still 
portrayed as the authoritative source of information and action. In contrast, the general 
public—though frequently shown as preparing for the storm—is often portrayed as a 
more panic-prone, scattered mass of characters. Neither side is perfect, but if one were to 
bet on which side is making more rational, thought-out decisions based upon the 
newspaper narrative, the safer bet is on the officials and their understanding of the 
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situation. The public is urged to put their faith in official orders, even when that faith is 
challenged by skepticism. 
 Granted, it is important at this stage in the discussion to emphasize that public 
safety plans are important in saving lives and reducing property damage, but it is also 
worthwhile to consider how newspaper media communicate these messages and plans to 
their readership. Essential information is almost never plainly put forth in newspapers; it 
is enclosed in narrative, packaged not only to tell the story, but also to sell it. In doing so, 
this narrative packaging lays out people’s places in preparation by characterizing official 
and lay sources. By portraying residents in the variety of ways described earlier in this 
chapter, it is harder to imagine what exactly a well-prepared person looks like, as so 
many counter-images and sound bites are woven into the media narrative. Instead, these 
newspaper articles offer a variety of models of how to seem less-than-competently 
prepared.  
 Given the uncertainty inherent in these storms, a trait expressed in the general 
narrative of storm preparation, it would seem to make sense that there is an inexactness of 
residential response. This uncertainty, coupled with the invocation of memories of past 
storms (both damaging ones and false alarms), creates an environment where it may be 
prudent to use sources besides the official messages to make personal preparations. 
However, given the previous examples, this uncertainty seems to be utilized more often 
in forgiving official decision-making. All the while, these same decision-makers are the 
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ones to be followed, lest residents find themselves “on their own.” In general, though, 
residents seem to be on their own, regardless of whether they comply or not.  
 Using an analysis approach inspired by Zhang and Fleming and Choi and Lin, this 
chapter examined patterns within the news stories in the days leading up to the three 
hurricanes pertinent to this discussion. This kind of analytical approach allowed for a 
wide range of newspaper articles to be considered together to form a collection of 
preparation narrative from the official perspective. The following chapter expands the 
discussion to look at a selection of residential perspectives on hurricane preparation. In 
doing so, we can consider how the elements of the official narratives, discussed here, are 
integrated into or resisted by lay discussions of the issue. 
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Chapter Four: 
Lay Discussions of Preparation 
 
 As in the media discussion of Chapter Three, preparation plays into the stories 
told by lay people about hurricanes. This chapter explores how the concept of preparation 
is constructed within lay experience. The interviews used for examples in this chapter are 
a mix of my own fieldwork interviews and archived interviews. It is important to note 
that the ideas discussed in this chapter are not the experiences of every resident; they are 
intended to point out impressions that surfaced in some of the residential narratives I 
considered. Also worth noting is that these interviews are reflections of hurricane 
experience. Unlike archived newspapers that capture what media communicated in the 
days before the storms in question, the interviews capture the post-storm perspectives of 
residents. In large part, this issue is one of accessibility. The likelihood of interviewing 
someone before a storm while they are preparing, in a comprehensive manner for 
research, is slim, never mind amassing a collection of interviews to discuss. This project 
seeks to mitigate that issue by considering multiple storms as this allows for a 
consideration of how people prepare over time, just as the media narrative analysis 
allowed for a discussion of trends in articles across hurricanes. 
 
 
 
137 
Making Decisions in Lay Narratives 
 
 Often when people tell their “hurricane stories,” the stories tend to focus on the 
experiences during and after the storm. Preparation itself tends to only be a part—and 
sometimes a minor part—of their stories. As a result, we might visualize a hurricane 
narrative in this way: 
 
 
Figure 11. A linear representation of a hurricane narrative. 
  
Using the Labovian (1972) framework for personal narrative, one could say that 
preparation is more of a complicating action in the narrative, decisions that are leading up 
to the much more “interesting” or “important” parts of the story. No one tells a story in 
which the preparation stage is the resolution of the actions, and the storm itself and days 
after are simply information leading to the coda. Although, at first, this placement in the 
narrative structure may seem to indicate that preparation is not a significant consideration 
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from a narrative standpoint, looking at this aspect can inform the discussion of how 
people make decisions, prepare on the basis of these decisions, and perceive of the threat 
imposed by hurricanes. Also, some constructions of preparation in these narratives 
incorporate commentary on how useful or non-useful preparation activities were. These 
evaluations provide insight as to how actions taken before a storm are judged by the 
person in hindsight. 
However, we do not have to think about hurricane narratives only in this way. 
Stories of preparation, whether they are full-blown narratives or narrative fragments, can 
be thought of as their own subgenre of storm stories. This approach makes sense 
particularly because a hurricane threat does not necessitate a hurricane actually landing 
and causing damage. For example, for many Houston-area residents, Hurricane Rita was 
a storm in which there was little “during” and “after” to discuss because the track of the 
storm shifted. With this in mind, we can think of hurricane narrative using a different 
visualization: 
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Figure 12. An overlapping-narrative approach to hurricane narrative. 
 
Using this approach allows us to focus on the importance of hurricane narratives 
regardless of the outcome of the storm. Depending upon the individual’s experience, he 
or she may have a preparation story and/or a recovery story (though, admittedly, a 
standalone recovery story is more difficult to conceive). The storm itself rests in the 
center, allowing for overlap between the two stories. 
 With this in mind, it is important to note that preparation narrative is not always in 
a teller’s immediate, active repertoire. Depending upon whether a storm is large or small, 
the storm itself and its aftermath may seem like the “bigger” stories to tell. This ties back 
to the earlier discussions of tellability discussed in Chapter One. Given the potential of 
appearing more mundane than other hurricane stories, preparation stories may be judged 
less tellable to certain audiences. For this reason, sometimes discussions of preparation 
need to be prompted more in the collection process, though issues of preparation often 
surface simply by asking about what was going on in the days leading up to a storm. 
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Therefore, the “naturalness” of sharing preparation stories, in my own collection and in 
the archival material, varied. Some preparation narratives emerged in response to 
questions about a particular hurricane, while at times interviewees needed to be explicitly 
asked about getting ready for a storm
25
. 
There was a mix of decisions made by my informants. Some described how they 
evacuated; others discussed how they gathered supplies and prepared to ride out the 
storm. Still others described leaving—or attempting to leave—for one storm and staying 
for another. This range of decisions was similar to those discussed in Chapter Three. This 
chapter will explore the influences on these decisions and the ways residents talk about 
preparing. Also, later sections in this chapter look at how residents talk about their past 
preparation, including what I call “preparer’s remorse.”  
 
 
Influences on Decisions 
 
The Influence of Media/Official Messages 
 As indicated in the media narrative chapter, residents seem to have multiple ways 
of making decisions about what to do in the days before a hurricane. The decision is often 
not one calculated simply by data for the storm at hand. This is not to say that the “data” 
composed of information about the storm filtered through media channels does not play a 
                                                          
25. This variation across narrators can occur in other types of folklore collection, as well, when trying to 
collect material about a topic. 
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role in the decision-making process of many residents. In the narratives I looked at, many 
people were exposed to information from the media, but the extent to which it impacted 
their decisions varied. For example, New Orleans resident Glen K. remarked about 
gathering information: “...I mostly checked out the internet. The weather, uh, stuff off the 
internet. Because when I get home from work the news is over, so I really didn’t have 
that opportunity. But it was mostly the Internet and...I started watching it like I said about 
a week before”26. Here, a resident uses the media information to gather storm data, just as 
residents are often told to do. Several media outlets are available, and, in this case, Glen 
K. chose the media outlet that fit into his normal lifestyle, which required him to go to the 
internet instead of watching the news on television. 
 Other residents tended to look towards television as the news outlet of choice. For 
another New Orleans resident, Glen A., the official warning through the media had a 
significant impact on him, albeit at the last moment. He recalled: 
 
I have weathered quite a number of storms in New Orleans and I am very familiar 
with them. When we first got the notice of Katrina coming, I wasn’t concerned 
because I know that these storms come and go in the Gulf Coast and they can turn 
a different direction. I waited until almost the very last hour to get out of New 
Orleans. We watched—I was at the apartment in New Orleans and watched 
television and saw Mayor Nagin come on and he [Nagin] said “If I could order 
you out of the City of New Orleans, I would order you out. But I can’t, but I’m 
telling you: Get out of New Orleans. This storm is dangerous. If it comes up the 
Mississippi River, it’s going to flood the entire city of New Orleans, and you 
really do need to get out.” And I said to Michael, who was living with me in the 
little apartment in New Orleans, “We need to get out of here. Let’s go to 
Houston.” So we packed up Michael’s two cats, my dog, got into the truck and 
                                                          
26. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
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took off. But it was the last moment. It was ten o’clock at night on the Saturday 
night
27
. 
 
Mayor Nagin’s warnings prompted a last-minute change in plans for Glen A. His initial 
lack of concern was displaced by the mayor’s plea. 
  However, staying alert to media information does not always facilitate certainty 
in response. Louisianian Adam F. explained that he was aware of Katrina about a week 
before it hit, but “Just like everyone else we saw the initial reports and it said it wasn’t 
gone [sic] to hit this area. It was gone [sic] to turn or it was gone [sic] to move or 
something. I knew people that started evacuating on Friday evening and Saturday and [at] 
that point we still weren’t sure it was gone [sic] to hit and then by Sunday morning we 
knew that it was coming here”28.  Uncertainty is central to Adam F.’s description, as the 
storm seemed like it could have turned away or turned elsewhere, but then it became 
evident that it was going to hit the New Orleans area.  
 Not only are people sometimes unsure how to act, some are simply not paying 
much attention to the information disseminated by media outlets. Returning to Glen K., 
who followed information online, he commented: “And as it progressed I didn’t, still 
didn’t really take it too seriously because it was still way away and it was projected for 
Florida and this and that. And I didn’t pay a whole lot of attention to it”29. Similarly, 
                                                          
27. Surviving Katrina and Rita in Houston, University of Houston. 
28. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
29. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
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Michael P. from New Orleans commented that “I watched channels 4, 6 and 8 that is 
CBS, NBC and FOX news locally. [And I thought] Holy Crap that is a big storm. That 
was probably the first thing that I thought of. After that, you just really kind of ignore 
it...I just kind of kept a second hand glance towards it every so often”30. In these 
examples, residents stayed informed, but the information they gathered did not 
necessarily call them to jump into preparation activities. Instead, a “wait-and-see” 
approach seemed to kick in. 
 The media played a part in Ronald F.’s description of the days before Hurricane 
Rita threatened to make landfall in the Houston area
31
. Recalling the damage they had 
seen done to New Orleans, he worried about Spring, Texas, which is about thirty miles 
northwest of Houston. He described the threat that Rita seemed to pose: 
 
And as we got closer to it, it seemed as if the storm, at least the local weather 
people were saying that it was basically going to come from the Gulf of Mexico 
and travel up basically the Ship Channel to Houston. The Ship Channel is an 
interior waterway that makes Houston a little bit different than a lot of other 
inland cities in that it is a port. As a water source, the media people felt that the 
hurricane would draw water support and basically follow the path of the Ship 
Channel all the way to Houston and logically lambaste Houston the way New 
Orleans had been lambasted. 
 
                                                          
30.  “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
31. For full disclosure, Ronald F. is my father. He and my mother moved from the northeastern United 
States to Spring in the early 1970s, and they have lived in the area since that time. 
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Even though he was not terrified, he was concerned. To him, the media seemed to be 
setting up the expectation that Rita could do the same damage as Katrina. He kept 
watching and listening to the information as it progressed. 
 Regarding Ike, Houston resident and Galveston business owner Sharan Z. 
recounted keeping track of media messages in the summer of 2008. She noted: 
 
So that summer, we had had two evacuation scares already. And I think with 
Hurricane Gustav, which ended up going to Baton Rouge, we evacuated for two 
days. Took the cats to Houston. My employee was in the guest room. And nothing 
happened. It went the other way. So it had been a very busy season with 
hurricanes like this one where you’re constantly on watching TV and by 
September 13th I was tired of it. Yeah, I was just tired of watching TV and tired 
of being worried about it. And when this one started to come up, I started to come 
up, I have to admit to you, I didn’t want to acknowledge it. And I was like, “OK, 
so it’s a Category 2, it’ll hit—they say it’s going to hit Galveston. It’ll hit 
someplace else because it always happens at the last minute that it goes 
someplace else other than where it’s supposed to go.” 
 
Sharan’s comments underscore the relationship between media exposure and the resident. 
She kept connected to media messages enough to have heeded past evacuation 
recommendations. Also, she was informed about the details of the hurricane and language 
associated with hurricanes, noting that the storm was a Category 2 and what its track was. 
However, this relationship is a bit unstable. As much as she was connected to the 
information, she also grew tired of it, not wanting to acknowledge the possibility of 
another storm threat. In addition, there is a mistrust of the official messages themselves 
expressed here, as Sharan notes that the track may indicate one thing, but the actual path 
may be very different. Both wariness and weariness can be issues in the choices made 
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regarding hurricane preparation. Ideas of trust and mistrust are explored further in the 
next section. 
 
Suspicion of the Media and Official Messages 
 Although media may play a role in how residents gather information about an 
oncoming storm, the extent to which that information is trusted varies. For instance, when 
asked about his preparation process, Houston area resident, Brett C., talked about 
watching the news: 
 
My opinion is probably a bit jaded. Usually, you know, the news is, in my 
opinion, they’re trying to get eyeballs. You know, it’s like there is some 
marketing involved there where you know they want to give you a reason to 
watch, so I don’t always think that they have the best interest of the general public 
in mind when they would report on it. And I think in a lot of cases, they, you 
know, sensationalize and blow it out of proportion and overdramatize what’s 
going on for that reason... for me watching the news at that time for what’s going 
on, I always try to take a step back and, you know, filter all the salesmanship of 
the news team out of it and try to really just focus on what’s the weather map look 
like on the thing and “Where am I in relationship [to] that track of the storm and 
how concerned should I really be?” versus the local Home Depot that’s sold out 
of hurricane clips
32
 and it’s people fighting in line. I don’t really care about that 
kind of stuff...  I watch it for the radar. That’s about all I can get out it that’s 
useful to me but it’s kind of a joke I mean.  I mean I remember specifically after 
the storm there were several follow up stories and editorials about the 
sensationalism of the local news teams and, you know, making fun of certain 
reporters who were, you know, putting themselves in harm’s way for the story. It 
was kind of a big joke to really—and disappointing too because they could really 
be a lot more useful in terms of what they’re there for and they should be, but 
unfortunately because of the Daytime Emmys or whatever kind of awards they 
give out for newscasting and reporting and so forth, they probably feel like they 
                                                          
32. Hurricane clips are construction materials that are designed to help buildings resist damage from 
high winds. Depending upon their location, the clips may be used to protect the building structure or to 
keep roofing tiles in place. They are also employed to assist in window protection. 
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have to do something a little extra to get the recognition or whatever, the kudos 
for it.  
 
It is important to note that the data about the storm is conveyed amidst a lot of other 
information—runs on grocery stores, empty superstore shelves, and the like. (These 
narrative motifs in media coverage were noted in the article analysis in the previous 
chapter.) Here, Brett C. seems to place himself as the person best suited to interpret the 
raw data of the storm via the radar, instead of relying on the officials to tell him what to 
worry about. Brett focuses on the track and where it is on a map in relation to his home. 
 Brett C.’s attitude that news media reportage is generally inaccurate or overblown 
was not in isolation. Another example came from Carolyn F., a resident of the Spring 
area for over thirty years
33
. She has lived through several tropical storms and hurricanes 
that threatened the greater Houston area. During our interview, she made comments about 
her slant on media coverage. She explained: 
 
They make you hyper. I remember with Alicia [in 1983]. Your cousin was down 
with us, and he, when he was a child, didn’t deal with weather problems well. And 
he would be watching television, and then they would go into all the things about 
Carla [from 1961] and the devastation to Galveston and this, that, and the other 
thing. And he’s terrified. I’m dealing with a kid that is going, you know, basically 
getting sick because he is so stressed out, and it’s all because, for some unknown 
reason and I don’t know why it is, they, I think, there is a difference between 
keeping you informed in a way that is helpful and seizing on something to make a 
major story from something that isn’t. They don’t seem to have a factor in there to 
recognizing the fact that the more they do it, they hype up something, the more 
terrified they make people when it’s weather-related. […] They can literally have 
people stay home from work or not do things because they are expecting these 
horrendous rains that don’t come. So they really, they never filter it at all with a 
                                                          
33. Carolyn F. is my mother.  
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grain of what might happen or what, you know, they just keep going. And I don’t 
know why. But this is a problem I think that they over—they’ll grasp at 
something, and I don’t know if it is because weather people have so few times to 
shine, and hurricanes and widespread tornadoes and rain have a tendency to make 
them  shine. They all want to be Dan Rather and hang onto the lamppost during 
the hurricane and make their national name. And, you know, you don’t need it34.  
 
In this discussion of Alicia, Carolyn moves into a critique of media coverage. The 
problem is not that she does not try to stay informed; instead, it is that the coverage is 
sensationalized to the point of obscuring the useful information, to the point of terrifying 
people, and in the case of my ten-year-old cousin, making a child sick with worry. She 
also notes a tension between heeding warnings and negative outcomes, in that listening to 
the media’s calls to action may result in needlessly avoiding work or other activities. 
Ultimately, she tends to downplay the media calls to action, taking a much more reserved 
attitude towards hurricane preparation. As she commented: 
 
I think to be aware that something is coming, to be given reasonable things you 
can do, because aside from evacuating, OK, about all you can do is make sure that 
you have batteries, canned food, and I can’t think of much else that’s literally 
going to help you get through anything. And propane if you happen to have any 
camp stoves or propane grills. But I mean aside from that, what can you do? You 
can’t shield your house from high winds. You can’t stop flooding. Now, actually 
speaking, if they actually could tell you that there is going to be flooding in your 
area, something that they do not seem able to do, you could maybe sand bag, but I 
doubt it in most cases, so aside from saying, “OK, we have this storm and, you 
know, take your necessary precautions and we’ll give you updates on where it is,” 
but they don’t need to hype it, I don’t think, as much. And like that thing with 
Galveston [the Ike evacuation], I’m sorry, someone should know, be it the mayor 
on down, whether 25,000 people did or did not go over the Causeway. It’s not 
                                                          
34. Newsman Dan Rather became a national news correspondent for CBS after his role in the coverage 
for Hurricane Carla for local CBS affiliate KHOU. 
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exactly, you know, an eight-lane highway
35
... I think they scare people. I have 
known your father to get terrified because of them hyping some weather system 
that’s supposed to come through.” 36 
 
In this way, she continues to differentiate the media warnings and, as she puts it, 
“reasonable things to do.” She also hones in on the need for “actual” information on the 
storm, as opposed to “hype.” For her, it again boils down to what she perceives as the 
media’s use of fear, and how that fear affects people, using here my father’s recurrent 
anxiety over potential storm threats covered by the media as an example.  
 In these instances, the media is seen as an “official source,” but one spreading 
slanted information, and whose intent is less than altruistic. Either the reporter wants to 
be a “Dan Rather” or the news team is angling for an award. In neither of these cases are 
news personnel seen as focused on protecting the population or informing the audience. 
Instead, they are focused only on ratings and accolades, which, in turn makes people such 
as Brett C. and Carolyn F. tend to react skeptically to the stories they are told by these 
sources.  
 Other informants had mixed positions on media intent and accuracy. For example, 
Houston resident Tamara F. generally praised the media after Hurricane Ike. She stated 
that much of the information shared was good and current, although some information, 
                                                          
35. This refers to the ambiguity reported in the media on how many people evacuated Galveston for 
Hurricane Ike and how many remained on the island. 
36. It is interesting to note that Carolyn F. talks about Ronald F. being terrified. However, in Ronald F.'s 
interview, quoted earlier, he noted that they were not terrified before Rita, but were concerned about how it 
might impact Spring. 
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which she deemed as rumors in the sense of being untrue, were reported as fact, which 
led to confusion. However, she ultimately believed that the media stepped up and was 
more careful in their coverage of Ike than Rita. Regardless of beliefs about the media and 
the stances held towards the media, most of my informants still kept tabs on media 
information, whether or not they used it to inform their action plans. 
 
History of Storm Experiences 
 For many people, other sources of information seem to play more influential roles 
in making pre-storm decisions. Another factor in the process is the experience of the 
individual and community in past storms. Examples seem to fall into two kinds of 
experience, which I conceptualize as short-term and long-term. To illustrate, in the short 
term before Katrina, many individuals remarked that they had seen New Orleans miss 
possible devastation from hurricanes. Several narrators pointed this out in their stories. In 
her story, Holly G. described how she had been in New Orleans long enough to watch 
other storms miss the city and expected Katrina to do so as well: “I’ve been through 
hurricanes before, but they’ve always veered away. You know, it didn’t really hit us 
smack-dab-on before. And even though it seemed like a serious one this time, and we 
should really leave, and I was boarding up my windows the day before...”37. As a result, 
she and her ex-husband remained for Katrina. Pamela M. stated that “people thought it 
                                                          
37.  “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
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would be as it always was” in describing the days before Katrina38, and Chanda N., even 
though she had evacuated, was devastated by the aftermath of Katrina as “...it seemed 
like New Orleans had always dodged the bullet”39. It is worth noting here the use of 
“always” in these three examples because, if we consider hurricanes in New Orleans 
history, as discussed in Chapter Two, the city has been damaged by other storms. 
However, after a series of storms that avoided the area in near history, some residents 
began to see this pattern as the norm.  
 Related to this thinking were people who felt that their part of the city was safe 
from Katrina. Christine M. did not realize Katrina’s threat until seeing artists at a local 
festival packing up and that the roadway contraflow
40
 had started. Faced with the storm, 
she noted:  
 
Well, my husband and I feel like the area of the city we live in has never 
flooded...you know never say never...but has never flooded, so we’ve um our 
house is a one story um surrounded by two story houses so we felt that we weren’t 
gonna flood and that our house was not gonna be damaged by trees so and we 
usually don’t leave for hurricanes, so we said you know what we’re not leaving 
because we’ve left in the past and it’s been shoo shoo’s41. 
 
 
As in the “always” comments above, this one plays with the idea of things “never” 
happening, supported by the idea of “shoo shoo” evacuations in her past. Also of note in 
                                                          
38.  “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
39. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
40. Contraflow is when the flow of traffic is reversed in one direction of a highway, resulting in all 
traffic on the highway going in the same direction. 
41. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
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Christine’s comments is the concept of the choice being informed by feeling (they “feel 
like” their area had never flooded; they “felt” that damage would not occur), with the 
verb shifts within this description pointing toward an uncertainty about this information.  
 For other people, these other, larger storms constructed a longer-term history to 
pull information from. New Orleans resident Stacy C. also recalled past storms in her 
own recounting of the time before Katrina:  
 
I always grew up with stories like my MawMaw would always tell me about 
Camille, Hurricane Camille, you know, how horrible it was and how many people 
died, so when you grow up listening to those stories and your grandparents’ 
stories of what they went through and how many days they were without power, 
you know, maybe friends that had maybe passed away because of the storm, in 
the back of your mind you always know you gotta, you know, it’s dangerous and 
you have to be careful.  
 
The example here illustrates how events in longer-term memory resonate with individuals 
in the process of deciding what to do. Storm memory can have varying meaning in the 
minds of people determining how to prepare for a storm. 
 In his story of Katrina, Adam F. connected the time leading up to the storm with 
stories of Betsy, even though he chose to remain in the New Orleans area for Katrina. 
Glen K. also made connections to Betsy and Camille, both of which he had experienced 
personally. He described Katrina as “...probably the worst I’ve ever seen and I’ve been 
through Betsy and Camille. I was young and I don’t remember, I vaguely remember them 
storms, but this one really, it was something”42. In the course of Glen K.’s interview, he 
                                                          
42. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
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both indicated the connection to past storms and that this storm history is often forgotten. 
He stated: “This generation is blind, we’ve never seen, don’t remember the bad 
storms...we’ve always had these near misses. New Orleans, Louisiana been getting these 
near misses for the last couple years. Bad storms, they miss us. And I think we got 
comfortable with that. And I didn’t ever think it was going to hit”43. It is worth noting, 
again, the use of “always” here, even though Glen K. uses it as a negative example, and 
he chose to evacuate at the last moment. His comment, though, points to a tension 
between the short-term and long-term memories, and how short-term memory can make 
people “blind” to other threatening storms. 
  In Chanda N.’s Katrina narrative, she had planned to stay until her family 
compelled her to evacuate. She had already evacuated twice that year due to hurricane 
threats and was reticent to go again. Like many residents, another aspect of personal 
experience can come into play—the seemingly unnecessary evacuation. (Of course, 
perceiving the evacuation as unnecessary is something that usually comes after the storm 
has passed.) Evacuation is not simply leaving home for a bit—it is a decision that 
requires money, time, and connections to transportation and places to stay. In any given 
storm season, there may be no calls to evacuate or there may be several, and each 
evacuation incurs costs, both personal and financial, for the evacuee. To some, such as 
Chanda, two evacuations for storms that did not amount to much in the end made her 
want to stay for Katrina. 
                                                          
43. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
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 As with Katrina responses, recent memories of Katrina and its aftermath fed into 
reactions to Rita. Stacy C., the New Orleans resident who mentioned Camille earlier, 
evacuated to the Houston area before Katrina. She faced a long and difficult evacuation 
that involved leaving with four children, one of whom was only two days old. One month 
later, when Rita threatened and she was still in Houston, Stacy C. refused to evacuate. 
Her response was pointed: “Over my dead body. I will not get in that car again... If Rita 
wants to take me, she can take me. I’m done. I am done.” The repetition of her comment 
on being done helps to underscore the absoluteness of her resolve.  
 Houston residents were also influenced by the experience of Katrina. K.C. G.
44
, 
for example, noted the following: 
 
We had just had Katrina prior to [Rita], and I think that had we not had Katrina 
prior to [Rita] and seen the influx of everybody from New Orleans and had the 
experience in this city where we took everybody in. I think our response would 
have been a little bit different. I think my response would have been a little bit 
different. In the days before the storm we knew Rita was coming and it was 
humongous. At one point I think, if I am not mixing up my hurricanes because we 
have so many of them, it like filled up the Gulf. Looking at it was ridiculous. I 
remember they kept doing all these maps you know in the days prior saying, “it’s 
going to hit here. It’s going to hit here.” Finally, they were like, “It’s going to 
come straight up 45, and we were like, ‘Yea. OK that’s scary considering what 
just happened with Katrina.’“ 
 
In K.C.’s story, both media information and storm history came into play in her response 
to the storm. It was not only that the storm on the map was huge and its track was on 
course for her home area, it was also that Katrina just happened that added to the 
                                                          
44. K.C. is this informant’s first name, not a pseudonym. 
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urgency. She and her husband, who she described as a “nutball survivalist,” stayed 
because they had supplies at the house and, as she watched the mass evacuation from 
Houston, she did not want to get stuck in the gridlock.  
 Brett C. also connected the evacuation for Rita with Katrina. As he stated, “We 
were told to evacuate and that’s because it was in close proximity to when Katrina had hit 
so everybody was quite paranoid about what was going to happen based on that whole 
storm that occurred and so everybody left and we left probably late in that afternoon 
around four [o’clock].” Again, it was the memory of the recently passed storm that 
motivated the attention paid to the evacuation order. In the end, Brett C. joined the 
somewhere between 2.5 and 3.7 million people who evacuated for Rita. Many of these 
people would not have been considered people who had to evacuate, but they still chose 
to
45
. In his book, A New Species of Trouble, Kai Erikson borrows the term “the 
evacuation shadow phenomenon” to describe “...the gap between what official wisdom 
called for and what the people at risk, acting upon wisdom of their own, actually did” 
(1994, 140). Although the term “evacuation shadow phenomenon” was coined by 
Zeigler, Brunn, and Johnson (1981) writing about evacuations due to the threat of a 
nuclear meltdown, the same general idea is apt here. Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski also 
note this aptness this in relation to Rita when they write, “…the evacuation shadow 
phenomenon was seen most recently [as written in 2006] immediately prior to Hurricane 
Rita. Despite the fact that they are common, and despite the fact that why they occur is 
                                                          
45. For Ike, residents in many of these areas were dissuaded from evacuating because of the issues with 
the massive Rita evacuation. 
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well understood,  ‘inappropriate’ efforts to seek safety on the part of people whom 
authorities do not consider at risk have also been seen as indicative of panic” (2006, 59). 
They posit, however, that responses such as these are not indicative of panic but are from 
people being “risk averse or because they do not fully understand or trust the warning 
information they have received” (Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006, 59). The idea of 
the evacuation shadow phenomenon is also worth noting because it illustrates a way in 
which residents apply approaches that have been promoted by officials in preparedness 
communications, but not necessarily in ways that officials would promote in the specific 
context. In the case of Brett C., his family was in a mandatory evacuation area south of 
Houston, but many families were not. It is interesting that Brett C. makes a panic 
assumption that Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski argue against, labelling people as being 
“quite paranoid” before Rita and that paranoia as motivating them onto the roads. 
 Ultimately, Rita left the greater Houston area largely unaffected, as the storm 
made landfall east of the city. Three years later, though, the memories of evacuating 
echoed in the decision-making processes of residents facing Hurricane Ike, a storm that 
did have significant impact on the Houston-Galveston area. Brett C., an evacuee for Rita, 
labeled the storm a “false alarm” and noted that: “Just talking about Rita, we were a bit 
gun-shy of just packing up and high tailing it out of town due to the bad experiences from 
that. And it was just the previous year [sic], and so we elected to stay mainly for that 
reason and ride out the storm wherever it was going to be when it hit.” Here, the 
experience with the last major threat (Rita) influenced the response for the current threat 
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(Ike). Regardless of the storm’s track and potential threat to the area, Brett C. and his 
family put more weight in their experience with Rita and subsequent challenges with 
evacuation and chose to stay for Ike. Unfortunately, unlike Rita, Ike hit Brett’s home 
hard, causing considerable damage, although none of his family was injured. 
 Vicki B., a resident of a town south of Houston recounted both evacuating for 
Rita and not leaving for Ike. She opened her evacuation story by stating that “Well, we 
evacuated for Rita because, because it was stupid. It was stupid. We saw what Katrina 
had done and everybody got into a great big hubub and Thursday evening before Rita hit 
we had packed up everything.” Although she, her husband, and their pets were able to 
make it out to their evacuation location, unlike many people who were stuck on the road, 
other matters made her time away from home a miserable one. They stayed in a 20’X40’, 
one-room camp house with more than eleven people and many animals. Although 
communications were limited, they knew that Rita had done “squat all” and that they had 
“prepared in vain.” The experience was uncomfortable and negative for Vicki and her 
husband, and they swore never to evacuate there again. Based upon their Rita experience 
and the experiences of others, such as a neighbor having one of their children die while 
stuck on the road in the evacuation, they chose to stay for Hurricane Ike. Again, 
individual decisions for one particular storm are built out of prior storms, whether that 
influence is to promote evacuation or staying. 
 Sharan Z., the bookstore owner in Galveston and Houston area resident, also 
noted the effects of Rita on her Ike decisions with both how to prepare the shop and 
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where to go. In addition to Rita’s effects, storms in 2008 also came into play in the 
decision making process. She commented: 
 
So that summer we had already had a couple of scares. We had evacuated twice. 
After that, I didn’t move anything in the shop because you know when we got 
back from Rita, we had to pay money again to put books back up and the brunt of 
the tourist season was over, we didn’t have much money coming in...so after that 
I was like, next time we have a hurricane scare, that’s it, not moving anything, 
that’s what I have insurance for...With Rita we also had a five hour drive to 
Houston...and it was agonizing and we had two cats in the car with us in the heat 
of the day... So, that experience, I think, the experience with Rita, people just had 
really bad experiences...We felt that it was important to stay in Houston because 
we wanted to get back to the store as soon as possible. Plus, I grew up in Houston. 
I had been through Hurricane Carla as an elementary school kid. I had been 
through Hurricane Alicia as a young mother in my, like about thirty years old. 
And I had been through Tropical Storm Allison in 2001 and that was pretty scary 
also but, you know, you don’t evacuate. You just stay home, kind of guard your 
property. Make sure if you’re here you can take care of things better, if you have 
a problem. 
 
She went on to explain that during Alicia, she had some property damage, but that she 
was able to take care of it quickly due to being home. Here, the effects of several storms 
were influential in her decisions to leave things as is in the shop and to stay put for Ike. 
Additionally noteworthy is that this decision comes out of personal challenges (a past 
agonizing drive) and of financial impact (the cost-benefit analysis of having to put books 
back on the shelves after the storm passes), as well as a history with storms farther in the 
past that inform her. Sharan’s experiences on all these levels fed into how she chose to 
respond. 
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Immediate Context, Immediately Personal 
 Another influence on residents’ decisions may be the immediate situation that 
people are living in before the storm. These immediate contexts can cause residents to 
have minimal exposure to official data altogether or to have matters that, to them, take 
priority over the storm itself. In the narrative told by New Orleans resident Elizabeth H., 
she was too busy planning a family party to keep up with the news about Hurricane 
Katrina
46
. A celebration also affected the preparation plans of New Orleans area resident 
Lemel J. Her birthday fell on the same weekend as Hurricane Katrina, and her plans to go 
to a Biloxi, Mississippi resort originally caused her to ignore people’s warnings for her to 
prepare for the oncoming storm. She eventually evacuated from the city “after being 
harrassed” and looking up information online47.  
 To use another example from a different storm, Houston resident Mike M. —a 
self-proclaimed hobbyist hurricane tracker who uses weather reports to follow hurricanes 
on his own—noted that he was “caught off guard” by Hurricane Rita. Like Elizabeth H., 
personal events were the focus of his attention, as his wife Yvonne had recently had 
surgery at the time. By the time she was settled enough and he made note of the storm, he 
was “completely unprepared” and evacuation was no longer an option for his family.  
 In the case of Houston-area resident Kathryn H., her pregnancy affected her 
exposure to information on Ike. She recalled not really thinking about Ike until hosting a 
                                                          
46. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
47. “Through Hell and High Water: Katrina’s First Responders Oral History Project” Collection, 
Williams Research Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection. 
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Bible study at her home a few days before its landfall. When discussing the days before 
Ike, she said 
 
Well, I remember—I remember it because I was pregnant. My due date was 
September 20th, so, like that—I do have very clear memories of Ike because 
every day leading up to your due date you remember...Anyway, I remember at 
that Bible study [around the Wednesday before Ike’s landfall on Saturday 
morning], like that’s when we were first talking about there’s this hurricane 
coming, what’s going on with that? But I wasn’t really that concerned, I was like, 
“I’m having a baby. That’s kind of what I’m thinking about right now.” 
 
Kathryn’s focus was primarily on being pregnant, not on the approaching storm. She did 
go to Target (a chain retailer) for supplies while her young son was in a Mother’s Day 
Out daycare, giving her time to pick up some items. Kathryn noted that the store was not 
very busy, even though it was the Thursday before the storm. Many people at the store 
approached her about being nine-months pregnant, asking her if she was worried about 
“having the baby in the middle of a hurricane.” In contrast, a store employee approached 
her to tell her about the time she was nine-months pregnant in Japan during a typhoon. 
The employee told Kathryn that she “knew she wasn’t going to have that baby during the 
typhoon...[She] knew he or she wasn’t going to come then. But as soon as that typhoon 
left, [she] went into labor.” Kathryn remembered “thinking that would be nice. That 
would be ideal.” As she wished, this scenario is what ended up happening to her. The 
scene in the store helps to illustrate the priority that the pregnancy took in Kathryn’s 
approach to preparation and that it takes in her narrative of Ike. 
160 
 Other kinds of events can also affect the preparation process. For New Orleans 
resident Mark M., participating in a parade played into his preparations. He explained: 
 
There’s a Mardi Gras krewe48 called the Krewe of Oak that parades the Friday 
before Mardi Gras and also as a Midsummer Mardi Gras. This krewe’s been 
parading now for twenty-two years and they had a parade scheduled on Saturday 
night outside the Krewe of Oak. It’s a marching parade with a couple thousand 
people, pulling floats, and that kind of stuff. So a lot of people packed up their 
cars and put their pets inside their cars and everyone went out to the Maple Leaf
49
 
around nine o’clock, business as usual, and prepared to go ahead and have a great 
time...We paraded fast. We did a bit of a shortened route because of the wind 
gusts and the floats and the float heads and whatnot...After the parade, a bunch of 
those people jumped in their fully packed cars with their pets and drove on out of 
town, and a bunch of those people stayed and danced. I guess me and a lot of my 
friends were the ones who stayed and danced. A lot of people left Sunday 
morning. But Sunday morning, I was starting to get prepared
50
. 
 
 
Here, the strength of a long-standing tradition influenced the timing of storm preparation. 
For some of the participants, it delayed their evacuation until after the parade, and, for 
others, such as Mark M. it delayed the beginning of his own storm preparations, which 
included boarding up windows, filling up trash cans for a backup water supply, and 
storing supplies on a porch. 
 The influence of immediate context was also present in the narrative of Glenn Z., 
a student in Houston but previously from Florida, another place frequently threatened by 
hurricanes. When the threat of Hurricane Rita drove many residents to evacuate, Glenn Z. 
                                                          
48. A krewe is a social organization that puts on parades and other festivities around Mardi Gras. 
49. The Maple Leaf is a local bar a music venue. 
50. “Through Hell and High Water: Katrina’s First Responders Oral History Project” Collection, 
Williams Research Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection. 
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wanted to stay due to his experiences with other storms, such as 1999’s Hurricane Floyd. 
However, he ended up evacuating due to his friends. As he explained: 
 
I just moved here a couple of months beforehand for grad school and it was a 
couple of weeks or a month after Katrina...so Katrina was still on everyone’s 
mind...Well, everybody started to panic, it was like oh let’s evacuate, everybody’s 
got to evacuate. And the mayor went on TV and was like don’t evacuate unless 
you think you should. And then everybody said well that means we should 
evacuate because we don’t want to be underwater like in Katrina. But I didn’t 
want to evacuate at first because I had been through like four or five hurricanes 
that year already in Florida and in Florida it’s just like something that 
happens...So at first I was like that’s ridiculous just because with Katrina doesn’t 
mean Rita’s going to be anything like it. So I didn’t want to evacuate but then all 
my friends, everybody I knew...they were like we’re going to evacuate and I was 
like well maybe if I evacuate it will be fun. 
 
Glenn Z.’s comment ties in several threads of the discussion thus far. His initial response 
was to stay in place due to the “four or five” other storms he had dealt with in Florida. 
His friends, many of whom were also incoming graduate students who were new to the 
area and to the threat of hurricanes, were instead focused on concerns stemming from 
Katrina. Glenn ended up more influenced by all of his friends leaving and the importance 
of a social network in a new place, an immediate concern to him, than by his own 
experiences, and he chose to evacuate the area. Ironically, Glenn Z.’s evacuation attempt 
did not succeed due to traffic and car troubles, and he eventually returned to his Houston 
apartment and was there through Rita.  
 Other people can influence the decisions made by residents. Returning to Sharan 
Z., she recounted being in Houston the Wednesday before Ike because she had a day off. 
Her employee, Paul, called her from the shop about the storm coming. Sharan had told 
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him that they would take a wait-and-see approach to the storm. Paul, however, told her 
about information he had gathered from another shop employee. Sharan explained 
 
We had a part-time employee who was big into sailing ships, little boats you 
know. And he had all these sailing websites that kept talking about the storm 
surge. So he came in, he was in downtown Galveston to get some supplies, and he 
comes running in the shop and says, “Paul, you’ve got to evacuate. This is going 
to be horrible. It’s going to have a horrible storm surge even though it’s only a 
Category 2”... And most of us in Galveston, we didn’t even really understand 
what a storm surge was...All you think of with a hurricane is the wind. So, and 
you know, there was a Category 1 that hit near the end of [Galveston] Island and 
we had a blackout for about an hour or two and that was it...We didn’t even have 
a big rain event. So, you know, Category 1 is to us, here, is no big deal. Category 
2, it’s like “OK. It’s a Category 2, we can live with that.” But, you know, because 
we are behind the seawall. We’re not out in the west end and we’re pretty far 
away from the ocean... So, Paul called me up and said, “Sharan, [the part-time 
employee] knows what he’s talking about. We’ve got to leave right away.” I said, 
“OK.” I thought, “Alright, so we’ll evacuate again. What the heck, you know.” 
 
Sharan’s comments point to the employee’s expertise as influential in the decision to 
prepare the store in Galveston, even though her gut still told her that it would probably be 
a needless preparation process. She returned to the shop and boarded it up using specially 
designed boards for the windows. She and her employee also moved some books to other 
locations. They then headed north to Houston the next day to try to avoid the experience 
they had when evacuating ahead of Rita. 
 In addition, people make their decisions based upon the ability of family members 
to evacuate. In a few cases in the narratives I looked at, decisions were made due to 
medical constraints of family members. In Joel R.’s case, she was tied to New Orleans 
before Katrina due to a family member’s hospitalization.  Her family knew they wanted 
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to do something because “...the storm had such a magnitude”51. However, given that her 
daughter had had a premature baby the week before the storm and the baby was still in a 
hospital in the area, her family evacuated to a downtown hotel. As she commented,  
 
... [W]e did that, instead of leaving, because we thought, you know, usually a 
hurricane would be two or three days and, you could go back to, you can get back 
in and things like that...So, we thought that we would be close to downtown, 
because Touro
52
 wouldn’t be too far away and after the storm passed, we could 
get my daughter back to [the hospital] to take care of and see her newborn baby.
53
  
 
Medical and family reasons can override the official calls to action.  Similarly, Slidell 
resident Adam F. noted family medical reasons as part of his decision not to evacuate: “I 
guess being hardheaded would be one [reason for not evacuating]. That’s most people’s 
excuse. I had a family member, my sister’s husband, who was in the hospital. He had an 
aneurism a few weeks before the storm and the initial plan was to...scoop him up [and 
take him to the downtown hotel where Adam F. worked as a manager]”54. The need to 
help with an infirm family member tied him and his father to the area, but, he also notes 
his own attitude fed into the decision, a decision that caused his mother to be “balling 
[sic] crying” before she evacuated. Turning to a different storm, in the case of Michael 
M., the hobbyist tracker mentioned earlier, he remained in Houston for Rita due to his 
wife Yvonne’s surgery keeping her under medical care after her hospital stay. (Before 
                                                          
51. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
52. Touro is a New Orleans hospital.  
53. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
54. “Writing Katrina” Collection, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans. 
164 
Ike, Mike also noted that Yvonne was seven-and-a-half to eight months pregnant with 
their second child, so she was not very mobile if they had wanted to evacuate. Their 
choice for Ike, though, was to stay at home.) In cases such as these, family and friends 
can have a significant impact on the decision to stay or go. However, it is worth noting 
that some residents made decisions that did not agree with those of friends and family, so 
the influence of others is not an absolute one.  
 
 
Preparing Resources 
 
 Regardless of whether residents stay or leave before a hurricane, they are faced 
with the need to gather supplies and other preparation activities. The matter of what 
materials to gather in preparation for a hurricane has variability within the lives of 
residents whose narratives I considered. Christine M., a New Orleans resident who 
remained for Katrina, did the following to prepare for the storm: 
 
I had gone to the grocery Saturday morning [August 27] because even if the 
hurricane would not have hit us directly, I figured we were going to lose 
electricity, so I went to the grocery, got food that could be cooked on the 
grill...and of course bought a bunch of beer [laughs]...and, you know, munchie 
food, [of course] water, dog food because we have two dogs and two cats at the 
time...batteries, flashlights, the usual hurricane stuff...both cars were gassed up [in 
case of flooding]...we have tools, if we had to climb on the roof...
55
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Many of these items are similar to those recommended via media communications, with 
some variations. Notable additions include the beer—an indication of some levity in the 
preparations—and the tools for getting onto the roof in case of flooding. The tools reflect 
the potential (and real) danger of becoming trapped in a house if flood waters rise too 
high for the structure.  
 Ronald F.
56
, recalled gathering supplies in the days before Rita. He noted that they 
“got as much material as we felt was appropriate in terms of water and food and other 
products, stockpiled. Batteries and the like. And we have an interior closet on the first 
floor in our story and a half home that we periodically clean out for hurricane situations 
or tornado situations, as it’s the most interior closet that we have so that was ready.” 
Carolyn F. also described this safe room under the stairs, and that she gathered supplies 
for comfort in a place in the house thought safe from high winds. In contrast, she 
discussed how she did not do much for Ike, a storm that affected them more than Rita. 
She commented that she made ice in preparation, but that ultimately she said that was a 
“stupid idea that ice was going to help me” as it only lasted so long after the power 
outage they had for Ike, which lasted over ten days. The contrast between the 
preparations for the two storms highlights how preparation perspective can shift over 
time.  
                                                          
56. As noted in an earlier footnote, Ronald F. is my father. Until retirement, he was the sole wage-
earner for my family. Rita is especially significant to him and to my family, in part, because he was laid off 
from the company (where he had worked for fifteen years) on the day of Rita's anticipated landfall. In this 
way, he had to worry about the loss of his livelihood and about the potential loss of his family's property at 
the same time. 
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 The frame of individual reference, too, can affect what is gathered. Houston-area 
resident Kathryn P., for instance, noted differing styles between her and her husband. She 
evacuated for Hurricane Rita and recounted the following about her preparation: 
 
I just remember running around and grabbing photos and mostly thinking, “OK, I 
can buy new clothes but, you know, these photos are going to be—any writing 
that I had that I didn’t have backed up, you know, like I had some old writings 
from when I was in high school that I have never put on computer. I grabbed 
those, of course. And one thing that Rita taught me was to keep—I realized that I 
hadn’t really thought about that before so I hadn’t really gathered, I didn’t really 
know where all the important stuff was and so when Ike came through I was 
much more prepared in terms of what I am taking and where is it, so I could really 
find it. But, you know, that was a weird thing... I had always wondered “What 
would I take in a situation like that?...It’s like when you are in a situation like 
that, it’s—it wasn’t so different from how I had imagined it but it was somewhat 
different... 
 
To the date that I interviewed her, Kathryn P. still kept some of the stuff that she packed 
in her trunk. She guesses she “is still paranoid [she] might actually have to do it again.” 
Some of the items she keeps in her preparation kit include a favor from her wedding, 
pictures not on computer, albums, and journals from a trip to London. Kathryn P.’s 
construction of preparation is more dependent on emotional importance than physical 
importance, and few of the items she listed in her description of preparation are similar to 
those appearing in official lists. In contrast, her husband focused on clothes, laptops, and 
the family cats (as she put it: “so much more practical than I am”). Their preparations 
became an act of compromise and negotiation as materials were added to the evacuation 
vehicles and then removed due to lack of space. They disagreed over her taking student 
papers, some old and some current, as she felt responsible as a teacher for student work. 
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She did end up taking some student work with her. They removed items such as extra 
clothes (winter clothes, sweatshirts) and cat toys, as there was only so much room to 
pack. This kind of supply gathering looks very different from the clean-seeming 
checklists provided through official channels, but it also illustrates the impact of the 
personal on preparation.  
This example helps to illustrate the differences between collecting items for 
physical survival and collecting items for identity preservation, and that, in situations 
such as hurricane preparation, different individuals in communities place different value 
on the physical objects they gather. As sociologist Ian Woodward writes about thinking 
about material culture:  
 
There are two principal paradigms—which should not form mutually exclusive, or 
antagonistic, analytic frameworks—for the interpretation of consumer objects: 
one based in semiotics, which emphasizes the ability of objects to represent or 
signify something in social discourse; the other in cultural anthropology, which 
focuses on what people do with objects and the ways in which the objects are 
culturally embedded in social relations. (2001, 118) 
 
 
In this way, objects collected for a storm can be signs of practicality and preparedness, as 
well as consumables that help for survival. In addition, they are objects embedded in the 
context of the person collecting them, and thereby have particular social meanings to the 
individual. Here, Kathryn P. and her husband have differing relationships to the objects 
they collect in order to prepare for the oncoming storm, and, as they are evacuating 
together, they must compromise on what to take with them. On one hand, Kathryn P.’s 
description of her husband as being more practical than she is speaks to the concept of 
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proper preparation. On the other, Kathryn P.’s objects speak to the importance, for some, 
of saving items that represent one’s self and its relationship to the social world. In her 
discussion of material culture and identity, marketing scholar Marsha L. Richins 
discusses the difference between the public and private meanings of objects. To Richins, 
public meanings are assigned by people who do not possess the object, formed by shared 
social understandings of the object. Private meanings “…are the sum of the subjective 
meanings that an object holds for a particular individual” (Richins 1994, 506). However, 
these meanings are not completely separate from one another as clean-cut categories. In 
this way, the public and private meanings can both come into play in how an individual 
regards an object. Kathryn P. is aware of objects that have the public meaning of being 
prepared, but also she understands the private meanings of some of the objects she 
collects while preparing. What is useful to consider here, then, is that the connection of 
an object to a person’s self can influence the value that the individual places on it and the 
importance that object can take on when someone considers issues of evacuation and 
preparation. This connection may not be clear to an outsider—someone seeing a wedding 
favor among objects in a hurricane preparation kit might consider its inclusion an 
inefficient use of space—but the connection can be strong to the person doing the 
preparation. 
 Not all supply gathering looked like Kathryn P.’s. Houston-area resident Tamara 
F. noted how preparing for Rita “...served us very well for Ike.” It had taken her family 
about two days to prepare for Rita, so when Ike became a threat, they already had 
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plywood, canned food, and emergency supplies all in one place. She commented, “We 
knew pretty much what we needed to do.” As soon as the media started reporting on Ike, 
they bought what they did not have enough of three days out, including canned juices and 
food. They also withdrew cash, bought gas (not to evacuate, but to have in the car), and 
gathered emergency supplies, such as batteries for their radio, television, and flashlights. 
As a mentor to teaching assistants at a local university, she also communicated with 
them, as many of the teaching assistants had never been though a hurricane before. She 
advised them to get food, water, cash, and gas and to stay at home. In contrast to Kathryn 
P., Tamara F.’s description of how to prepare looks much more like the ideal goal 
promoted by media (but often missing in their stories). 
 Brett C. also highlighted some positive aspects of preparation. He described 
gathering items before Rita, focusing mainly on important documents and paperwork. He 
explained that 
 
We didn’t really prepare a whole lot other than I remember, you know, we have a 
whole file cabinet, you know, they told everybody you know on as far as TV, the 
news, and so forth to give advice about what you should do in the event of 
needing to evacuate, what you should bring or what’s important or what’s not 
important. So, you know, a lot of it was dependent upon your situation, of course, 
you know...One of the first things everybody thinks about is like pictures and 
things that are valuable and memories and so forth that are irreplaceable. But, you 
know, for us, we didn’t really have like bunches of photo albums like my parents 
had and probably your parents have, that generation before the digital age of, you 
know, digital cameras and so forth. All of our stuff is on, you know, [an online 
photo service], so we didn’t have to worry about packing that stuff up, but we did 
still have a few little things. But I had a little portable...10X12 plastic file cabinet 
thing. I just loaded it up with all our important insurance information, you know, 
birth certificates, I think we had some resumes and stuff in there...Just all the 
important documents that we could think that we might need and could fit in a 
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decent size portable file, plastic file cabinet box that we had...Other than that, just 
the clothes on our back and a few changes of clothes and that was pretty much 
it...It was kind of one of those we’d never really thought about it until it actually 
happened of what we’d actually take with us, but it was probably a good exercise 
for us in determining what was really important and valuable to us that, you 
know, we needed. And I was actually pretty pleased that we actually gathered it 
all in one little box [laughs]. It just kind of makes you stop and think “Why do we 
have all this other crap?” If we had to flee for our lives, what would we take? And 
it all fits in one little box. 
 
Brett’s preparation, although it was something they had not thought about before Rita, 
reflected a methodical gathering of resources, partially based on media recommendations 
and partially based on their own personal situation.  
 Other residents had variations on what to gather for Ike. Glenn Z. explained that 
he filled up containers with tap water in his home, posing the question “Why can’t I just 
fill up my containers with tap water?” He had food in the apartment, but this food was not 
bought for the storm. He felt they had enough canned goods that he and his girlfriend 
would not starve for a few weeks, so he was not concerned. K.C. G. commented that she 
usually has a good supply of water on hand, so she was not worried about getting more. 
She also explained that she had been “trained well” by her ex-husband and had prepared 
with a flashlight and a radio. Vicki B. noted how she and her husband cut plywood for 
their windows. They also filled five-gallon cat litter pails with water
57
 and gathered 
                                                          
57. Glenn Z.’s reaction against purchasing and Vicki B.’s water collection could point towards another 
master narrative at play in addition to the one discussed later in this chapter—a pro-capitalist one that 
prioritizes the purchase of product in order to be properly prepared. In choosing to circumvent the buying 
process by using their own containers, these residents could be countering that narrative. 
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propane for the outdoor cooker and batteries. She commented that they did as much as 
they could to be sensible about it. 
 
Concern over Resources: Looting and Protection of Property 
 In a few of the interviews that I conducted, the concern over the protection of 
property surfaced. Looting in the wake of Hurricane Katrina was a topic widely covered 
by media outlets, and it is a concept that is considered in several academic publications 
and presentations (e.g., Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006; Miles 2007; Priesmeyer 
2010; Goldstein 2011). After Katrina, stories of looting and unruliness were rampant, and 
the media helped to disseminate stories of looting, particularly in the heavily flooded 
New Orleans area. For example, news stories with the titles such as “Looters Take 
Advantage of New Orleans Mess,” “New Orleans Mayor Orders Looting Crackdown,” 
and “New Orleans Police Officers Kill Looters in Bridge Shoot-Out” splashed across 
media outlets. With the influx of people escaping Katrina coming to Houston, stories of 
increased crime in Houston also circulated (Fugarino 2011).  
In preparation for Hurricane Rita, some residents were concerned about looting 
occurring in their own area. K.C. G. took several pictures after Rita of places in the 
suburb of Spring. One of the pictures she took was of a jewelry and loan store in a strip 
center that was boarded up in preparation for the storm. In large, black spray painted 
letters, someone had painted “Looterers will be shot!” with a hand-painted target next to 
the statement (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. A storefront in Spring, Texas. Photo courtesy of K.C. G. 
 
Even though Spring is well out of the downtown Houston area, and was well out of the 
storm surge threat area, the concern for the social problems that were described in the 
wake of Katrina were manifested in the preparation for Hurricane Rita. The “truth” of 
how people would behave after a potentially damaging hurricane carried weight, even 
though the reports of looting post-Katrina have been discussed as being racially biased 
and misrepresented. As Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski note, the reports serve to record 
“volumes of information on what the media and public officials believed and 
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communicated about looting in New Orleans…[T]hese reports characterized post-Katrina 
looting as very widespread, wanton, irrational, and accompanied by violence. Moreover, 
the media confined their reporting to the putative lawless behavior of certain categories 
and types of people…to the exclusion of other behaviors in which these disaster victims 
may have engaged during the disaster, producing a profile of looters and looting groups 
that overlooked whatever prosocial, altruistic behaviors such groups might have 
undertaken” (2006, 66). The message was sent that looting comes out of major hurricane 
events—and was received and applied by people in a different context. In response to this 
concern, part of the Spring store owner’s preparation activities was to send a message to 
potential looters in order to protect his or her store and the property inside of it. 
 Another Houston-area resident, “Cindy,” listed the items packed before she left 
her apartment for the last time before going to work, where she was going to stay for the 
duration of Rita
58
. She described packing a variety of materials: documents, dog supplies, 
and food and water. She included several items that she felt had important sentimental 
value, but she also included a weapon with her items. As Cindy explained, “I grabbed my 
gun because after Katrina I didn’t know what to expect.” Unlike the “looterers” sign that 
proclaimed a kind of certainty that the concerns of Katrina would become relevant to 
Rita, Cindy’s comment rides the fence a bit. The possibility of threat is credible enough 
to warrant action in her case; the stories believable enough to justify carrying a weapon. 
                                                          
58. Cindy is a pseudonym. 
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 Another story that reflected the mistrust of people surfaced in my interview with 
Joe M. Joe left Houston before Rita as part of a car caravan with his parents. After telling 
me the story of their evacuation, Joe noted that he had another story to add, and it was 
one of his parents’ experience in a town in East Texas, when he was no longer with them. 
He recounted the following narrative: 
 
But there is an interesting side story. Obviously gas was very scarce during [the 
storm] and at one point my parents went to go get—they went to get gas and they 
pulled in at East Texas. Here’s the thing to realize is that this was off in the 
country like off in East Texas country, so they found this little gas station. And 
they found a place to get some gas. And this was after I left. But they found a 
place to get gas. There were these two guys out there with shotguns that were 
keeping order and making sure the place stayed orderly. Making sure people kept 
their place in line. And that was how things were maintained at that store. Yeah, 
that was how martial law was declared at that little store. And if you wanted your 
gas just don’t get out of line. It wasn’t threatening, they said it wasn’t threatening, 
it wasn’t –no one was held at gun point, but it was just to let it be known that no 
one was going to get out of line, no one was to—that there was not going to be 
any uproar, any kind of fighting at this gas station. So I thought that was 
interesting. 
 
The behavior Joe describes here was echoed in his comments afterward about his general 
impression of the social situation surrounding Rita. As he put it, “It was very, I saw a 
different side of people during that experience. It was very, if you want to call it, for lack 
of a better term, like ‘post-apocalyptic.’ It was very, um, you really saw what happens 
when things break down and when people kind of had to fend for themselves.” He went 
on to talk about how he did not see a lot of altruistic, or, as he put it, “oh we’re one big 
family, let’s have a BBQ on the freeway” behavior. 
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 In these ways, a sense of protection over resources and safety surfaced in some 
stories about the days before Rita. Interestingly, this concern did not crop up in Ike 
stories in my collection of interviews, which might be attributed to the debunking of 
media coverage of looting after Katrina or due to a lack of looting reports post-Rita. 
However, this is not to say that this concern did not surface for any residents in 
relationship to Ike. In my own article (2011) about online comments post-Ike, several 
commenters discussed the issue of effective law and order response, one even discussing 
being part of a roadblock north of Houston that protected his neighborhood from anyone 
who should not be there. 
 
Evaluation of Preparation: Preparer’s Remorse 
 While looking at several hurricane narratives, another aspect of the discussion of 
preparation that emerged was the presence of evaluative comments that were woven into 
some interviews. In these cases, it was not evaluation of the media information, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, which was notable. Instead it was the evaluation of one’s 
own preparation response that was interesting. In making evaluative comments regarding 
their actions, narrators assign value and significance to them. (It would be possible to tell 
the story and mention these actions without the evaluation.) Some residents, such as 
Tamara F., noted the positive aspects of her preparation. She noted that her and her 
family’s experiences with Rita prepared them well for Ike, leaving them with little to do 
to prepare. However, most of the evaluative comments that jumped out during my 
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research were the more critical ones. Two examples of this negative evaluation were 
(emphases are mine): 
 
 Vicki B.: In discussing her preparation and evacuation before Rita, she 
commented that “Well, we evacuated for Rita because, because it was stupid. It 
was stupid.” 
 Carolyn F.: During her preparation before Ike, one of the activities she did was 
make extra ice in the freezer. While discussing this, she comments that it was a 
“stupid idea that ice was going to help me.” As previously noted, she added that 
the ice did not last the ten days that their power was out after the storm. 
 
Considering these comments together, I began to think of them as examples of 
“preparer’s remorse.” When the preparation activities do not match the effects of the 
storm, either by being too much for little effects or too little for greater effects, in 
retrospect an individual may chide themselves for taking certain actions. These actions 
are often ones that may have been recommended to them to take by officials or often part 
of official response. Taking Vicki B.’s example, she lived in an area urged to evacuate. 
Considering Carolyn F.’s issue with making ice, ice is frequently provided by relief 
sources after a storm, so it is not irrational to think to produce it beforehand. However, in 
preparer’s remorse, the narrator places blame on him or herself for seeming to make a 
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bad judgment call or for losing appropriate perspective when they “should” have known 
better.  
 Borrowing from Labov’s narrative structure, preparer’s remorse comments feed 
into the evaluation of the narrative. They serve to tell some of the “so what?” of the story 
of a particular storm, to help to show “what the narrator is getting at” (Labov 1972, 366). 
In the case of preparer’s remorse in Rita narratives, it feeds into the sense of over-
response for a storm that seemed to do very little, while in Ike narratives, it feeds into the 
sense of not being able to do enough or not being able to predict what could have been 
done (such as when Carolyn F. describes the ten-day to three- or four-week power outage 
in the area as being “inconceivable”).  An undercurrent that runs beneath this idea is one 
of control. Even though they took recommended actions or seemed to align with official 
instructions, these narrators attribute fault to their actions inwardly (at least in part), as 
opposed to focusing blame on being told to do things that were not helpful. This internal 
placement of control and blame gives weight to the value of lay judgment in that the 
narrator can find flaw with their own action and, potentially, change it when faced with a 
different storm threat. Vicki B.’s critique of her evacuation choice, for example, made her 
determined to stay for Ike. The active critiquing of one’s own actions, therefore, plays 
into other actions. Preparer’s remorse can be an influencing factor, and, in this way, story 
can communicate experience and may inform action. The experience is formative as is 
the evaluative aspects of the narrative retelling of that experience. In this way, narratives 
can act as cultural scripts, providing a way in which “individuals are able to both give 
178 
expression to an experience which is intensely personal and at the same time (or, as part 
of the same process) give a culturally informed meaning to their experience” (Mattingly 
1998, 14). Through narrating their experience, these individuals make sense of the 
choices they have made. 
 A different version of this concept seemed to come into play in other stories. 
When Brett C. described his Ike preparation, he said his family did “pretty much nothing” 
before laughing. He continued, “We got together with some friends and just visited with 
them. Had a time and as far as our family goes, we didn’t really do anything.” Even 
though he explains that he was not sure he would have done much differently, except 
board up the windows, the laughter around putting in no real preparation action seems to 
critique the action a bit by poking fun at it.  
 
  
Complexities in Residential Response 
 
 As evidenced in the examples from this chapter, residential preparation and 
response to storm threats are complex in ways not communicated in media portrayals, in 
part due to the unique nature of individual experience and situations. Sharan Z.’s 
comment highlights some of these complexities: 
 
Each time you’re like—because after Rita, we were like, we should have left at 
night. And we should have left at like two or three in the morning and driven an 
hour to Houston, you know. This time, it was—so that was on our mind. The next 
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hurricane that comes we’ll be scurrying around putting our expensive books in 
our storage area, or at least up on our balcony area [they had massive losses due 
to high water in the shop from Ike]. And, you know, every hurricane leaves you 
with different priorities, but, you know, each hurricane is so different that you 
don’t know how to plan for it. 
 
In other words, hurricanes are different; priorities change; and individuals differ in the 
experiences they bring to every storm threat. As discussed above, these lay concerns can 
include choosing the best evacuation approaches, securing business and personal 
property, not wasting effort or financial resources, protecting self and family from 
perceived threats (including those beyond the storm), and choosing the “right” things to 
gather for living and for memory. 
 
 
Master Narrative, Narrative Entitlement, and Hurricane Preparation 
 
 In Chapters Three and Four, I laid out traits in media narratives and residential 
narratives about hurricane preparation. Discussing them side-by-side facilitates thinking 
about how these two kinds of narratives interact. Officials and residents use many of the 
same conventions to construct preparation, but how they do it differs, creating complexity 
and tension. Using the concepts of master narrative and entitlement, both introduced in 
Chapter One, provides a framework for thinking about these interactions. From this 
discussion, I will draw forth some recommendations as to how this discussion can inform 
future preparation in the next chapter.  
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Master Narrative and the Narrative of Pre-Victimization 
As discussed in Chapter One, master narratives (or metanarratives) are totalizing 
narratives that serve to create order to social life and to legitimize that kind of order. As 
Lyotard comments, “The decision makers…attempt to manage these clouds of sociality 
according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements 
are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They allocate our lives for the 
growth of power” (1979, xxiv). In doing so, the master narrative can create a “truth” that 
disallows or disregards the heterogeneity of human experience, if that truth is not 
destabilized. 
Elaine Lawless notes in “Transforming the Master Narrative” that  
 
Lyotard points out that until we recognize that there is a master narrative in place 
and that we have all been participants in the structuring and application of that 
master narrative can we call it into question, examine it, and ask ourselves 
whether or not we want to change it. Until this recognizing moment, he claims, 
the master narrative has been acting invisibly. (2003, 61)  
 
 
In this way, we must try to identify master narratives at work before we can (if desired) 
attempt to change how they work or whether to shift the narrative. Although “hurricane 
preparation” may not seem as overt a master narrative as the cycle of violence from 
Lawless’s work or the “welfare mother,” “college student,” or “housing project resident” 
identified in Julian Rappaport’s discussion of dominant cultural narratives (1995, 803), 
the media-communicated messages of preparation seem to provide concepts that are 
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culturally familiar to those within the audience. These concepts, described in Chapter 
Three, include: 
 
1. The idea that to be prepared, residents should listen to the media and follow 
instructions and checklists.  
 
2. The idea that, generally, residents seem scattered, with many choosing not to 
follow actions well, leading to panic or poor decision making. 
 
3. The idea that official sources, although potentially fallible, are the best to 
listen to and to follow. 
 
Traits such as these seem to coalesce into a “narrative of pre-victimization” surrounding 
hurricane preparation. In this narrative, residents are placed within a narrative space in 
which they are quite possibly doomed. In this space, residents are set between following 
instructions provided by official sources and being on their own, outside the circle of 
official protection. Further, as pointed out in Chapter Three, residents are urged to use 
“common sense,” which is often aligned with following ideal direction, as opposed to lay 
knowledge. The narrative of pre-victimization is also conveyed in the emphasis on last-
minute preparation. Amidst the frenzy at stores and the gridlock on the road, the imagery 
described points to a sense of being endangered, even while attempting preparation and 
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agency. In these ways, residents trying to be safe already seem dangerously close to being 
too late—to protect their homes, to gather supplies, or to head to safer locations. 
Residential voice is used within these media stories to bolster the narrative of pre-
victimization. By using these “sound bites,” the lay voice supports the more monolithic 
master narrative. In Chapter Three, examples of lay voice seemed to support portrayals of 
residents as resigned, panicky, misguidedly hopeful with their deviant plans, or aligned to 
official recommendations (and, therefore, more seemingly reasonable). Additionally, the 
names of past storms are frequently evoked to remind residents of damage and danger, 
not always to connect with preparedness. The emphasis falls in the disastrous aftermath 
more than successful danger mitigation through ample preparation. When residents seem 
to use past storms as rationales for not following orders, this is often set beside concerns 
of those around them or in the light of being hardheaded. A particularly vivid example of 
this discussed previously was the “stubborn old man” (self-described) who would only 
evacuate for Ike if Jesus Christ told him to, even if his wife was less certain. This 
situation is similar to the one Bonnie O’Connor describes in her discussion of patient 
compliance to medical advice. She comments that compliance is often considered a “one-
way street” in which the patient should receive and follow the orders of health 
professionals (O’Connor 1994, 173). Within this conceptualization of compliance, the 
patient who is non-compliant is characterized as “deviant, uncooperative, negligent, 
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stubborn, ignorant, unreliable, or at the very least in default” (O’Connor 1994, 174)59.  A 
similar characterization of residents who do not prepare as determined by official 
recommendations seems to be at play in the narrative of pre-victimization. 
These dimensions of the narrative of pre-victimization have potential negative 
impact on how residents respond. Instead of inspiring action, residents can be more 
inspired to take a stance of helplessness or to shut down or become distressed. A tension 
between the official and the lay can be felt in Carolyn F.’s comments: 
 
I think to be aware that something is coming, to be given reasonable things you 
can do, because aside from evacuating, OK, about all you can do is make sure that 
you have batteries, canned food, and I can't think of much else that's literally 
going to help you get through anything. And propane if you happen to have any 
camp stoves or propane grills. But I mean aside from that, what can you do? You 
can't shield your house from high winds. You can't stop flooding. Now, actually 
speaking, if they actually could tell you that there is going to be flooding in your 
area, something that they do not seem able to do, you could maybe sand bag, but I 
doubt it in most cases, so aside from saying, "OK, we have this storm and, you 
know, take your necessary precautions and we'll give you updates on where it is,” 
but they don't need to hype it, I don't think, as much. 
 
 
Although she is critical of the media communications about storms, she also 
communicates a kind of limited agency in what can be done to prepare. In this sense, her 
“what can you do?” question could be applied to both the lay and official side. However, 
many residential narratives seem to play with the master narrative. The lay responses are 
more nuanced. As opposed to the “official” as serving as main authority for decision 
                                                          
59. O’Connor argues that this conceptualization of compliance ignores the agency of the patient and 
that they “…make treatment choices based on an enormous complex of independent variables” (1994, 174).  
This observation parallels those of this discussion of hurricane preparation. 
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making, the lay perspective weaves together authority from a variety of sources, weighted 
alongside other perspectives—past experiences, family experiences, community 
experiences, and the like. That information is taken into consideration: sometimes 
utilized, sometimes modified, and sometimes ignored. Taking into consideration Mary 
Douglas’s definition of risk as “the probability of an event combined with the magnitude 
of the losses and gains that it will entail” (1992, 40), it seems that many variables are 
used to determine probabilities and magnitudes that go beyond simply looking at the 
storm data. Some risk perception research tends to portray lay people as being ill-
informed or irrational in their ability to assess risk, although more recent research in the 
field has pointed toward a more flattering image of the lay population. As Nick Pidgeon 
and Robin Gregory write, “…it appears that rather than being inevitably biased, or ill-
informed, public risk perceptions exhibit a rationality that may be sensitive to factors 
sometimes ignored in expert analyses” (2004, 610). From a folkloric perspective, 
thinking of the lay person as able to make informed decisions, even when the information 
used to determine them might differ from that used by the “expert” population, is not 
difficult.  The complexity in the process bolsters the need to understand the localized 
factors that determine risk perception. As Diane Goldstein writes in Once upon a Virus, 
“...understanding attitudes towards susceptibility is dependent on understanding the 
variety of cultural issues and influences that constitute risk for the communities and 
individuals in question” (2004, 67, emphasis in original). Granted, Goldstein is 
discussing risk perception within the context of AIDS, but the comment is still relevant in 
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this discussion. We need to understand how these factors are weighed on a local—be it a 
community, a family, or an individual—level. 
With the weighting of a variety of authoritative (in this sense, meaningful) 
information, also comes the variety of priorities that come into play when residents 
consider what it is like to be “safe” and prepared. One example that surfaced in the wake 
of Hurricane Katrina was the priority people had of ensuring that their pets were taken 
care of, sometimes causing risks to themselves to include this family member in their 
plans and sometimes resulting in the difficult decision to leave pets behind. The interest 
in stories of people and their animals brought about several books in the years after 
Katrina, including Cathy Scott’s Pawprints of Katrina: Pets Saved and Lessons Learned 
(2008). This priority placed on animals also surfaced in some of the narratives considered 
in this project, with several residents discussing the impact of pets on their evacuation 
plans, including Kathryn P., Sharan Z., and Glenn Z. In Glenn Z.’s case, for example, his 
evacuation attempt for Hurricane Rita was, in part, ended due to sickly pets in the car. 
However, this priority is not one that can be universally emphasized. In her own 
experiences evacuating for Katrina, Stacy C. had to leave the family cat behind. This 
interest in pet preservation is worth noting because, due to public interest and support of 
people and organizations assisting animals post-Katrina, official changes such as the 
2006 Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards (PETS) Act, have occurred. The 
federal PETS Act mandates that local and state governments include pets in their 
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evacuation plans, as well as federal funding for some shelters (Scott 2008, 229-230). This 
act is an example of a lay issue being addressed at the official level. 
 Livelihood priorities can also factor in, whether it is businesses or material items 
deemed necessary for survival. Earlier in this chapter, Sharan Z. had to weigh issues 
dealing with her bookstore in her plans for hurricane preparation. In Chapter Three, the 
woman who comments that she might as well go with her home, as it is everything she 
has, stands out as an extreme example of this kind of prioritization. The familiar 
comment about lives being more important than possessions is one that is referenced 
frequently in the days before a hurricane, but the value of recognizing the varying weight 
that can be placed on physical spaces and items can influence the choices individuals 
make in the preparation process. Fundamentally, looking at lay perspectives of 
preparation highlights how complicated hurricane preparedness is. The concept of 
preparation with residents is often tailored to the specific contexts of the individuals 
involved. This context-dependence forms some of the difference between the official and 
lay approaches in grappling with hurricane preparation. Official authority is often both 
heeded and questioned, met with a mixture of cooperation and resistance.  
 
Narrative Entitlement in This Context 
The simultaneous actions of cooperation and resistance between official and lay 
perspectives bring to light issues of narrative entitlement. By utilizing residential voices 
in support of the official narration, the media takes control of the representation of 
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residential experience. In this way, the characterizations of residents discussed in Chapter 
Three are created and then “given life” by the residents’ own voices. In this sense, the 
power in telling the story is controlled by the media, not by the residents themselves. By 
cherry-picking residential quotes, the news media—intentionally or not—reduces 
individuals’ entitlement to valid experience and narration of that experience through the 
larger media packaging. This packaging reinforces the characterization of pre-storm 
situations, much of which plays into the aforementioned narrative of pre-victimization. 
This pre-storm narrative also opens the door for an easy acceptance of the kinds of post-
storm narratives discussed in other literature, such as those of looting and lawlessness 
(noted in pieces such as Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006). These post-storm 
narratives frequently contradict evidence of “proactive and prosocial” behaviors of 
residents in these situations.  
Undermining lay entitlement, all the while seeming to include residential 
perspective, attempts to further mainstream the decision-making process. This 
mainstreaming is intended to serve the public good, but still warrants critical discussion. 
It is not simply that the media misrepresent these situations. This discussion does not 
propose to demonize the media and officials and to presume that their intent is not at least 
largely motivated by public safety. What appears to be at work here is a misplaced 
emphasis on certain situations, which in turn creates a gap between mainstream narrative 
and lived experience.  
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Residents resist this master narrative when they choose various approaches to 
issues of preparation that align with their lived experiences and frames of reference. In 
this way, the concept of “common sense” becomes a contentious one. When used in 
official communication, it often represents a certain alignment with governmental and 
media recommendations. From a lay perspective, however, this may not be the case. 
There is a struggle at play over who has the right to talk about what it means to be 
prepared. The actual preparation that occurs can, at times, stand as an example of when 
lay experience outweighs the preparation narrative of authorities. However, at other 
times, the result is more of a blending of narratives, a compromise. The “official” 
narrative of preparation is not simply accepted on its own because experts and authorities 
construct and disseminate it. Instead, the individual brings to these situations their past 
experiences and perceptions of risk which inform their construction of preparation. This 
seems similar to the “tension between monologic, coherent points of view and diverse 
understandings” that Shuman mentions when discussing narrative asymmetry60 (2006, 
151). In this way, gaps can form between these narratives of preparation, creating a 
situation in which, to outsiders, individuals can look woefully underprepared for a 
hurricane, even though their actions may have a rational, first-person component.  
                                                          
60. Narrative asymmetry is a term used in the work of Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps, a linguistic 
anthropologist and psychologist, respectively, who have written frequently on narrative and storytelling. 
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Chapter Five: 
Challenges to Public Safety and the Value of Narrative 
 
Taking into consideration the issues of master narrative and entitlement discussed 
in Chapter Four, a challenge emerges: to balance the need for public safety 
communication and education with the needs to allow for variation of experience and to 
avoid completely homogenizing the narrative of preparation. If issues of entitlement are 
coupled with a general distrust of news media, potential threats to public safety are 
created and propagated. As discussed in Chapter Three, alternate decision-making 
processes and outcomes are often framed as ill-conceived by official narrative. The 
aforementioned “stubborn old man” seems almost a laughable character in a serious time. 
In addition, residents are often shown as ill-prepared or scrambling last-minute to become 
prepared. On the other side of the equation, some residents, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
perceive the media as intentionally packaging the “sexy” news, more interested in ratings 
and readership than useful communication. Essentially, mistrust of the other is 
communicated by both sides. When this mistrust is inserted into a situation of 
uncertainty—as very little about a hurricane is certain in advance of its arrival—getting 
all parties to respond in concert can become even more challenging. To make headway in 
this challenge, it becomes necessary to, as Susan Ritchie comments “restor[e] difference 
as meaningful and irreducible differential” (1993, 376). In other words, it is important to 
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identify the differences and use them constructively as tools, not as obstacles to be 
eradicated. 
At the core, it seems reasonable to assume that most people involved in a 
hurricane situation do not want harm to come to lives or, if possible, to property; there is 
a common goal at play. However, the relationships between official and lay perspectives 
are complex and necessitate consideration as to how to bring these perspectives to 
recognize one another more openly. The goal is not to mandate uniformity, but to 
promote cooperation. 
Understandably, from a public safety perspective, this goal can be challenging in 
that it creates complexity in determining how to assist people before a potential disaster 
and how to communicate in ways to persuade action, but not to propagate hysteria. For 
example, in my interview with Charlie K., the Emergency Management Coordinator for 
Galveston, Texas, we discussed his experiences as both a resident and public servant 
during Hurricanes Rita and Ike. We also talked about what he anticipated the public 
would do in the future after Ike, which destroyed a large number of homes and flooded 
much of Galveston and the surrounding area. He commented: 
 
The people that didn’t evacuate this last time were people mainly behind the 
Seawall and said I’ve been here for bigger storms than a Category 2 and they 
thought it old hat. If they’d been here any time or knew the history that Category 
2 storms don’t top the seawall. And so that’s the ones that stayed. And those 
people there from talking to them, those people there are probably going to be the 
easiest to evacuate this time... But the people that evacuated either on buses or 
their private vehicles and then couldn’t get back on the island for two weeks will 
probably be the ones that we’re going to have a hard time getting rid of this time. 
So have they learned anything? No. [laughs] It’s really, and we preach it, we 
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don’t take lightly when we tell the mayor and he calls for mandatory evacuation, 
it’s not just because we haven’t got anything better to do...it’s because we’re 
trying to save lives.  
 
Also, in the course of his discussion of preparing the general public for hurricane season, 
he explained, “It’s just a battle we fight every year.” Although his comments seem to 
make light of the issues discussed here, they also point toward a desire to bridge the 
communication gaps between some of the “official” entities and the public they work to 
protect. Ultimately, the battle for public safety is a good cause, and through 
understanding local concerns and decision-making processes, what seems like a battle 
may become a more cooperative enterprise. Narrative approaches provide tools for 
understanding how preparation is constructed from multiple perspectives and how we 
may go about creating bridges between differing viewpoints. 
 
 
The Contributions of This Research to Folklore Studies 
 
 As identified in Chapter One, this thesis seeks to contribute to several areas in the 
literature that have not been yet fully addressed. For one, it extends disaster folklore 
research by considering not only hurricanes, but by considering multiple storms within its 
scope. This extension is important given the tendency of certain geographical regions to 
be subject to storm threats repeatedly over time. Additionally, it adds to the discussion 
about the interactions between media and personal narrative (building on work such as 
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Lindahl’s “Legends of Hurricane Katrina: The Right to Be Wrong, Survivor-to-Survivor 
Storytelling, and Healing”). By using media analysis, this study explored the complexity 
of the media discussion by uncovering trends in these constructed stories. By doing so, 
this approach allowed for both the official messages and lay stories to be considered 
through similar narrative lenses. 
 What is more, this discussion created space to consider preparation narratives as a 
subtype of the larger pool of personal experiences of hurricanes. By locating preparation 
narrative as an area to consider in addition to recovery narrative, this study deals with 
narrative material not strongly researched in the literature. This approach opened the way 
for applying concepts of master narrative and entitlement to a new kind of personal 
experience narrative. By doing so, I identified the “narrative of pre-victimization,” a new 
concept brought forth through my analysis. The interactions between the narrative of pre-
victimization and narratives of lay preparation provide a fruitful way of exploring the 
interplay between lay and official perspectives on preparation. At the crux of the 
discussion is a call to consider narrative as a way to understanding issues of preparation. 
In her discussion of AIDS narrative, Diane Goldstein notes the following: 
 
The existence of health legends and health narratives should indicate to those who 
are concerned about public health and who are listening to lay responses that all 
information requires placement into cultural context. Narratives provide just that. 
Through narration, health information comes to life, exploring, affirming, 
rejecting, and sometimes replacing information that is offered by powerful 
outsiders without true cultural contextualization. Narratives take truth claims and 
hegemonic constructions and make them a culture’s own (or not), twisting them 
and turning them in ways that force them to make cultural sense. (2004, 172) 
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Likewise, this thesis applies a similar approach to examine the ways in which narrative 
can be a tool for looking at differing responses to hurricane preparation.  
 Studying preparation also adds depth to the rich field of disaster folklore. Carl 
Lindahl emphasizes the need to recognize the importance of survivor narrative in 
understanding disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. As he comments, “A disaster 
survivor’s story is among her most important remaining possessions; many emerged from 
the ruins of their city with little more than their personal accounts of heroism and 
endurance” (2012, 171). The stories of the survivors are valuable to themselves, and they 
are valuable to helping in the recovery (both theirs and other survivors) after the disaster. 
As we consider the recurring threat of disaster from hurricanes in this region, we can also 
add a different angle to consider with narratives in this context. While in no way 
diminishing from the experiences of individuals identified as survivors in the works of 
Lindahl and others, we can consider that, in the act of preparation, one must acknowledge 
the possibility of the destruction of life and property. One must prepare with the hope that 
all will be well, but with the knowledge that it may not, the anticipation that one may 
need to survive destruction. This acknowledgment gives meaning to these acts of 
preparation, and it gives weight to considering these preparation narratives as worthy of 
study. 
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Limitations and Future Possibilities 
 
 As is the case of any research undertaking, there are limitations to the fieldwork 
and scope of this thesis. As my fieldwork was mainly guided by the snowball method, it 
does not offer a representative cross-section of the ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic 
diversity of these greater city regions. As such, this research does not necessarily 
generalize across all of these categories. In addition, the narratives tended to be focused 
on those of residents from the urban or suburban regions of these two greater city areas, 
so rural residents are not as well represented in the examples provided (though, Vicki B., 
for instance, is from more of a rural area). In addition, other coastal regions and storms 
were outside of the scope of the current discussion (Hurricane Sandy on the East Coast of 
the United States is a recent example). All of these areas offer valuable possibilities for 
future research. 
 
 
Caveats and Applied Recommendations 
 
In addition to contributing to the discipline’s discussion of disaster folklore and 
personal narrative, this research can also contribute beyond the realm of folklore studies. 
At this stage, however, it is also important to note that, as a folklorist, I need to recognize 
a challenge in discussing these issues. Ritchie comments that there is a danger inherent in 
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talking about issues of representation, in speaking for other people and their experiences. 
She also argues that it is not enough to point out issues of lay and master narratives. As 
she notes, “... contemporary folklorists have done a great deal to interrogate the 
appropriation of local cultures by larger master narratives... Now, though, a truly 
postmodern folklore presents a different task than the mere critique of totalizing master 
narratives: the affirmative theorization of emergent difference” (1993, 366). The 
recommendations put forth in this discussion seek to point out emerging differences 
between residents included in this project and the master narrative that surfaced in the 
media pieces reviewed. There is no claim that these lay experiences represent those of all 
residents. This echoes the sentiment expressed by sociologists Kristen Barber, Danielle 
Antoinette Hidalgo, Timothy J. Haney, Stan Weeber, Jessica W. Pardee, and Jennifer 
Day in their article, “Narrating the Storm: Storytelling as a Methodological Approach to 
Understanding Hurricane Katrina”: “Although we address various emerging themes, we 
do not claim to speak from the perspectives of all hurricane-affected residents; no work 
can do this” (2007, 105). The hope here is that the emerging differences can help to 
meaningfully inform the discussion of how to improve disaster preparedness. 
In making recommendations, this discussion recognizes residential narratives as 
resources. Borrowing from Rappaport, “The ability to tell one’s story, and to have access 
to and influence over collective stories, is a powerful resource” (1995, 802). In making 
these recommendations, the hope is to increase the pooling of narrative resources, 
allowing the media to diversify the ways in which mainstream narrative and lay narrative 
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relate to one another: instead of co-opting the residential voice in order to support the 
mainstream narrative, allowing residential voice and knowledge to help facilitate the 
communications about preparation. 
In a 2004 article on communication of weather information, David King notes the 
importance of considering the lay audience. He writes, “Different worldviews and belief 
systems at least partially influence the way in which many people interpret hazard 
information. Science cannot automatically override these beliefs and attitudes” (King 
2004, 65). King highlights challenges in knowledge of cyclone (hurricane) terminology, 
levels of risk acceptance in the audience, and perceptions of risk expectation (how 
dangerous the storm can be). Amidst these challenges, King concludes: “The basic 
message is to involve the community, prompt them to be the actors in taking information, 
and diversify the message. The warnings must remain clean and standardized, but the 
routes to understanding them must be as diverse as the people” (2004, 71). This concept 
is echoed by Larsson and Enander when they comment that “measures to increase 
people’s preparedness are more likely to be effective if they are selectively directed 
towards certain target groups” (1997, 20). In order to help facilitate preparation 
communication, the diversity of the lay audience is an important consideration. 
Central to this enterprise is the recognition of lay knowledge and expertise as part 
of the communication of preparedness. This requires an awareness and mitigation of the 
narrative of pre-victimization to shift to a narrative that embraces and puts to the fore the 
agency of residents in preparedness. As Howard F. Stein notes, “Practically speaking, 
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since all planning for ‘disaster preparedness’ is at least partially shaped by looking into 
the rearview mirror, it behooves those of us who anticipate future catastrophes to know 
how others and we look into that mirror” (2002, 157). From a media perspective, re-
treading on their own narrative is an easy touchstone, but tapping into the “other” can be 
more challenging when it diverges from the familiar narratives described here. News 
media, and the officials they facilitate communication for, need to relate preparation 
information to the public in the face of an impending hurricane as part of their service to 
the public good. However, the integration of certain approaches may assist in the impact 
of that information on the attitudes and actions of the audience. Some possible 
approaches include: 
 
 Information should be concrete and actionable. Checklists may be helpful as 
reminders to people, but if they are convoluted or outside of the reach of 
residents, the likelihood of adoption may be reduced. Consider input from 
residents to simplify or present options.  
 
 In conjunction with the above suggestion, relying on tropes related to the 
narrative of pre-victimization may turn people away from taking preparation 
action. In attempting to present dramatic stories of stripped shelves, the results 
may be to promote helplessness (Why bother?), distrust (Why listen to the 
news?), or anxiety (Why should I remain calm?). There needs to be a balance 
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struck between media storytelling and avoiding “hype.” Credibility in official 
messages is not a given in the minds of residents. Credibility here can be seen 
on two levels. One, it deals with the credibility of the information surrounding 
a hurricane, and, two, it deals with the credibility of the information sources, 
the news media outlets themselves. On one hand, the audience may deem the 
information credible and act upon it or pass it to others. On the other hand, the 
audience may also hold a noted skepticism about the bearer of the information 
and, in this way, downplay or disregard the information provided. Depending 
upon how the individual deems the information and its source, their 
perception of how to deal with the threat of a hurricane and their responses to 
media can vary widely. As Georgina Boyes comments about rumor legend 
performance, “The truth is a shifting concept, dependent on viewpoint and 
accidental presence at a place and time; a truth exists wherever it is 
perceived…” (1996, 50-51, emphasis in original). In the case here, these 
perceptions of truth, in turn, are reflected in media messages and audience 
responses. The media needs to be vigilant to strike balance in their narrative 
construction. 
 
 The media needs to be aware of the impact of long-term and short-term storm 
memory. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, the invocation of a storm’s 
name can mean many things to different people. Attention needs to be paid to 
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how historical storms are referenced in order to consider the impact of those 
references. A storm reference is not a monolithic thing. Referencing storms 
can be a very powerful thing to audience members, or not resonate at all. 
 
 Officials should consider ways to promote more images of positive lay 
preparation both during hurricane season and during the days leading up to a 
specific storm threat. They tend to do well promoting what they have done, 
whether it be governmental officials improving contraflow or different news 
outlets having improved storm tracking technologies. Partnering with lay 
people and communities to promote proactive responses may help to improve 
future preparation responses. Authority figures calling upon residents to be 
good neighbors in preparation three days before a storm threat can only do so 
much; promoting and recognizing lay preparation regularly may do more. 
These kinds of activities do exist, but more active promotion of them may 
further benefit residents and their communities. 
 
 That official sources communicate about hurricane preparation is not in question. 
As pointed out in other works, such as that by Choi and Lin (2008), messages geared 
toward preparation and risk prevention are in the media for public consumption. At the 
core of this discussion, then, is the call to spur considerations of how these 
communications can be improved in the hopes of increasing public safety. Bridging 
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official and lay perspectives seems to be one way to approach this improvement. Looking 
at hurricane experiences over time can help us learn from one another, to help one 
another, and, when the time comes, to stay safe in the face of disaster. 
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